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ABSTRACT 
 
Organisations, national governments and supranational bodies have all been active 
in formulating policy measures to regulate access to, and use of, Internet content.  
The research investigated policy responses formulated and implemented within the 
European Union, the Council of Europe, the UK government and three UK 
academic institutions during a five-year period from 1998 to 2003.  This 
investigation took place from a perspective of concern for the potential impact on 
freedom of expression and freedom of enquiry of such policy initiatives.  On a 
theoretical level, the study aimed to illuminate the process of information policy 
formulation in this area.   
 
Habermas’ ideas about the erosion of the public sphere, and the promotion of 
conditions favourable to an ‘ideal speech’ situation, were used as an analogy to the 
issues posed by the regulation of speech on the Internet.  The growth in use of the 
Internet worldwide as an informational, recreational and communications tool has 
been accompanied by a moral panic about ‘unacceptable’ Internet content.  The 
effectiveness of a range of responses that have been made to control this 
‘problematic’ medium, including the use of technical, ethical and legal constraints, 
were examined.  Freedom of expression and freedom of access to information 
were considered, both as a fundamental human right and in the context of a 
professional ethic for information professionals and academic staff and students. 
 
Policy-making by the European Union and the UK government was explored via 
longitudinal analysis of primary and secondary documentary sources; by the 
Council of Europe via a combination of documentary analysis of primary and 
secondary sources and participant observation at a policy-making forum; and at the 
organisational level via case study research at three UK Higher Education 
Institutions.  This case study research used a combination of documentary analysis 
and semi-structured interviews with relevant personnel.  Findings from the three 
case studies were triangulated via a questionnaire study carried out with student 
respondents at each of the Institutions, to explore students’ actual use, and misuse, 
of University computer networks and their attitudes towards attempts to regulate 
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this use.  The SPSS computer software package was used to analyse the data 
collected via the questionnaire study. 
 
The re-interpreted policy process model proposed by Rowlands and Turner (1997) 
and the models of direct and indirect regulation proposed by Lessig (1999) were 
used as heuristic tools with which to compare the findings of the research.  A new 
model, the reflexive spiral, was designed to illustrate the dynamic, evolving and 
bi-directional character of the policy formulation processes that were identified. 
The enquiry was exploratory in nature, allowing theories and explanations to 
emerge from the data rather than testing a pre-determined set of conclusions.   
 
The conclusion is that the democratising potential of the Internet has indeed been 
constrained by policy measures imposed at a range of levels in an attempt to 
control the perceived dangers posed by the medium.  Regulation of the Internet 
was found to be a problematic area for organisations, national governments, and 
international organisations due to its inherently ‘resistant’ architectural structure 
and its transborder reach.  Despite this, it was found that, at all levels, the Internet 
is subject to a multi-tiered governance structure that imposes an increasingly wide 
range of regulatory measures upon it.   
 
The research revealed that of the three re-interpreted policy process models, those 
of the Garbage Can and the Bureaucratic Imperative were found to be particularly 
illustrative of the policy formulation process at all levels.  The use of Lessig’s 
models of regulation (Ibid) was also found to be applicable to this area, and to be 
capable of illuminating the many forces impacting on information flow on the 
Internet.  Overall, the measures taken to control and regulate Internet content and 
access were found to have exerted a negative impact on freedom of expression and 
freedom of access to information.  
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“Give me the liberty to know, to utter and to argue freely according to 
conscience, above all liberties”. 
 
Areopagitica: For the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing 
John Milton, 1644. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with 
a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.  Through the use of Web 
pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a 
pamphleteer…The content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought. 
Reno v. ACLU 521 US 844, 870 (1997)1 
 
1.1 Aims and objectives 
 
What are governments, international organisations, institutions and society in 
general ‘doing’ about the Internet, in response to the many calls for regulation and 
control of ‘dubious’ content to be found on it, and its potential for misuse?  This 
question leads into consideration of the potential impact of such measures on 
freedom of expression, which forms the central research question of this thesis. 
The aims of the study were: 
 
1. To investigate policy measures intended to control and regulate access to 
illegal, ‘harmful’, ‘undesirable’ or ‘inappropriate’ content on the Internet.  
The investigation included measures formulated and implemented during a 
five-year period from 1998 until 2003 at national, supranational and 
organisational level.    
2. To determine what effects, if any, such measures were having on freedom 
of expression, freedom of access to information and academic freedom.   
3. From a methodological and theoretical perspective, to explore, test and 
extend existing methods and frameworks available for the analysis of 
information policy measures.  
 
 
                                            
1 US Supreme Court ruling on the Communications Decency Act.  
<http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/faclibrary/case.aspx?id=1658> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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The specific objectives of the research were:   
 
1. To monitor and analyse policy formulation over the relevant time 
period towards regulation of Internet content and access at transnational 
level by the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU).     
2. To monitor and analyse policy formulation over the relevant time 
period towards regulation of Internet content and access at national 
level by the government of the United Kingdom (UK). 
3. To learn how policy measures to regulate and monitor Internet access 
are being formulated and implemented in UK Higher Education 
Institutions through a case study approach. 
4. To evaluate the impact of these measures on Internet use at the 
institutions, particularly with regard to the freedom of academic 
enquiry. 
5. To compare and relate the findings of the policy formulation and 
implementation analyses to a range of policy models in order to explore 
and explain how the issues relating to the regulation of Internet access 
and use were framed, and solutions shaped, by the decision-making 
process. 
6. From a methodological viewpoint, to examine the usefulness of the re-
interpreted process model of policy-making suggested by Rowlands 
and Turner (1997) and the regulatory models proposed by Lessig 
(1999) as heuristic devices to explore information policy concerns. 
 
The policy monitoring at national and transnational levels was conducted primarily 
through documentary analysis, and in part through participant observation.  The 
documentary monitoring included retrospective analysis from 1996 onwards and 
extended through to the end of 2003, thus providing a longitudinal insight into 
shifts in policy emphases over the period under consideration.  Although there was 
also much pertinent legislative activity taking place in the US during this period, 
analysis of this activity warrants a major study in its own right and here only brief 
reference is made to such developments as have impacted on UK and European 
contexts.   Similarly, although there are many other aspects of information policy 
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that impact on the freedom of an individual to access information on the Internet 
(such as data protection, copyright and privacy), as well as other potential barriers 
to use such as available network infrastructure and access to computer facilities, 
the policy monitoring concentrated on policy that specifically aimed to regulate 
access to illegal, offensive or harmful Internet content.  Nevertheless, some 
discussion is made of the ‘panopticon’2 model of the Internet as this is seen as 
being central to the mechanisms of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1991 and 1997; 
Dean, 1999; Mehta and Darier, 1998) that promote the self-regulation of access to 
Internet content. 
 
Policy studies at the institutional level were conducted via case study research at 
three UK academic institutions, complemented with a questionnaire study carried 
out with student respondents at each of the case study sites.  The fieldwork for the 
academic case studies and the questionnaire study was carried out between 
October 1999 and December 2001.   
 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
 
In addition to presenting the aims and objectives of the study, this initial chapter 
outlines the rationale and theoretical framework for the research.  It provides some 
background to the development of the Internet and its relevance to freedom of 
expression and introduces the policy models that are subsequently considered in 
the discussion of the findings of the study. 
 
Chapter Two will discuss the methods adopted, and the rationale for using the 
methods in question.  The subsequent four chapters are devoted to presentation of 
the findings of the different components of the research: thus Chapter Three 
presents the results of the longitudinal policy monitoring at European Union and 
United Kingdom macro levels; Chapter Four presents a case study of policy 
                                            
2 After Jeremy Bentham’s 19th Century vision of building design for prisons, asylums and factories 
that incorporated a central surveillance facility allowing observers to view the behaviour of every 
resident whilst preserving the invisibility of the observer (Bentham in Bozovic, 1995).  
 
 4
formulation within the Council of Europe; Chapter Five describes the findings of 
the institutional case studies carried out within three UK Higher Education 
Institutions; and Chapter Six presents the results of the questionnaire study carried 
out to explore student use and misuse of university computing networks. 
 
Chapter Seven discusses these findings with particular regard to the theoretical and 
methodological implications of the findings, and their relevance to the 
development and advancement of knowledge in this area.  Any limitations 
identified in the methods adopted are also discussed here.  Chapter Eight is 
confined to discussion of the final conclusions in response to the study’s central 
question, aims and objectives, and also identifies potential areas for further work. 
 
1.3 Rationale and theoretical framework 
 
The Internet is now exerting a significant impact on global patterns of access to 
information, education, commerce and entertainment.  It has been categorised 
alternately as a neo-utopian liberating force facilitating the expression of 
alternative and dissenting speech; or a dystopian space that is responsible for an 
increased atomisation and fragmentation of modern societies.  The author’s thesis 
is that the Internet offers a forum that has the potential to repair, at least in part, the 
erosion of the public sphere identified by Habermas (1984; 1987; 1989).  
According to Habermas, this erosion has led to a reduction in the rational 
discussion of public affairs that once enabled democratic decision-making to take 
place.  With regard to the Internet, the moral panic (Cohen, 1980) that has 
characterised its portrayal by the media, the resulting high levels of public anxiety 
and the very real dangers posed by its use to perpetrate a range of criminal 
activities, have led to a range of legal and policy measures on the parts of 
international organisations, governments and organisations.  It is suggested that 
these measures are, at least in part, preventing the full democratic and 
informational potential of the Internet from being realised, and are limiting its 
effectiveness as a forum for rational debate. 
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The German thinker Jürgen Habermas devoted much attention to the conditions 
that he believed would make possible the rational discussion of public affairs and 
promote democratic decision making in order to reach the most favourable policy 
outcomes for society.  He considered that the ‘public sphere’ (Őffentlichkeit) that 
had previously been provided by the coffee houses, clubs and salons of the 
Eighteenth Century, where public discussion of the important events of the day 
could take place independent of politicians and the court, had been eroded and 
distorted.  This decline and distortion could be attributed to factors such as an 
increasing manipulation of information by the media, political ‘spin doctors’, 
technocratic ‘experts’ and commercial advertising.  The extension of the role of 
the State, and the trend towards an increasing legal regulation of private life 
(‘Verrechtlichung’) was also incurring restrictions on the freedom of the individual 
(Outhwaite, 1994).   
 
Habermas saw a potential remedy to this situation in the development and 
promotion of ‘ideal speech’ situations in which there is genuine equality of 
participation in the analysis of social problems and public policy decision-making 
rather than the domination of an instrumental technocratic rationality.  This current 
thesis supports the notion of the benefits of promoting ‘ideal speech’, and is 
premised on the basis that the Internet has the potential to facilitate the expression 
of ‘viewpoint diversity’ (Newey, 1999) represented by this concept.  However, it 
also recognises that content on the Internet, and access to that content, is subject to 
significant levels of regulation, that in themselves threaten to exert the same kind 
of distortion and erosion of debate described by Habermas (op cit). 
 
Over the last century, the developed world has undergone a radical transformation 
from an Industrial to a Post-Industrial Age (Bell, 1974), characterised by a 
dependence on the value of services, information and knowledge as the economic 
and social foundations of society.  Although the origins of this transformation can 
be traced back to the early Twentieth Century, the current rise of this ‘Information 
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Society’ has been encouraged and fostered largely by the rapid development and 
global reach of the Internet3.   
 
Many writers have recognised that the introduction of new technologies tends to 
be accompanied by a desire on the part of public authorities to control and regulate 
their use and access to them (for example, Sola Pool, 1983; Moore, 1991; Hill and 
Hughes, 1998, p. 181; Green, 1999; Slevin, 2000, p.220; Davies, 2002).  The 
invention of the moveable type printing press is a good illustration of this 
tendency.  And so it was with the Internet as it permeated beyond its military and 
research-led origins, and came to be used as a primary communications medium 
and information source, as well as a means of recreation, in universities, libraries, 
schools, the workplace and private homes.  However, the control of Internet 
content and access presents very particular difficulties, as content transcends 
national boundaries and legislative jurisdictions.  Attempts to define illegal or 
offensive content inevitably encounter problems due to differing cultural values 
and norms, as well as different legislative regimes.  Technical solutions, originally 
hailed as holding the solution to the ‘problem’ of Internet control, have evidenced 
serious – and seemingly insurmountable – limitations and shortcomings.  
 
Despite these difficulties, concern regarding the availability and dissemination of 
offensive, potentially libellous and illegal content on the Internet has led to the 
adoption of a number of policy measures at institutional, national and international 
level, with the expressed intention of monitoring and controlling access to, and 
dissemination of, such content. The investigation of these policy measures at both 
macro and micro level, and their comparison against a range of policy process 
models, was intended to facilitate a fuller understanding of the policy formulation 
process in this arena, and how this could potentially be enhanced in order to 
improve the decision-making process. 
  
                                            
3 For a useful overview of this development, see Dearnley and Feather (2001), Chapter One 
‘Theorizing the Information Society’. 
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Peace (1997) has noted the paucity of research that has been carried out to date 
into the issue of censorship in the university environment or University policies 
towards Internet regulation, whilst Bawden (1997) has noted that information 
policy, in particular, has been under-researched at organisational level.  Likewise, 
Rowlands (1996) asserts the need for more ‘value-critical’ and ‘paradigm-critical’ 
approaches towards information policy research, and, together with Turner 
(Rowlands and Turner, 1997, p.51) has identified the potential for research into the 
interaction and impact of different theoretical models in an information policy 
context.  In particular, they note the potential for exploration of the policy process 
model to engender a deeper understanding of policy problems.  It is intended that 
this study will contribute towards developing this understanding and addressing 
some of the identified gaps in current research.   
 
The study is, by definition, multi-disciplinary in that it draws on a range of 
academic areas of study such as the public policy sciences, law, technology and 
the social sciences.  Its primary disciplinary focus, however, comes within the field 
of Information Science.  According to Browne (1997b), within this discipline area 
the positivist paradigm has tended to prevail over other theoretical perspectives. 
This paradigm is based on a belief in the existence of a fixed ‘truth’, and the role 
of research is to reveal and prove this objective truth.  However, this study has 
preferred to adopt the paradigm of post-positivism as a theoretical framework, as 
the inherently value-driven stance of the researcher and the role of interpretation in 
defining truth is considered to be of critical importance.   
 
The post-positivist paradigm accepts the multiplicity of causes and effects that 
impact on a phenomenon, and, while it does accept and aim to illuminate the 
existence of an objective reality, it also accepts that this reality can never be fully 
understood or explained.  Moreover, it takes account of the impact of values on the 
policy environment and process.  To quote Browne (Ibid, p.346): 
 
“..information policy, like all public policy, is embedded in the political and cultural 
context and consequently different values will shape both the policy and the process used 
to derive it.” 
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The mode of enquiry was intended to be exploratory and explanatory, allowing the 
theories and explanations to emerge from the data, rather than imposing a 
predetermined set of conclusions (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), and, in accordance 
with the post-positivist perspective used multiple sources of predominantly 
qualitative data.  It adopted the first two of the eight approaches to policy studies 
identified by Hogwood and Gunn (1984), namely those that focus on policy 
content and on policy process, with a particular emphasis on the latter approach.  It 
is intended to provide a normative contribution to knowledge of information policy 
approaches rather than focussing solely on a descriptive approach.  
 
1.4 Social and historical context of the study 
 
1.4.1 Development and growth of the Internet 
 
The Internet was originally conceived in the US in 1969 with a project led by the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to link four computers in a 
distributed network, ARPANET, which would be capable of surviving the impact 
of a nuclear strike. By 1973 ARPANET had become a national network across the 
US, but access was limited to universities, research establishments and defence 
agencies, and the network operated with a lack of overall control or security.  At 
the same time, academic communities in the US were beginning to establish their 
own electronic networks.  At Duke University two students established a system 
called USENET, a network built and organised by the users themselves, allowing 
them to swap information on specific topics without restriction or external control.  
This was followed by the establishment of a similar network for academic staff, 
called BITNET. The American government, identifying the potential in 
networking activity, subsequently decided to fund the National Science 
Foundation’s network, NSFNET, linking universities and academic research 
establishments throughout the United States.   
 
Similarly, British universities established JANET (the Joint Academic Network) in 
1984, linking academic institutions across the United Kingdom.  In contrast to the 
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earlier emphasis in the US on use for scientific purposes only, JANET had an 
explicit aim to serve the entire higher education community, regardless of 
discipline (Kahn et al, 1997, p.140). 
 
By the late 1980s the technology existed to link the individual networks together 
and academics were able to exchange information internationally.  From this time 
onwards the Internet has grown at an impressive rate and has become a 
communications medium of global reach, largely as a result of the development of 
the World Wide Web (WWW) by Tim Berners-Lee from 1989 onwards at the 
CERN Particle Physics laboratory in Switzerland. This facilitated a graphical 
interface with hypertext linking and easy browsing and navigation thus making its 
use more accessible and attractive to non-scientists.  The popularisation of the 
Internet was also a result of the growth of independent, commercially-funded 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs): as the Internet was initially government-funded 
its use was originally limited to research, education and government purposes, 
commercial uses being prohibited unless they directly served the goals of research 
and education.   
 
The combination of the development of the WWW and the coming into existence 
of commercial ISPs means that it is no longer just academics, students and 
government workers who use and provide services on the Internet.  The most rapid 
growth in recent years has been in the area of business use, and individuals 
worldwide use the Internet for private and work-related communication, and for 
recreational, consumer and educational purposes. In the second quarter of 2001 it 
was reported that around 38% of UK households had home access to the Internet 
(Office for National Statistics, 2002); by December 2003 this had risen to 
approximately 50% of all UK households, with a government target having been 
set of all households that want it having access by 2008 (Wray, 2003).   
Worldwide, forecasts suggest that there will be around 1 billion Internet users by 
2005 and this figure is likely to have doubled by 2010 (Castells, 2001, p.3) 4. 
                                            
4 However, these statistics should be interpreted in context: despite the global reach of the Internet 
there is still a huge ‘digital divide’ between the developed and the developing world.  In 2001 the 
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1.4.2 The Internet and freedom of expression 
 
Despite this popularisation and commercialisation, the education and research 
driven origins of the Internet have had a strong influence on Internet use and 
content (Faulhaber, 1997; Hill and Hughes, 1998; Valauskas, 1996).  Moreover, 
the unplanned – and even anarchistic – origins of the Internet led to its 
characterisation as a forum for individualism and the free expression of alternative 
or controversial content, ranging from unorthodox political expression through to 
pornographic and obscene matter.  Jordan (1999, p.3) has noted the egalitarian 
potential of the Internet, commenting that ‘in cyberspace5 no one can be silenced 
because their voice is the quietest, and no one can be heard with more effect 
simply because they are more aggressive’.  As long ago as 1965, Arthur C. Clarke 
was giving poetic expression to a utopian vision of the liberating potential of new 
communications technologies: 
 
The advent of communications satellites will mean the end of the present barriers to the 
free flow of information; no dictatorship can build a wall high enough to stop its citizens 
listening to the voices from the stars.       
 (Clarke, 1965) 
 
The metaphor of McLuhan’s ‘global village’ (McLuhan and Powers, 1989) has 
also been applied to the Internet to describe its ethos of a world-wide community 
of citizens with shared values, symbols, rituals and norms (Bekkers, 1997).  
 
Castells (1997 and 2001) gave early recognition to the potential of the Internet as a 
tool for democracy.  He noted that 
 
                                                                                                                        
Internet still connected less than 2% of the world’s population and it was reported that 80% of the 
world’s population had never made a telephone call (Millar: 2001a). 
 
5 The term ‘cyberspace’ was first used by William Gibson in his 1984 science-fiction novel 
Neuromancer referring to the geographically unlimited, non-physical space created by the 
interlinking of computers, telecommunications networks and digital media.  
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…online information access and computer-mediated communication facilitate the 
diffusion and retrieval of information, and offer possibilities for interaction and debate in 
an autonomous, electronic forum, bypassing the control of the media…More importantly, 
citizens could form, and are forming, their own political and ideological constellations, 
circumventing established political structures, thus creating a flexible, adaptable political 
field. 
(Castells, 1997, pp.350-351) 
 
A highly significant factor in determining the future development and culture of 
the Internet was the decision by Berners-Lee not to patent the Web; his vision of 
the Web was ‘a global space where people could share information, ideas and 
goods, unfettered by any central body’ (Woolnough, 2001).  Laudon (1995, p.36) 
has noted that: 
 
Among Internet aficionados there is a strong libertarian ethic that argues that individuals 
should be able to ‘do what they want, when they want’ and that the collective social 
welfare is advanced by the pursuit of a kind of minimally organized anarchy.   
 
However, he does also concede that, when carried to an extreme, such an approach 
risks turning into ‘an amoral free-for-all with no connection to the collective social 
welfare’ (Laudon, 1995, p.36).  Such fears, combined with intensive media 
reporting that created a ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 1980) in which the Internet was 
seen as almost synonymous with pornography, led to strenuous calls for regulation 
of Internet content – and of access to content.   
 
In addition, from the early optimistic notions of the Internet as a virtual 
marketplace of ideas and opinions, ‘marketplace’ being used in the classical sense 
of an open public forum (agora), it has become a literal marketplace, where 
business corporations rely on a secure, ‘decent’ and non-controversial 
environment.  Such pressures have led to demands for legislation and the 
development of a variety of non-legislative control techniques to regulate the 
Internet. 
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Thus, it can be argued that the Internet ‘control’ debate has been characterised by 
the competing perspectives of technological and political utopianism, with the 
Internet portrayed as an instrument of liberation, democracy and social benefit, and 
that of technological dystopia, with it seen as contributing to moral breakdown and 
loss of control on the part of Nation States.  Wall (2000) has referred to these 
competing perspectives as being those of the ‘cyber-liberators’ versus the ‘cyber-
regulators’. Castells (2001) also maintains that the Internet has evolved into what 
he describes as a ‘contested terrain’ between the contrasting paradigms of freedom 
and regulation.  These two perspectives are central to the investigation and 
discussion of measures to regulate Internet content that forms the substance of this 
thesis. 
 
1.4.3 Theoretical conceptions of censorship and freedom of expression 
 
The drive to censor information and ideas has historically been based on one of 
two concepts, that of harm or that of morality (Dhavan and Davies, 1978; Heins, 
2001; Robertson, 1993). The first premise adopts a causalist justification for the 
imposition of censorship, on the grounds of the potential specific harm to society, 
or sections of society, liable to be incurred through the creation and dissemination 
of, or access to, the controlled material.  The second premise is based more on a 
notion of ‘upholding community standards’ and the preservation of the morals of 
the individual and the society – access to material is controlled on the grounds that 
it is inherently ‘bad’. Within UK law, definitions of obscenity have been based on 
whether the item in question, if taken as a whole, is liable ‘to deprave and corrupt 
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands 
such a publication might fall’6.   
 
In contrast to the paternalistic approach of protecting the population from the 
potential harm or corruption they will undergo as a result of exposure to materials 
deemed to be unacceptable, the premise of freedom of expression is that the 
                                            
6 This definition, on which the Obscene Publications Act 1959 (Parliament, 1959) is still based, 
was originally made by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in 1868 (cited in Hannabuss and Allard, 
2001)  
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government has no right to impose their versions of morality through censorship of 
unconventional, “bad” or “dangerous” ideas: citizens are entitled to decide these 
matters for themselves (Heins, 2001).  Censorship on the grounds of harm is also 
seen as problematic on account of the near impossibility of providing evidence of a 
direct causal link between ‘harm’ and access to such material. For example, 
research studies have consistently failed to prove a causal link between access to 
pornography and the committing of sex crimes (Dhavan & Davies, 1978; O’Toole, 
1998; Gavison, 1998).  Feminist claims that pornography causes harm through the 
subjugation and objectification of women (for example, see MacKinnon, 1993; 
Dworkin, 1981 among many others) are harder to dismiss, although a strong 
argument against this line of reasoning is put forward by Feminists Against 
Censorship7 and by Strossen (1996) who suggest that censorship is itself a form of 
oppression that ultimately patronises and disempowers women.   
 
1.4.4 Freedom of expression as a professional ethic 
 
Freedom of expression, according to Robertson (1993, p.95), entails ‘…the right to 
entertain ideas of any kind, and to express them publicly’.  Measures aimed at 
controlling Internet content and access to information available via the Internet 
risk conflicting with a long-standing tradition in libraries and in universities of 
upholding the right to freedom of expression and freedom of enquiry, and of a 
strong hostility to censorship.  The erstwhile UK Library Association8 Code of 
Conduct and the American Library Association (ALA) Bill of Rights both 
vigorously defend the concept of free access to information without restriction.  
The Code of the UK Library Association states that 
 
…Members have an obligation to facilitate the flow of information and ideas and to 
protect and promote the rights of every individual to have free and equal access to sources 
of information without discrimination and within the limits of the law.   
     (Library Association, 1996, 2e) 
                                            
7 <http://www.fiawol.demon.co.uk/FAC/> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
8 The Library Association has now become the Chartered Institute of Library and Information 
Professionals (CILIP), following a merger with the Institute of Information Scientists. 
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Although the professional guidance from the new body, CILIP, is less developed 
in this area, its draft Code of Professional Ethics disseminated for consultation in 
2003 claims as one of its general principles ‘commitment to the defence of, and 
enhancement of, access to information’.  It also advocates ‘impartiality, and the 
avoidance of inappropriate personal bias, in acquiring, and evaluating information 
and in mediating it to information users’ (CILIP, 2003).  
 
 The ALA Statement On Professional Ethics contains the following commitment: 
 
In a political system grounded in an informed citizenry, librarians are members of a 
profession explicitly committed to intellectual freedom and the freedom of access to 
information.  We have a special obligation to ensure the free flow of information and 
ideas to present and future generations…Librarians must resist all efforts by groups or 
individuals to censor library materials.   
(American Library Association, 1981, p.335) 
 
Indeed, the concept of intellectual freedom has been called the library profession’s 
‘central ethic’ (Du Mont, 1991; Bundy and Stielow, 1987).  The American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) declares its opposition to censorship within libraries with 
the statement that ‘Libraries are free speech zones’ (ACLU, 1997).  
 
1.4.5 Academic freedom9 
 
Likewise, the concept of academic and intellectual freedom has been central to the 
development of universities – and, indeed, Castells (2001) maintains that without 
the academic freedom granted to US researchers in the latter half of the Twentieth 
Century, the Internet itself would probably never have evolved. The concept of 
academic freedom can be traced back at least as far as Ancient Greece, with the 
role of philosophers in framing arguments in support of intellectual freedom on the 
grounds that only through intellectual argument could one arrive at the final truth 
                                            
9 Some of the author’s comments made in the course of this section have been previously published 
in the proceedings of the 9th International BOBCATSSS Symposium on Library and Information 
Science (see Cooke, 2001). 
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of a matter.  During the early Middle Ages the academic community in a range of 
European universities sought to utilise the principle of academic freedom in order 
to create a sanctuary from the conflicting powers of the Church and the State 
(Sturges, 1999).  A useful overview of the history of the notion of ‘academic 
freedom’ with regard to freedom of expression and of enquiry (as opposed to 
concerning government interference in the institutional control of universities) is 
provided in the text of a lecture given by Sir Robert Birley in 1972.  He argues 
powerfully that 
 
Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.  Teachers and 
students must always remain free to enquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new 
maturity and understanding.  Otherwise our civilisation will stagnate and die.  
(Birley, 1972, p.12) 
 
Birley cites an early example of a challenge to academic freedom in late 17th 
Century Germany where, in 1690, Christian Thomasius, a lecturer at the 
University of Leipzig who criticised a book by a Court Preacher in Denmark, was 
subsequently forbidden to lecture and threatened with prosecution.  Thomasius, 
who nevertheless later went on to become Professor of Jurisprudence at the 
Academy of Halle, claimed that the Academy should be a place of ‘unfettered 
freedom, yea, freedom which is the very life of the spirit, and without which 
human reason is as good as dead’ (quoted in Hertz, 1962, p.111).   
 
In the UK a strong defence of the principle of academic freedom was made by 
Lord Robbins in a lecture to the British Academy in 1966: 
 
A society which respects and cherishes the freedom of its academic institutions and their 
members is much less likely to fall victim to the enemies of freedom in general than a 
society which does not.   
(Robbins, 1966) 
 
Section 43 of the Education Act (No.2) of 1986 endeavours to embody the 
principle of academic freedom within UK law with the following statement: 
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Every individual and body concerned with the government of any Further or Higher 
Education Institution shall take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that 
freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students and employees of the 
establishment, and for visiting speakers.     (Cited in Saunders, 1999) 
 
This (somewhat lukewarm) embracing of the principle of academic freedom is also 
espoused in Section 202(2)(a) of the Education Reform Act 1988, which stipulates 
that an educational institution’s governance arrangements must 
 
Have regard to the need…to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to 
question and test received wisdom and to put forward new ideas and controversial or 
unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or 
privileges they may have at their institutions… 
(Ibid) 
 
Middlehurst proposes the notion that academic freedom is not simply an 
entitlement for university personnel, but imposes a ‘duty of enquiry’ upon them.  
Thus, she comments: 
 
‘Academic freedom implies individual discretion to pursue (and promote in others) the 
quest for knowledge and truth in ways that are guided by individual choice within a 
framework of professional norms of conduct and behaviour.  As the main vehicle for the 
pursuit of knowledge, scholarly enquiry carries with it a duty to question, to exercise 
independence of thought and judgement and to strive after creativity: in short to reflect 
and to evaluate critically upon past knowledge and future premises.  The results of such 
critical enquiry must then be presented according to the conventions of reasoned 
argument’.  
(Middlehurst, 1993) 
 
It has been suggested by Arrowsmith (1998) that without the recognition, and 
indeed the ‘constant cherishing’, of academic freedom, an intrinsic part of the 
mission and purpose of higher education is lost.  This freedom does not relate 
solely to the ability to express ideas and opinions, but also implies the ability to 
access freely the body of knowledge and ideas accumulated within society.   
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Barnett (1990, p.136) emphasises that academic freedom should be founded on the 
principle that academic pursuits, carried out in academic settings by academic 
persons, should be directed ultimately by those persons.  He also notes that current 
defences of academic freedom tend to centre on the freedom of academic staff 
rather than on that of students.  He points out that the early German universities 
were founded on a spirit of enquiry (‘lernfreiheit’) with the student at the centre 
and knowledge being acquired through reasoned debate.  Such a notion of 
‘lernfreiheit’ may be critical to the success of current trends in higher education 
towards independent, autonomous and lifelong learning.   
 
The importance of academic freedom to the democratic process has been 
highlighted by Middlehurst (Ibid) who noted the role played by university ‘centres 
of intellectual expertise’ to the dissemination of knowledge to inform decision-
making within the community as a whole, and within governmental and 
transnational bodies in particular.  In the Germany of the early 1920s and late 
1940s, Jaspers (1965) envisaged the university as having ‘a role to play in the 
reconstruction of a more humane society, based on a more unitary and purposeful 
conception of knowledge’ (cited in Barnett, 1990).   
 
Given the protection awarded to free speech by the First Amendment10 of the US 
constitution, and the lack of any such constitutional protection in the UK, it is 
perhaps ironic that the literature relating to academic freedom suggests greater 
restriction of such freedom in the US than has been apparent in the UK.  In 
particular, the free speech of academics came under threat during the immediate 
post-war period of the McCarthy era, with academics being required to state under 
oath that they did not harbour any pro-Communist sympathies (Stewart, 1950).  
More recently the era of ‘political correctness’ has raised the difficult matter of 
drawing a distinction between the right to express ones own ideas and the duty not 
to cause offence.  In addition, the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York in 
                                            
10 The First Amendment offers US citizens a constitutional right to freedom of speech by 
prohibiting Congress from making any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.  For 
the text of the Constitution and its Amendments see <http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html> 
[Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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September 11th 2001 and the war in Iraq in early 2003 have led to a number of 
attempts to suppress any ‘unpatriotic’ sentiments on the part of university 
academics in the US.  Such attempts include the publication of a report listing over 
100 statements that ‘fail America’ made by US academics such as Noam Chomsky 
and Jesse Jackson, (Fine, 2001). 
 
Indeed, the threats to academic freedom in recent times in western democracies 
such as the UK and the US are various, emanating from a range of different 
sources, as described by Amit (2000, p.217): 
 
Ethics reviews, codes of conduct, sexual harassment policies, increasing limits on the way 
in which researchers use and administer their own research grants combine with a host of  
frequent auditing exercises…the university is being remade into a panopticon in which 
university professors censor, police, audit and market themselves while institutional 
administrations strive ever harder to limit their own liability.   
 
In the UK, new challenges to academic freedom continue to present themselves; 
during the period in which this study was undertaken, a number of cases came 
under review.  In one case, police confiscated a book of photographs by the late 
Robert Mapplethorpe belonging to the library of the University of Central 
England, and instructed the Vice Chancellor of the University to destroy the book; 
the Vice Chancellor refused to do so (Knight, 1998; O’Leary, 1998; Walmsley, 
1998).  There were even suggestions that the University could face prosecution for 
lending the book (Library Association Record, 1998a).  In another case, the home 
of a writer and researcher engaged on writing a history of pornographic films was 
raided and a large collection of films and documents seized, along with his 
computer (Campbell, 1998a).  A report by the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA, 
1999) in the UK in 1999 strongly condemned the University of Lincolnshire and 
Humberside for allowing the censorship of Jewish books and authors from reading 
lists in its provision at a partner college in the United Arab Emirates.  Disciplinary 
proceedings have been taken against Chris Brand, a lecturer at Edinburgh 
University, following the publication of his book, The G Factor, outlining 
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controversial opinions linking race to IQ, and comments made by Brand in an 
Internet newsletter on paedophilia.  
 
However, academic freedom should not imply a lack of due sensitivity or 
responsibility.  The tribunal report in the Brand case stated that 
 
It is incumbent on any citizen to act responsibly in the manner of his public utterances.  
This is particularly true of the academic in exercising his academic freedom, which does 
not give licence to express any opinion in any way one chooses.  One must be acutely 
aware of the manner in which material is expressed and individual views should be set in 
a suitable framework with due care to the sensitivity of the issue and regard to the 
implications of controversial statements made.  
     (Wojtas, 1998) 
 
These sentiments echo those expressed in an earlier era by Albert Einstein (cited in 
Tight, 1998, p.74), who commented: 
 
By academic freedom I understand the right to search for the truth and to publish and 
teach what one holds to be true.  This right also implies a duty: one must not conceal any 
part of what one has recognized to be true.  It is evident that any restriction of academic 
freedom serves to restrain the dissemination of knowledge, thereby impeding rational 
judgement and action. 
 
It is now common practice for Western universities to have written policy 
statements on the protection of academic freedom, including freedom of enquiry 
and freedom of expression.  However, the introduction of new Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) into universities has led to a number of cases 
suggesting restrictions to academic freedom.  Despite the potential for ICT to open 
up access to a ‘virtual marketplace’11 of ideas and minority viewpoints (Newey, 
1999; Golding, 2000; Walker, 2000), the Human Rights Watch Academic 
Freedom programme12 commented that ‘While the means of transmitting 
                                            
11 The original concept of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ comes from Mill (1859) in On Liberty in 
referring to the potential offered by ‘a constellation of printing presses and bookstores’ to promote 
an informed and active political community in which individuals have freedom of expression. 
 
12 <http://hrw.org/advocacy/academic/> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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information may be new, the old impulse to control the academics who convey this 
information has also grown’ (Zia-Zarifi, 2001).  It was reported in March 2004 that 
the websites of 300 academics at Birmingham University had been removed, 
following controversy over alleged anti-semitic content on one site.  This was 
despite the fact that the content on the majority of the sites related to issues such as 
air quality, genealogy or academics’ CVs (Curtis, 2004). Other specific recent 
examples of cases involving constraints on academic freedom linked to the use of 
ICT are described by Dearnley (1999) and Baty (2003)13.   
 
Simon Davies, Director of Privacy International14, suggests that recent UK 
legislative developments such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(RIPA)15 (Parliament, 2000a) threaten to ‘turn universities into wired Dickensian 
workhouses with central control and monitoring’ (Davies, 2000).  He envisages the 
implications for academic freedom of such measures as being potentially very 
serious: ‘Once management institutes an architecture of surveillance…the 
relationship changes between academics and their institutions’ (Ibid).  It will be 
seen that such fears were also reflected in the comments made by academic 
respondents during the course of the three academic case studies described in 
Chapter Five of this thesis.  With regard to filtering technologies, Davies describes 
their implementation in an academic context as representing a ‘Faustian Pact’ that 
compromises academic freedom by the drive towards self-censorship that it incurs 
and the repression of ‘controversy’ that he considers should characterise academia 
(Ibid). 
   
The role of self-censorship in preventing true freedom of expression and freedom 
of access to information should not be underestimated.  The potential for 
surveillance of electronic communications to induce a new power structure of 
‘electronic governmentality’ (Foucault, 1991; Dean, 1999; Mehta and Darier, 
                                            
13 These examples are also discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
 
14 <http://www.privacyinternational.org/> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
15 <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000023.htm> [last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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1998) by acting as a modern-day version of Bentham’s design of the Panopticon 
has been noted by several writers.  The visionary prison design of Bentham’s 
panopticon meant that prisoners could not tell whether or not they were under 
observation, which led to them behaving as if they were being observed even when 
no guard was actually present. There are clear parallels that can be drawn here 
with the ‘self-censorship’ that an Internet user who is aware of the possibility of 
having their communications monitored may consequently exercise.  Indeed, 
Castells (2001, p.173) maintains that the use of electronic workplace surveillance 
is, in the Information Age, a more pervasive and invidious means of replacing the 
shop floor control of workers that was previously exercised by management in the 
Industrial Age.   Miller comments that ‘The Information Superhighway’s ability to 
move us further toward a panoptic society can counter any positive impact it may 
have on strengthening democracy or free speech’ (Miller, 1996, p.265).  
Blanchette and Johnson also make the point that democracy cannot flourish in an 
environment of surveillance, and maintain that ‘the very nature of self and the 
kinds of personalities that develop in a surveillance society are different’ 
(Blanchette and Johnson, 2002, p.36). 
 
However, a desire to protect freedom of expression is not easily reconciled with 
the fears of network providers, systems operators and university administrators 
concerning their legal liabilities with regard to the dissemination of offensive 
and/or illegal Internet content.  Librarians have also demonstrated concern with 
regard to liability issues raised by their provision of unrestricted Internet access to 
the general public, to students and to the wider academic community.  In 
particular, the availability of pornographic, defamatory, and ‘race-hate’ material 
on the Internet have led to fears concerning possible breaches of the Obscene 
Publications Acts of 1959 and 1964 (Parliament, 1959; Parliament, 1964), the 
Protection of Children Act 1978 (Parliament, 1978), the Computer Misuse Act 
1990 (Parliament, 1990) and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
(Parliament, 1994a).  
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1.4.6 Measures to regulate Internet access and content 
 
These concerns have led to the development of a variety of restraints and controls 
by software developers, network providers and administrators, librarians and 
others responsible for the provision of Internet facilities and content.  Such 
measures include the development and implementation of filtering, monitoring and 
ratings technologies; metadata schemes for describing and organising Internet 
resources; Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs) and Codes of Conduct governing 
network use within institutions and organisations; user education to promote 
appropriate use of facilities; and requirements for users to sign disclaimers limiting 
the legal liabilities of access providers.   
 
Within the UK academic community UKERNA (the United Kingdom Education 
and Research Networking Association), the body responsible for the provision of 
the JANET service to the UK Higher Education community, has its own JANET 
AUP16 (Wood, 2003) and urges individual institutions to devise their own AUP.  
Penalties that may be imposed on institutions for contravention of the JANET 
AUP range from suspension of network services through to referral for legal 
action.  In addition, a number of legislative and self-regulatory initiatives have 
been implemented by national governments and international organisations in 
order to control the provision of, and access to, ‘inappropriate’ Internet content – 
such measures are given detailed consideration in Chapters Three and Four of the 
thesis. 
 
1.4.7 Technical solutions: filtering, rating and labelling 
 
…we must not think to make a staple commodity of all the knowledge in the land, to mark 
and license it like our broad-cloth and our woolpacks. 
(Milton, 1973, p.26, originally published 1644) 
 
                                            
16 <http://www.janet.ac.uk/documents/use_policy.pdf> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. Detailed 
consideration of the JANET AUP is given in Chapter Five of the thesis. 
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From the time of the initial moral panic concerning the Internet it has often been 
suggested that the control of Internet content and problems of access to 
‘inappropriate’ content would be resolved through the implementation of technical 
solutions, in particular the use of filtering software (Burt, 1997; Volokh, 1997). In 
the US a number of legislative initiatives have been put forward to mandate the 
implementation of filtering software, in particular with regard to public access to 
the Internet in schools and libraries.  Many private corporations and public sector 
organisations have also adopted Internet filtering and monitoring software with 
enthusiasm as a means of avoiding time-wasting by employees and reducing the 
risk of potential legal liability for their communications (Datamonitor, 2002). 
 
However, such software has demonstrated considerable technical limitations and 
its potential impact on freedom of expression and freedom of enquiry has been 
noted.   It has been argued that the installation of filtering software affords greater 
control to the end user over access to content and balances the right to freedom of 
expression with the right not to have to encounter offensive material (Burt, 1997; 
Auld, 2003; Cronin cited in Pierce, 2003).  This perspective has been subject to 
much debate and challenge, not least on account of the inaccuracy of many of the 
products, their potential for bias and the lack of transparency of the process that 
determines blocking decisions by software providers.  
 
Filtering software usually works on the basis either of blocking pre-specified 
keywords found on a web page or website, or by blocking websites that have been 
identified by the software providers as containing ‘undesirable’ content.  Keyword 
blocking in particular, has been demonstrated to be an inaccurate and imprecise 
‘blunt instrument’ with a tendency to under- and over-block as a result of the 
ambiguity of terms and lack of context sensitivity.  It is also not suited to handling 
inappropriate graphic images that are liable to slip through the filter if they do not 
contain any offensive text.  Other forms of filtering include keyboard monitoring, 
which checks keyboard input against a pre-set list of terms, preventing users from 
using particular search terms.  It can also be useful for blocking outgoing 
information such as credit card numbers and personal information in chat rooms or 
emails (Thomason, 2001).  In addition, it is possible for systems administrators to 
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restrict access to certain protocols, thus preventing the use of specific types of 
Internet services such as chat rooms or Usenet (Ibid). 
 
Lasica puts forward arguments against the use of filtering software, quoting David 
Sobel, legal counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)17, who 
defines the use of such software as ‘a move toward the privatising of censorship’ 
(Lasica, 1997).   He shares the concern that filters are too subjective and constitute 
a threat to freedom of speech, screening out ‘much more than smut’ such as 
information on alternative lifestyles, family planning, atheism, feminism and 
women’s organisations, animal rights groups, political organisations, safe sex and 
drug use.  An example of evidence of bias in the selection of sites blocked by 
CyberPatrol18, a popular filtering software package, was demonstrated by a 
University student who reverse-engineered the software to enable him to access 
the list of sites blocked by the software.  He found that the list included sites 
critical of CyberPatrol and its parent company, Mattel, as well as a website for the 
American left-wing magazine Mother Jones (Fine, 2000). 
 
Mezey also notes the inaccuracy of most filtering programs and the tendency to 
block useful and non-sensitive sites (Mezey, 1998).  In particular, he notes the 
conclusions of an EPIC report Faulty Filters: how content filters block access to 
kid-friendly information on the Internet (EPIC, 1997), which found that ‘the 
world’s first family-friendly Internet search site’, Net Shepherd Family Search, 
regularly blocked over 99 per cent of non-sensitive material that could be of 
interest to children.  An updated EPIC report published in 2001 suggested that 
filtering and rating systems, far from being mere software features or tools, can be 
considered to constitute ‘fundamental architectural changes that facilitate the 
suppression of speech far more effectively than national laws alone ever could’ 
(EPIC, 2001). 
 
                                            
17 <http://www.epic.org> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
18 <http://www.cyberpatrol.com> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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In addition to the first EPIC report cited above (EPIC, 1997), which made 
comparisons between 100 searches using Net Shepherd and 100 using the 
unfiltered Alta Vista search engine on which it is based, there have been other 
attempts at testing filtering software to assess the performance of the various 
programs.  One of the more extensive projects was the TIFAP (The Internet Filter 
Assessment Project) study19, which was carried out by a team of librarians in the 
US in 1997. Conclusions arising from the study included the importance of being 
able to configure settings on the software to best meet local needs; software based 
on site lists (lists of blocked URLs) is more accurate than that based on keyword 
blocking; user feedback is important, both in terms of informing users that material 
has been blocked, and in enabling feedback from users to software suppliers; users 
are not satisfied with retrieving material from ‘guided’ Internet access but require 
powerful search engine facilities; and finally, there is demand for software that 
includes a “patron override function”, that is, that warns users of explicit and/or 
offensive content, but does not block access (TIFAP, 1997).  Much of the work 
carried out by the TIFAP study is outlined in greater detail by Schneider (1997).  
 
The potential issues arising from the technical imperfections and limitations of 
filtering technologies, and the difficulties encountered in arriving at a universal 
definition of ‘acceptable content’ that is nevertheless sensitive to the norms of 
local ‘community standards’, are significant.  Apart from the potential impact on 
individual freedoms of over-blocking that the implementation of filtering software 
may incur, concerns have also been expressed with regard to the ‘false 
complacency’ that may result from its use.  Parents, librarians and teachers may be 
led to adopt a misplaced sense of security, putting too much reliance on filters 
rather than personal supervision to prevent children from accessing content that 
they consider harmful.   
 
Several projects aimed at testing the accuracy of filtering software have been 
carried out demonstrating that a substantial extent of both under- and over-
                                            
19 <http://www.bluehighways.com/tifap/> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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blocking of ‘objectionable’ content occurs with the most popular software 
packages.  For example, one study found that SurfWatch failed to block 56% of 
objectionable material (in contrast to its claim to block 90% to 95% of 
objectionable material) and improperly blocked 7% of non-objectionable sites 
(Hunter, 2000).  These results have been replicated in several other studies; for 
example, a Consumer Reports study carried out in 2001 that tested a range of the 
more widely-used software, together with AOL’s parental control facility, reported 
that ‘Internet filters have shown little improvement since the magazine last tested 
them in 1997’ (Consumer Reports Online, 2001).  An Australian study found that 
the filters that they tested blocked 78.6% of pornographic sites, but only 50% in 
the other ‘offensive’ categories (CSIRO, 2001).  It also found evidence of 
substantial over-blocking, as did a study carried out by the National Coalition 
Against Censorship (Heins and Cho, 2001).  The latter commented, ‘No filtering 
technology, no matter how sophisticated, can make contextualized judgements 
about the value, effectiveness or age-appropriateness of online expression’ (Ibid). 
 
However, not all forms of filtering work on the basis of excluding resources: 
recommender systems use evaluation of resources to select ‘in’ those that meet 
certain specified criteria (Resnick and Varian, 1997).   Both selection and 
exclusion filtering rely on metadata, described by Dempsey and Heery as 
‘knowledge which allows humans and automated users to behave intelligently’ 
(Dempsey and Heery, 1998, p.149) but which is more easily understood as ‘data 
about data’. In practice, metadata involves the tagging of data records to label 
resources in such a way as to enable the identification, description and location of 
networked resources and to facilitate the rating of content according to suitability 
for different user groups (Sturges, 1997, p.21). Links to a wide range of online 
metadata resources, including background documents, are provided by the 
International Federation of Library Associations (IFLA, 2003).  A useful review of 
metadata standards and practice is provided by Dempsey and Heery (1998), who 
also discuss the management of metadata and the use of search and retrieve 
protocols and models of metadata format.  
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Ratings and labelling systems are intended to aid the end user in making a decision 
about the suitability of a particular resource.  Labelling is a means of identifying 
the contents of an electronic data file without having to open it, the label providing 
the user with enough information to decide whether to open it.  Rating provides a 
means of assigning a value to the data file, based on defined assumptions or 
criteria.  Details of the rating of a file may be stored on a metadata label.  Filtering 
can be carried out on the basis of selecting or excluding files as a result of the 
rating assigned to them.  The rating or label can be assigned either by the creator 
or distributor of a resource, or by an independent agency designated for the 
purpose (as, for example, with the British Board of Film Classification for the UK 
film industry).  It is probable that many different agencies will become involved in 
the rating of Internet resources, but the quantity of sites and the rapid growth of the 
Internet would make it an impossible task for any one body to rate more than a 
small percentage of available resources.  
 
PICS, the Platform for Internet Content Selection, is a rating standard that 
established a consistent way to rate and block online content.  It was developed in 
1996 by Paul Resnick and James Miller of the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C), an international non-governmental consortium of Internet industry leaders, 
trade associations and public interest groups.  PICS aims to facilitate the 
development of technologies that give Internet users the ability to control the kinds 
of material to which they, or their children, have access.  The PICS technology 
allows any organization or individual to develop a labelling system which reflects 
their tastes and standards and, if they wish, to enable others to use these labels to 
select or block content (Australian Broadcasting Authority, 1997, p 13).  It is thus 
not a rating system in itself, but ‘a technique that allows rating and filtering 
systems to operate’ (Slevin, 2000, p.227). 
 
An example of a PICS-based rating system is RSACi, originally devised by the 
Recreational Software Advisory Council (RSAC) and subsequently further 
developed by the Internet Content Rating Association (ICRA)20, which succeeded 
                                            
20 Information about ICRA can be found at <http://www.icra.org/about> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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RSAC on its dissolution in 1999.  ICRA states as its aim to empower the public, 
especially parents, by helping them to make informed decisions about electronic 
media via the open and objective labelling of content (ICRA, 2003). It thereby 
hopes to combine the dual aims of protecting children from potentially harmful 
material, and simultaneously protecting free speech on the Internet (Ibid). The 
ICRA scheme consists of label descriptors that users can assign to resources on a 
scale of 0 – 4 on five content categories: chat; language used on the site; nudity 
and sexual content; violence; and ‘others’ such as gambling, drugs and alcohol. An 
important point is that ICRA itself does not rate Internet content, nor does it make 
value judgements about sites. The system is intended to allow the content 
providers to self-rate their sites using the ICRA labelling scheme.   
 
In addition to this initiative, the Microsoft Corporation, Netscape and Progressive 
Networks have co-operated in the formation of the Information Highway Parental 
Empowerment Group.  The Group has been working on a system that relies on 
content providers conforming to a rating system that identifies the type of material 
they offer.  However, while voluntary rating may work well, in the majority of 
cases it requires the co-operation of content providers and only a minority of 
providers elect to rate their sites.  Moreover, it has been argued that voluntary 
practices are unlikely to deter those who are really determined to get their message 
across, and should not be relied on by those responsible for providing public 
access to the Internet as a means of preventing offensive material being accessed 
on their machines (Capitanchik and Whine, 1996, p.13).  
 
A comprehensive list of links to Web sites offering further arguments against the 
use of ratings and labelling schemes has been provided by Finkelstein of the MIT 
Student Association for Freedom of Expression (Finkelstein, 1998).  Similarly, 
ACLU has produced a strong criticism of the long-term implications of Internet 
rating and blocking schemes, suggesting that they will lead to the Internet 
becoming ‘bland and homogenized’ (ACLU, 1997). More worryingly, they 
maintain that such schemes are ‘open to abuse by governments eager to censor and 
control information’ (Ibid).  
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This argument is also put forward by Lessig (1999) who suggests that labelling 
schemes offer a potential for invisible ‘upstream’ filtering and a lack of 
transparency in restrictions to information access.  Moreover, he makes a strong 
case against ‘perfect filtering’, even if the technology allowed this to take place.   
If rating and labelling schemes do permit us accurately to screen out undesirable 
content, society may be the poorer because we never have to ‘confront the 
unfiltered’, for example issues of poverty and inequality elsewhere in the world 
(Lessig, 1999, p.180).  This point is also made by Shapiro (1999), and by Stoker 
(1999) who applies it to the use of filters in an academic environment by 
commenting that it is not part of the role of a University to deliberately shield its 
students from ‘some of the more unpleasant features of life’ (Ibid, p.4).  Shapiro 
(1999) comments that ‘total filtering’ allows us to avoid information that leads to 
‘cognitive dissonance’ by confronting us with challenging or uncomfortable facts 
(“freedom from speech”).  This in turn means that, instead of re-evaluating our 
own beliefs and behaviours in the light of new evidence, we ‘would likely become 
self-satisfied and unchallenged, lacking motivation or curiosity’ (Ibid, p.111). 
Even the W3C have noted the dangers of any one labelling standard becoming too 
powerful: ‘If a lot of people use a particular organisation’s labels for filtering, that 
organisation will indeed wield a lot of power.  Such an organization could, for 
example, arbitrarily assign negative labels to materials from its commercial or 
political competitors’ (cited in Slevin, 2000, p.227). 
 
1.5 Introduction to policy models 
 
In investigating the decision-making process that determines policy measures with 
regard to regulation of the Internet, and the implications of those decisions, the 
study used the ‘re-interpreted policy process’ typology proposed by Rowlands and 
Turner (1997) as an aid to understanding the complexity of factors involved in this 
area of decision-making.  A central aim of the study was to compare the features 
of the three policy-making models presented in the typology with those that 
appeared to be evident in policy formulation towards Internet content and 
regulation within the European Union, the Council of Europe, the UK national 
government and three selected UK Higher Education Institutions.   The use of 
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policy models in this way can be useful as a means of representing and simplifying 
reality, in order better to understand social processes – although Parsons (1995) 
warns of the need to always maintain a critical stance towards such models as 
there is a danger that we will use them to enable us to see what we want to see. 
 
The three policy process models, the ‘rational actor’, the ‘bureaucratic 
imperative’ and the ‘garbage can’ are derived from a re-interpretation of 
Lasswell’s functional staged model.  Lasswell (1970) noted the value of using 
models as a heuristic tool to explore and explain policy-making, noting that 
‘Systematic models provide a means of exploring interdependence among the 
functional components of a policy process’ (Ibid, p.9).  The functional staged 
model represents policy making as a linear process, with clearly defined, logical 
stages and the rational, unimpeded pursuit of policy goals from initial issue 
identification through to evaluation of policy outcomes: 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.4: Lasswell’s staged model of ) 
 
Fig. 1.1: Lasswell’s staged model of the policy-making process (as represented by 
Rowlands and Turner, 1997, p.50) 
 
However, this depiction of policy making as an unencumbered, wholly rational, 
uni-directional and finite process does not easily fit with the more chaotic, 
turbulent nature of policy making in a real-life organisational context.  
Recognition of this mismatch has encouraged a redefinition of the policy process 
in order to better understand and interpret the reality of what actually happens in 
the process and how real-world policy decisions are shaped.  This redefinition 
forms the basis of the re-interpreted policy process model (Rowlands and Turner, 
1997), as illustrated diagrammatically in fig. 1.2 overleaf. 
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Fig.1.2: Characteristics of the Re-interpreted policy process
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1.5.1 Re-interpretation of the policy process: the ‘Rational Actor’  
 
Of the three policy process models in the reinterpreted typology, it is that of the 
‘Rational Actor’ that is closest to Lasswell’s original representation of the policy 
process.  The ‘Rational Actor’ model suggests that in an ideal world, decision-
making would be the outcome of perfectly rational processes in a context of 
perfect knowledge; policy implementation would be pursued consistently, 
unimpeded by external variables and brought to a successful conclusion 
(Rowlands and Turner, 1997).  Within the model, decision-making is based on a 
linear process involving the identification of problems; thorough consideration and 
description of all facets of the problem; consideration of different solutions based 
on the constraints identified; outlining of the advantages and disadvantages of each 
potential solution; and the choice of a solution that will achieve maximum benefit 
(Burger, 1993).  This implies that decision-making takes place in a context in 
which adequate time is available, and that implementation is not impeded by any 
interfering variables.  However, Rowlands and Turner (1997) also suggest that this 
model represents an unattainable ideal, assuming, as it does, that policy 
formulators and implementers pursue policy goals in a wholly rational manner and 
that they can exert a perfect control over the policy environment.   
 
1.5.2 Re-interpretation of the policy process: the ‘Bureaucratic Imperative’ 
 
A potentially more realistic interpretation of rational policy-making in the real 
world is offered by the notion of ‘bounded rationality’ proposed by Simon (1957; 
1976), in which ‘rational decision-making has to be understood in terms of the 
organizational and psychological context within which decisions are taken’ 
(Parsons, 1995, p. 279).  This ‘bounded rationality’ takes account of the context in 
which decision-making takes place, the ‘passions’ of decision-makers, the 
impossibility of obtaining perfect knowledge on which to base decisions, and the 
human limitations of those who are making and implementing policy decisions 
(Ibid). 
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The notion of ‘bounded rationality’ characterises the ‘bureaucratic imperative’ 
model of the re-interpreted policy process (Rowlands and Turner, 1997; Hill, 
1993), in which rational attempts to achieve policy goals are subverted by 
organisational factors and cultures.  The cognitive limitations of individuals, and 
the organisational division of labour that encourages a limited ‘departmental’ 
perspective, detract from a perfect rationality.  In addition, personal and 
institutional values, norms, procedures and accepted wisdoms all affect policy in 
ways that are not always conducive to the achievement of the ideal outcomes 
(Burger, 1993; Rowlands and Turner, 1997).  Policy-making is essentially rule-
governed (Burger, 1993) and aimed at the achievement of consensus; this favours 
policy measures that tend towards conservative and cautious approaches, and the 
protection of the interests of the most powerful stakeholders (Rowlands and 
Turner, 1997).  The emphasis on rules and regulations tends towards a situation 
where conformity to these rules and regulations becomes an end in itself, rather 
than achievement of the original policy goals.  
 
The model also suggests that policy-makers tend to react in an incremental fashion 
to immediate short-term problems rather than engage in long-term planning.  
Solutions are based on a pragmatic agreement of what can be achieved in 
circumstances of uncertainty or ignorance: it is, as described by Rowlands and 
Turner (Ibid), ‘the art of the possible’.   
 
1.5.3 Re-interpretation of the policy process: the ‘Garbage Can’ 
 
Whereas the other two policy making models assume that policy formulation is 
inherently an orderly, rational, continuous and linear process, proceeding from an 
initial understanding of a problem to the application and evaluation of measures 
designed to resolve it (Rowlands and Turner, 1997), the garbage can model depicts 
policy making as 
 
…a garbage can into which policy goals, organizational rules and constraints, the ‘right 
climate’ and other often unexpected variables are thrown together.  The resulting policy 
 34
outcome is often unpredictable and because of the ambiguous nature of the policy goals 
themselves, often unrecognisable. 
(Kingdon, 1984) 
 
With garbage can policy formulation the place that an issue occupies on the policy 
agenda depends largely on the importance attached to it by the various 
stakeholders, and problems are ‘constructed’ in order to justify solutions.  The 
model is particularly useful in illuminating the early stages of policy formulation, 
in particular, the issue of problem definition.  There is an emphasis on the role of 
policy actors, and the influence that individual stakeholders can bring to bear on 
the policy process, particularly at the problem definition stage: indeed, Rowlands 
and Turner (Ibid) have characterised this model as being more about politics and 
power structures than about rational argument. 
 
1.5.4 Lessig’s models of direct and indirect regulation 
 
The models proposed by Lessig (1999), indicating the forces and modes of control 
that act to exert direct and indirect regulation on an issue or policy area, have also 
been used to interpret and understand the findings of this study.  It was anticipated 
that these would be of heuristic use in the light of the multiplicity and complexity 
of the forces and modes of control involved in regulatory measures towards 
Internet use and content.   
 
Baker (1989) recognised that control over knowledge can be exercised by a range 
of different forces and means, such as individuals, governments, the market place, 
legislation and social censure.  Peace (1997) has noted the complexity of legal, 
ethical, technical, governance and economic issues that are involved in the 
formulation of information policy at the micro level within academic institutions. 
At the macro level, the multiplicity of forces that constitute a ‘national information 
policy’ have been described by Rowlands and Turner (1997, p.48) as an amalgam 
of statutory law, common law, social norms, administrative practice, market forces 
and international agreements and treaties.  
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The model developed by Lessig (1999) can be used to illustrate the way in which 
these varied forces act to constrain and regulate information flows, as shown in 
Figure 1.2.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1.3: Lessig’s  model of direct regulation (Lessig, 1999, p.88) 
 
In the model, regulation is exerted on the central ‘dot’ by the different forces of 
law, the market, social norms and ‘architecture’ (in Lessig’s application of the 
model to Internet regulation, this is represented by ‘code’21). As an example to 
illustrate the different modalities of regulation represented by the model, 
censorship in the online or offline environment may be exercised through 
legislation (for example, Acts such as the Obscene Publications Acts of 1959 and 
1964); the market (for example, pricing strategies that restrict access to 
information to specific sectors of the population); norms (for example, religious 
beliefs that may, in particular, lead us to ‘self-censor’ our own access to 
information sources); and ‘architecture’ (for example, shelving pornographic 
                                            
21 For example, the use of age verification schemes, or filtering software. 
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magazines on the top-shelf to restrict access).  The regulation is direct and usually 
transparent to those whom it affects. 
 
However, regulation is not always direct, and this is particularly true of the many 
self-regulatory initiatives that have been implemented with regard to the control of 
Internet use and content.  Lessig has therefore further developed his model to 
illustrate the ways in which indirect regulation can operate, particularly through 
the implementation of legislation that exerts an influence on the other modalities 
of regulation.  This model of indirect regulation is shown in Figure 1.3. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.4: Lessig’s model of indirect regulation (Lessig, 1999, p.93) 
 
 
Market 
Norms 
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In this model direct regulation, whereby the law instructs citizens on how they 
should behave and punishes deviation from that behaviour, is replaced by 
legislative and regulatory initiatives that are used to modify the other modes of 
constraint (the market, social norms or technical ‘architecture’) in order to produce 
the desired control.  For example, market conditions (such as the cost of petrol) 
may be manipulated by government (for example, by higher taxation) in order to 
regulate behaviour (in this case, perhaps, to reduce traffic congestion).  With 
regard to the regulation of Internet content, the withholding of grants to libraries 
that do not implement filtering software22 is a good illustration of the government 
exercising indirect control.  As Lessig (Ibid) points out, this model of regulation 
risks producing a regulatory environment that lacks transparency and undermines 
political accountability.  Whereas a law restricting the use of private cars can be 
seen to be a clear statement of the government’s position on transport regulation, 
higher petrol prices through increased taxation may be confused by consumers as 
being the responsibility of ‘greedy’ oil companies and petrol station owners.   
 
However, an alternative perspective on self-regulation is offered by McIver et al 
(2003), who maintain that the kind of ‘soft law’ that is represented by self-
regulatory approaches, such as charters and codes of practices, is more effective 
than ‘hard law’ (legislative instruments) in coping with the ‘turbulence’ resulting 
from changing norms, values and systems in an era of globalisation and rapidly 
changing technical and political environments.  In some cases, it may also act as 
the ‘stepping stone’ to hard law.  This kind of ‘norm-based governance’, with rule-
making derived from established community values and unwritten norms could be 
argued to represent a more democratic form of regulation than the more top-down 
approach of formal hard law  (Harvard Law Review, 1999).   
 
 
 
 
                                            
22 As, for example, is the case with the Children’s Internet Protection Act in the US. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has introduced the research question that the study intended to 
explore, namely the alignment (or non-alignment) between measures being 
adopted at a range of organisational levels to regulate Internet use and content, and 
the protection of freedom of expression and freedom of access to information in 
the online environment.  It has suggested that the resolution of the apparent 
conflict between the role of universities and libraries in upholding freedom of 
expression and opposing censorship, whilst remaining responsive to the need to 
remain at all times within the confines of legality and to avoid undue offence to the 
sensitivities of their clientele, is of crucial importance.   
 
It has also introduced a range of models that were used in the study to inform and 
illuminate the policy-making process that led to the adoption of such measures.  
With regard to the theoretical context of the study, the work of Jűrgen Habermas 
has been discussed in reference to the concept of the public sphere and the ideal 
speech situation, as an analogy to the democratising potential of the online 
environment.  The rationale for the study has been presented on both a 
methodological basis, and in terms of the challenges to freedom of expression 
presented by current modes of Internet regulation.  With regard to the theoretical 
framework for the study, this has been located within the paradigm of post-
positivism.   
 
The next Chapter will outline the methods adopted in carrying out the research and 
will discuss the rationale behind the adoption of such methods, with particular 
reference to the relevant literature on methodology.  
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODS ADOPTED 
 
2.1 Introduction to the research strategy 
 
This chapter outlines the different stages of the research, describes the general 
characteristics of the methods chosen, and indicates the rationale for choosing each 
of the particular methods.  Limitations to the scope of the research are identified, 
as are any ethical issues pertinent to the research strategy. Chapters Three to Six 
inclusive of the thesis present the findings from the different components of the 
study, the relevance and implications of which, when taken as a coherent entity, 
are discussed in Chapter Seven.  Chapter Seven also discusses any limitations of 
the methods adopted that emerged in providing answers to the research questions.  
Chapter Eight offers reflection on alternative approaches that might have yielded 
additional useful data, and suggests areas for potential future investigation. 
 
The research involved three separate studies, although these were closely related in 
terms of aims and objectives, and there was some overlap in methods adopted: 
 
1. Longitudinal monitoring, over a fixed period, of policy formulation and 
implementation at national and transnational levels, to characterise the 
development of policy over time and the predominant nature of the policy 
making process.  This policy monitoring was carried out through a 
combination of analysis of primary and secondary documentary sources and 
participant observation. 
2. Institutional policy formulation, implementation, and impact, was investigated 
using the case study approach at three UK Higher Education Institutions 
(HEIs).  The case studies were carried out using a combination of methods 
including semi-structured interviews, observation and scrutiny of documentary 
evidence.  The information thus obtained was supplemented by that obtained 
from the third element of the research, the questionnaire study. 
3. At each case study site a questionnaire survey was carried out among a 
targeted group of students to determine their experiences of, and attitudes 
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towards, measures implemented in their institutions to control their network 
use. 
 
Given the use of multiple methods, attention was paid to applying an integrated 
approach to the data collection strategy, with different elements of the study 
aiming to build on, clarify, or test previous findings.  This process of triangulation 
was intended to ensure reliability and validity of the findings.   
 
In order to advance the theoretical understanding of policy formulation, the 
findings of the studies were analysed against the re-interpreted policy process 
models proposed by Rowlands and Turner (1997) and Turner (1999).  To gain 
further insight into the role of the different factors impacting on policy in this area, 
the models of direct and indirect regulation proposed by Lessig (1999) were also 
used to illuminate the findings of the study.  A further model is also proposed, 
based on the findings of the study, in order to build on the understanding and 
explanation that can be gained from the use of the existing models. 
 
2.2 Longitudinal monitoring of policy 
 
A central aim of the study was to monitor the development over time of national 
and international policy formulation with regard to regulation of Internet access 
and content.  In order to assure an appropriate depth and integrity of analysis of the 
issue under investigation, the monitoring was limited to policy approaches adopted 
by the UK at national level, and by the EU and the Council of Europe at 
transnational level.  This macro-level policy monitoring was important in terms of 
understanding the wider context within which institutional policy formulation was 
taking place, and in informing the debate concerning the desirability of alternative 
models of Internet governance.  The policy monitoring took place between 1998 
and 2003 inclusive, at a time when the issue of access to ‘unacceptable’ Internet 
content was receiving considerable media attention and was therefore high on the 
policy-making agenda of private and public sector institutions, national 
governments and international bodies.  Relevant literature was also reviewed in 
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order to conduct retrospective policy study for the years 1996 – 1997 inclusive, to 
set the context for subsequent policy initiatives.   
 
The methods used to carry out the policy monitoring consisted of the analysis of 
primary and secondary documentary sources, and participant observation in the 
process of formulating Council of Europe guidelines to access to networked 
information (see Sturges, 2000a).  Although some reference is made in the course 
of the thesis to important policy developments in other geographic areas where 
these have clearly impacted on the areas under study, the scale of the study 
precluded in-depth investigation beyond the stated geographical and political 
scope. 
 
2.2.1 Documentary analysis as a research method23 
 
Developments in policy approaches by the EU, the Council of Europe and the UK 
government towards the control of Internet use and content were monitored 
primarily by regular scanning of the professional literature, the news press and 
relevant websites.  In addition, a wide range of formal policy documents from 
government bodies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) were 
scrutinised. The chosen approach accorded with Denscombe’s assertion (1998, 
pp.158-159) that documentary analysis is appropriate in circumstances where 
documents can be considered as ‘a source of data in their own right’.  Such an 
approach also offers the advantage of relatively easy availability to data sources 
with fewer ethical problems than may be encountered in gaining access to people 
as research subjects. The use of official policy documents, whose primary purpose 
is to enhance accountability, offers potential advantages in terms of their attention 
to detail, systematic approach, accuracy and public availability.   However, such 
sources may also lack objectivity, offering a partial version and selective 
interpretation of the evidence, and thus require a high level of critical evaluation.  
Nevertheless, if a sufficiently critical approach is adopted, such documents can 
                                            
23 For the purposes of this study, and the discussion that follows in this chapter, ‘documents’ refers 
to a range of sources including websites, electronic mail messages and press coverage, as well as 
published hard copy sources.   
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reveal much through the analysis of the priorities and values conveyed through the 
text, and the manner in which different ideas are related through the text (Ibid).  
The focus on values in the current study meant that these official sources, in 
addition to being readily accessible, proved to be a rich source of data, in 
particular with regard to the analysis of policy priorities and emphases. 
 
The advantages of relatively easy (and generally non-costly) access to data 
presented by documentary analysis as a method are accompanied by those of the 
permanence of the data thus acquired, and its openness to scrutiny by subsequent 
researchers.  Creswell (1997) also adds the concept of the benefit obtained from 
using ‘thoughtful’ data, enriched by the attention given to its compilation.  
Nevertheless the method has its disadvantages and limitations: careful 
consideration needs to be given to the authenticity and credibility of the source, its 
representativeness, and its true meaning (for example, what has been left unsaid, 
and what is written ‘between the lines’?).   It is also important to use a balanced 
selection of documents that is influenced as little as possible by one’s own bias or 
a desire to confirm one’s own hypothesis (Bell, 1993, p.70).  This is particularly 
true in the case of value-critical research, such as the current study.  Relevant 
documentary sources may not be publicly available, or may be hard to locate, and 
issues of privacy, confidentiality and consent may also have to be addressed (Ibid).  
The wide public availability of a full range of relevant documentary sources on the 
Internet meant that the current research did not encounter significant access 
difficulties, although it was necessary to give continual consideration to issues of 
bias and representativeness.  Considerable press coverage and attention in the 
professional literature to issues related to ‘unacceptable’ Internet content further 
extended the range of sources. 
 
The advantages of use of the Internet as a data source for policy research of this 
nature have been described by Hamilton (2003): for example, its global reach, 
constant updating of topical issues, access to a broad spectrum of bodies with a 
wide range of viewpoints and easy retrieval facility.  However, these advantages 
are accompanied by some limitations, such as potential bias, the lack of scientific 
rigour and the questionable validity of some Internet sources, together with the 
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transitory nature of much of the information.  To resolve the latter issue, hard 
copies of important documents were made.  The issues of bias and validity were 
addressed by using careful evaluation of the source of documents. While it was 
necessary to recognise the possibility of bias in documents, it was also considered 
important that the documentary evidence reflected the wide range of viewpoints 
held by stakeholders in the Internet regulation debate. The data obtained via 
documentary analysis was further supplemented by insights obtained through 
participant observation in the Council of Europe policy formulation process (see 
2.2.2).  
 
In order to identify relevant documents for analysis, an initial literature search was 
carried out using a range of online databases and library catalogues.  New UK, 
European Union and Council of Europe official publications were scanned, as 
were the newspaper press and the professional library and information science 
literature.  The publication of policy documents on the World Wide Web meant 
that official websites of bodies such as the European Union and the Council of 
Europe provided a particularly rich source of primary documents.  In particular, 
the Legislative Observatory of the European Parliament24 that tracks the trajectory 
of EU policy initiatives through the various consultative and legislative stages was 
exceptionally useful.  This was further supplemented by the Quick Links25 current 
awareness service, which provides an email alerting service linking to online 
access to international coverage of information policy developments, together with 
a website that offers a helpful thematic gateway to relevant sites. 
 
There is a wide range of organisations with issues relating to Internet censorship at 
the centre of their mission.  Their websites also proved to be extremely useful in 
monitoring new policy initiatives relating to regulation of Internet access and 
content26. Useful UK sites of this kind included Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties, 
                                            
24 <http://wwwdb.europarl.eu.int/dors/oeil/en/default.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
25 <http://www.qlinks.net> [last checked 5/7/2004] 
 
26 The website addresses of these organisations can be found in the bibliography at the end of the 
thesis. 
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founded in 1997 by Yaman Akdeniz at the Cyberlaw Research Unit of the 
University of Leeds, with the purpose of promoting free speech and privacy on the 
Internet and raising public awareness of such issues; and the Campaign for Internet 
Freedom, an organisation dedicated to opposing online censorship.   
 
In the US, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), was founded in 1990 to 
“protect privacy, free expression, and access to public resources and information 
on-line, as well as to promote responsibility in new media” (Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, 1996).  The EFF launched the Blue Ribbon Campaign, which 
encourages websites favouring freedom of expression to carry the blue ribbon 
motif.  The EFF also hosts the site of Computers for Academic Freedom on its 
server, an organisation maintaining an archive of documents relating to on-line 
information access in the academic environment.  
 
Other useful US and international sites included those of the Citizens Internet 
Empowerment Coalition (CIEC); the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); the 
Center for Democracy and Technology, which advocates public policies that 
promote civil liberties in the networked environment; the Global Internet Liberties 
Campaign (GILC), an international coalition of organisations campaigning for 
human rights on the Internet; MIT SAFE, a student organisation originating in the 
US to fight against on-line censorship; and Peacefire, an organisation that 
campaigns for the rights of young people under 18 to unfiltered access to the 
Internet.  Clearly, many of these organisations have a US-focus, and they all have 
very specific value-laden missions as their driving force.  Although it was 
necessary to be aware of the potential bias reflected in their publications they 
proved to be an important alerting source to new policy initiatives and alternative 
perspectives on the Internet control debate.  
 
Thus, in addition to monitoring new monograph and journal publications, policy 
information was obtained from a wide range of online sources.  Details of all 
relevant documents examined were recorded on a database using Endnote27 
                                            
27 Available from Adept Scientific <http://www.adeptscientific.co.uk> 
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bibliographic software, and given identifying keywords and a unique accession 
number to facilitate retrieval of hard copy.  These documents were used to provide 
a chronological ‘narrative’ of policy updates and trends – the results of this 
analysis are described in Chapter 3, Policy Context and Policy Monitoring. 
 
2.2.2 Observation as a research method 
 
The monitoring of policy initiatives via the analysis of documentary sources 
facilitated a comprehensive longitudinal overview of policy developments, and in 
particular of regulatory and legislative mechanisms.  However, it did not permit an 
in-depth insight into the detailed internal aspects of the public policy formulation 
process.  In this respect, therefore, the opportunity to participate directly in the 
development of the Council of Europe’s Guidelines for Public Access to and 
Freedom of Expression in Networked Information (Sturges, 2000a) was invaluable 
in contributing towards this dimension of the study.  This participation involved 
responsibility for the monitoring and collation of responses to an electronic 
consultation on initial draft guidelines.  It also involved attendance at an 
international conference held in Helsinki in 1999 at which the guidelines were 
presented and debated, with responsibility for collating, summarising and feeding 
back the range of viewpoints that were expressed.  Direct observation of this 
process, as a ‘partial participant’ (Harvey and MacDonald, 1993, p.155) offered an 
illuminative insight into the nature of international policy formulation, and the 
difficulties presented by the need to reconcile a wide range of vested interests and 
culturally diverse opinions. 
 
Observation as a method for this part of the study was particularly useful; as Bell 
(1993) has noted, observation can reveal characteristics of individuals, groups or 
processes that would be impossible to discover by other means.  It should afford an 
insight into what actually happens, rather than society’s perception of events and 
can ‘provide data on previously unrecorded aspects of the social world’ (Harvey 
and MacDonald, 1993, p.188).  In the current context, the emphasis was very 
much on the policy process and the roles played by the different stakeholders in 
the process, making observation an appropriate method to adopt.   
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Nevertheless, observation does have some potential drawbacks.  Data is 
necessarily subject to the researcher’s interpretation, both in terms of what data are 
deemed significant and worthy of recording, and the meaning that is derived from 
the data.  It can be very difficult for the researcher to eliminate his or her own 
preconceptions, and therefore a systematic and reflexive approach on the part of 
the researcher is crucial.  Unless the observation is covert there is also 
considerable potential for the ‘researcher effect’ to influence events and processes.  
 
In the context of both the electronic consultation and participation in the Helsinki 
Conference, no particular attempts were made to conceal the observation process 
from other participants.  However, with regard to the electronic consultation, 
participants were not specifically aware of the researcher’s involvement in the 
research process for any purposes other than as intermediary for the Council of 
Europe in publicising the exercise.  Similarly, although many of those attending 
the Conference were aware of the researcher’s interest in observing the outcomes 
of the debate, they were not specifically made aware of the observation of the 
policy process itself.  There was, therefore, no cause for believing that the 
presence of the researcher would have had any direct effect on the conduct of the 
decision-making process.   
 
It is less easy to assume that the researcher was able to eliminate all bias and 
preconceptions in recording and interpreting the observation data; however, the 
role of collating the views expressed by participants and presenting these to the 
author of the Guidelines required a very systematic and objective approach.  A 
daily journal was kept in which detailed notes from panel sessions were recorded 
and this formed the basis of the feedback presented.  Considerable efforts were 
made to ensure that the formal feedback report represented an impartial and 
comprehensive reporting of all expressed viewpoints.   
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2.2.3 The Council of Europe consultation process  
 
The process of arriving at the agreed set of guidelines began with the appointment 
of Prof. Paul Sturges of the Department of Information Science at Loughborough 
University as Consultant to the Council of Europe’s Culture Committee, initially 
with a brief to prepare a report on Freedom of Expression and the Communications 
Networks (Sturges, 1998a28) which was accepted by the Culture Committee at a 
meeting in Strasbourg in October 1998.  The Council of Europe claims a 
commitment to the promotion of public access to information and freedom of 
expression as being central to the maintenance of democracy29.  With the advent of 
new information technologies, the Council stated a concern to ensure that these 
technologies would not only pose no risk to the protection of this freedom, but 
would be harnessed to enhance it.  Thus, following acceptance of the report on 
Freedom of Expression and the Communications Networks (Ibid), Sturges was 
further commissioned to draft recommendations for guidelines on public access 
and freedom of expression in networked information.  It was anticipated that the 
guidelines would be used by governments and European policy makers, as well as 
by all providers of local public access to the Internet. 
 
The initial draft of the guidelines was presented to the Council at a meeting of the 
Culture Committee on 21-23 April 199930.  They were also posted on the Council 
of Europe website for consultation.  In order to draw attention to the consultation, 
the researcher was requested to post an email soliciting responses to the 
consultation to a range of relevant email lists (details of these lists are provided in 
Table 4.1 on p.123).  However, due to delays on the Council’s part in posting the 
guidelines on their website, and technical problems with the automated response 
system, the consultation resulted in a very limited response.  The guidelines were 
                                            
28 <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co-operation/Culture/New_Technologies/N.I.T/ 
Working_strands/Public_access/Sturges98_18.asp> [Last accessed 30/4/2003] 
 
29 <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Communication_and_Research/Contacts_with_the_public/ 
About_Council_of_Europe/An_overview/Media_and_democracy/default.asp#TopOfPage> [Last 
accessed 22/7/2003] 
 
30 The researcher was given an opportunity to comment on an early draft of these guidelines, prior 
to their presentation to the Culture Committee. 
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also circulated to relevant bodies of the Council of Europe for discussion.  Most 
importantly, they were presented and discussed at an international conference on 
“Public Access and Freedom of Expression in Cultural Institutions”, attended by a 
wide range of policy makers, politicians, academics and representatives of 
professional organisations.  The researcher was also invited to attend as an 
observer, and requested to collate a summary of responses to the guidelines for 
their author. 
 
The results of this wide-ranging consultation exercise are discussed in Chapter 
Four of the thesis.  The resulting final draft of the Guidelines was approved by the 
Culture Committee in March 2000, and by the Council for Cultural Co-operation 
in May 2000.   
 
2.3 Case Study Approach 
 
…a case study is an exploration of a “bounded system” or a case (or multiple cases) over 
time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information 
rich in context.   
(Creswell, 1997, p.61) 
 
The term case study is commonly used to describe the in-depth investigation of a 
particular case, whose uniqueness warrants study (an intrinsic case study), or of a 
particular issue, the case being used as a means of illustrating particular aspects of 
the issue (an instrumental case study).  The latter would be a more accurate 
description of the case study approach adopted for the investigation under 
discussion.  A case study is bounded by time and by place, and is considered 
within its contextual setting.  Yin (1994, p.13) describes a case study as an 
empirical enquiry that 
 
• Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
•  the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
 
Since the investigation of the case is likely to involve a variety of different 
research methods, such as interviewing, documentary analysis, and observation, it 
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can more accurately be considered as a research approach, strategy or tradition, 
rather than as a research method. Yin (op cit) identifies three broad categories of 
case study research design: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory, the specific 
category for any particular study being determined by the theoretical perspective 
of the research question.  For the study in question, an exploratory approach was 
deemed most appropriate in the context of the research question.  A case study 
may involve a single case or multiple cases (a collective case study, as in this 
particular research project).  The data collection and analysis is usually qualitative 
in nature. 
 
In deciding whether to use the strategy of case study research to investigate a 
particular phenomenon, Creswell (1997) notes that it is an appropriate strategy for 
studying a case with clearly identified boundaries, where there is abundant 
contextual material available, and a wide range of information sources to provide 
an in-depth picture of the phenomenon under investigation.  He considers the 
rationale for using the case study approach thus: 
 
For a case study, the researcher should focus on an event, process or program for which 
we have no in-depth perspective on this “case”.  Conducting the case study provides a 
picture to help inform our practice or to see unexplored details of the case.   
(Ibid, p.95) 
 
Denscombe (1997) considers the case study to be the most suitable approach when 
the aim is to focus on a particular instance of the question to be investigated, and 
the approach should provide the means to “illuminate the general by looking at the 
particular”.  It is an appropriate approach when the researcher wishes to focus on 
relationships between forces, and the processes involved in shaping phenomena.  It 
should enable the researcher to determine how the different forces affect one 
another, and to explain why certain outcomes may happen, through investigation 
of issues in their natural setting (Ibid).  In the current context, the researcher aimed 
to explore the forces impacting on policy formulation within the chosen sites, and 
therefore the case study approach was considered to offer significant advantages 
and relevance.   
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Hamel (1993) considers that the case study approach allows for a more inductive 
approach affording a search for the meanings inherent in a phenomenon.  It is also 
more appropriate when one wishes to incorporate the actor’s point of view on an 
issue, rather than taking a more detached stance (Ibid).  Again, both these factors 
were considered important in the context of this study. 
 
Consideration of the nature of the research question should be paramount in 
determining whether to adopt the case study approach, the use of case studies 
being most suited to the investigation of ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ questions (Yin, 1994).  
It is also the ideal strategy when the researcher lacks control over actual 
behavioural events, and where the focus is on contemporary or historical 
phenomena.  Yin notes that the use of the case study approach ‘allows an 
investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life 
events’ (Ibid, p 3) and that it is ‘the method of choice when the phenomenon under 
study is not readily distinguishable from its context’ (Yin, 1993, p 1).   
 
Schramm supports the use of case studies for exploring decision-making processes 
commenting that 
 
The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it 
tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were 
implemented, and with what result. 
(Schramm, 1971, cited in Yin, 1994)   
 
According to Yin (Ibid), in a policy study context, the case study approach should 
be considered when the research aims to: 
 
• Explain causal links in real-life interventions; 
• Describe an intervention and the real-life context in which it occurred; 
• Illustrate topics within a policy evaluation; 
• Explore situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, 
single set of outcomes; 
 51
• Conduct a meta-evaluation. 
 
The advantages of selecting the use of case studies as a research approach include 
the ability such an approach offers to deal with the subtleties of complex social 
situations and relationship processes; the integration of a variety of research 
methods and use of multiple data sources, thus allowing for a high level of 
triangulation; the lack of pressure to impose controls on the investigation of 
naturally occurring phenomena; and its suitability for theory-building and theory-
testing (Denscombe, 1998).  These factors were all considered important to the 
current study. 
 
However, concerns have been expressed with regard to the desirability of the case 
study approach.  Yin (1994) has noted concerns relating to a potential lack of 
rigour, due to the difficulties of overcoming bias and of reporting evidence fairly 
and objectively; the low level of the basis for scientific generalisation of results; 
and the long time-scale needed to conduct the research, which can result in 
unmanageable amounts of amassed data.    Denscombe (1998) also questions the 
credibility of generalisations arising from case study research, which is often 
perceived as producing ‘soft’ data.  He notes the difficulties in defining boundaries 
to the object of study, in negotiating access and maintaining confidentiality, and in 
avoiding distorted results due to the ‘observer effect’.   
 
It was recognised here from an early stage that the results from the limited number 
of case study sites could not offer a high degree of generalisability.  However, it 
was anticipated that the insights obtained from the individual case study sites 
would be useful in terms of illuminating specific aspects of the policy formulation 
process within the institutions concerned.  By concentrating on policy formulation 
with regard to a single specific issue (the regulation of access to Internet content) it 
was possible to define the boundaries of the study with a reasonable degree of 
clarity.   
 
All interviewees were assured that their comments would be reported 
anonymously, and that the identity of the institutions under investigation would 
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not be generally disclosed.  Although it is indeed hard to ensure that results are not 
distorted as a result of the ‘interview effect’ the researcher was impressed by the 
apparent frankness and openness with which interviewees responded to her 
questions. The use of a semi-structured question framework with open questions 
was intended to ensure that the ‘voice’ of interviewees was heard, without undue 
leading from the researcher. The verbatim transcription of interviews ensured that 
the data was recorded in an unbiased and accurate fashion.  
 
It is important to ensure that every case serves a specific purpose within the overall 
research study (Yin, 1994), and is genuinely worthy of study (Creswell, 1997).  In 
deciding on which cases to select for study, Denscombe (1998) stresses the 
importance of ensuring that the selection of individual cases is suitable for the 
research purpose.  The researcher should have a clear idea of what the case is 
intended to explain, before selecting a specific case for study. Creswell (1997) 
suggests that a case should be selected on the basis of its ability to demonstrate 
different perspectives on a problem, process or event; on its accessibility; and by 
the extent to which it represents either a very ordinary example of a phenomenon, 
or a particularly unusual example of the same phenomenon.  In the context of the 
current study, apart from the issue of access, the sites were chosen on the basis that 
they would offer a range of types of institution at different stages of maturity.  It 
was hoped that this would enable comparison of a variety of policy formulation 
models.  
With reference to data collection, a variety of research methods are appropriate for 
case study research, including interviewing (in person or by telephone, on a one-
to-one basis or via focus groups), observation (including, where appropriate, 
participant observation), documentary analysis and questionnaire surveys.  
Whatever methods are chosen, it is to be expected that most case study research 
will involve a range of different data sources, chosen for their anticipated 
relevance to the research question.  For this study, the methods chosen involved a 
combination of face-to-face semi-structured interviews, non-participant 
observation and documentary analysis.  The data obtained was further 
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supplemented with the findings from a questionnaire survey conducted with a 
selected group of undergraduate students at each of the case study sites (see 2.4).  
 
Prior to the commencement of data collection a case study protocol was prepared 
(Appendix One) which provided an overview of the project covering details of the 
research questions to be investigated, proposed field procedures and ethical issues 
such as confidentiality and anonymity.  In addition to assisting the researcher in 
compiling question frameworks and guiding data collection, this protocol was used 
to provide information about the study for those responsible for granting access to 
the case study sites. It was also circulated in advance of interviews to respondents 
to provide them with information concerning the nature and purpose of the study.  
The first case study site (Institution A) was initially regarded as a pilot site for 
testing the research instruments, but as these were found to require no further 
modification, data from this site was regarded as reliable and is included in the 
discussion of the findings of the case studies.   
 
A matrix detailing interviews carried out and documents obtained at each site was 
completed (Appendices Two and Three).  In addition, a journal recording field 
notes, observations and reflections was maintained.   Interviewees were selected 
according to their role in the institution, as detailed in the case study protocol. 
Efforts were made to ensure that a similar sample of personnel was interviewed at 
each institution, although roles were not always exactly matched. Some use was 
made of the ‘snowballing’ technique in identifying the most relevant personnel for 
interview, as the organisational structure and allocation of responsibilities did vary 
for each institution.   
 
The question framework, although based on the research questions identified in the 
case study protocol, was modified somewhat for each interview according to the 
role of the interviewee.  Thus, for example, systems personnel were questioned in 
greater depth on the technical aspects of network regulation, whereas academic 
staff were asked more questions about their day-to-day use of the network and 
what effects institutional policies appeared to exert on this. Interviews were 
recorded and transcribed.  In two instances, the interviewees requested a copy of 
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the question framework in advance.  In another instance, the recording failed; this 
experience showed the value of making a simultaneous hand-written record of 
responses alongside tape recording.  In this instance, the answers were written up 
shortly after the interview had taken place to ensure maximum recall, and the 
transcript submitted to the interviewee to check whether it represented a true 
recording of his responses. 
 
Data from the case studies were analysed on both a within-case and cross-case 
basis.  Specific themes emerging from the data relevant to the research questions 
were identified in order to obtain a picture of the policy formulation process at 
each institution, and of the impact of policy decisions on freedom of enquiry. 
Alternative perspectives of control and freedom of information, different policy 
formulation models and differing governance structures at each of the institutions 
were considered in the final analysis.  These results are described in Chapter Five 
of the thesis and their implications discussed in Chapter Seven. 
    
2.4 Questionnaire survey  
 
The third component of the research project was intended to supplement and 
triangulate the data obtained from the case studies by allowing the voice of 
students at each of the institutions to be heard.  The methods used in the case study 
approach had thus far provided a substantial insight into the policy formulation 
process and the impact of policy measures on academic and support personnel at 
each case study site.  However, it was less clear what effect policy measures were 
having on the student experience.  Interviews with a very small number of students 
were not seen as being a reliable method of gaining an insight into the student 
experience and it would not have been practical to conduct large numbers of 
student interviews.  Thus it was decided to use a questionnaire to explore the use 
of university computer networks and the opinions of a wider group of students at 
each site than would have been possible from personal interview. Even so, the 
numbers of respondents at each site were not considered to be sufficient to allow 
for a high degree of generalisation to the student body in total.  The purpose of the 
survey was therefore limited primarily to determining whether the implementation 
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and promotion of Computer Use regulations and policies could be seen to have any 
discernible impact on the targeted group of students’ use, and misuse, of university 
computer network facilities, including their freedom of enquiry and freedom of 
access to information. 
 
Harvey and MacDonald (1993, p.100) suggest that a common feature of 
questionnaires as a research strategy is that they ‘all involve asking people 
questions and summarising the answers in quantitative terms’.  It is appropriate as 
a strategy for measuring and recording empirical data (Denscombe, 1998) and can 
be useful as a means of comparing and relating data, but is less suited to proving 
causal relationships.  This can lead to a tendency towards empiricism whilst 
neglecting the implications of the findings.  It does have the advantage of being a 
relatively cost-effective and quick strategy, offering wide and inclusive data 
collection, although the results tend to favour breadth rather than depth (Ibid).  The 
accuracy of the results are dependent on the degree of honesty with which 
informants respond, and, unless the survey is repeated over time, it offers a “frozen 
image” (Harvey and Macdonald, 1993, p.136) that does not provide a longitudinal 
insight into the phenomenon under investigation. 
 
In the current context it was hoped only to be able to get a “snapshot” of what was 
happening with regard to students’ awareness of policy measures in place at their 
university, the effects of such measures on their computer use and their attitudes 
towards these measures.  Thus it was felt that, despite the disadvantages outlined 
above, the survey method would be a reliable and valid strategy for data collection.  
The quantitative nature of the data obtained would be supplemented by the 
qualitative data obtained from the case study approach.  It was not considered 
relevant or appropriate to take a longitudinal approach to this area of data 
collection.  With regard to honesty, it was felt that the anonymous nature of the 
data collection and the creation of a ‘safe’ environment (Belson, 1986, p.19) would  
encourage honesty and openness in responding to what were, in some cases, 
relatively sensitive and personal questions.   
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A copy of the questionnaire is provided as Appendix Four.  The questionnaire 
design was based on a significantly modified version of that used by Prior (2001) 
in her study into the decision-making process involved in the introduction of 
CCTV into a university environment.  The specific questions to be asked were 
based on the original research questions, which were further broken down into 
dimensions with a number of variables.  Thus questions related to: 
 
• The purposes and nature of usage of university network facilities (Q.1, 5, 6); 
• Awareness of university policies and regulations relating to computer use 
(Q.2); 
• Awareness of blocking or filtering of website access (Q.3); 
• Awareness of monitoring of website access or email usage (Q.4); 
• Experience of offence as a result of other users’ computer usage (Q.7). 
 
In addition, a simple Likert scale was used to explore students’ attitudes to: 
 
• Monitoring of web access and email usage (Q.8, 10); 
• Blocking of access to offensive content (Q.9); 
• The protection of their privacy whilst online (Q.11); 
• The ability of students to bypass measures to control their network use (Q.13); 
• The extent to which they felt they have a right to be informed or consulted 
about measures taken by the university to control or monitor their network use 
(Q.14). 
 
In order to challenge their thinking about the issues involved, they were also asked 
about what their expectations of their rights would be if they were in charge of 
university computing facilities.  The Likert scale was used to rate their agreement 
with a range of statements relating to whether, in such circumstances, they would 
expect to have the right to: 
 
• Block access to offensive (but legal) content (Q.14); 
• Block access to illegal content (Q.15); 
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• Monitor email content (Q.16). 
 
The final question using the Likert scale (Q.17) concerned their attitudes towards 
the rights of government to monitor email and web use, in the interests of national 
defence and security.  This question was felt to be important in the context of the 
monitoring of policy measures at macro level, particularly as the fieldwork was 
carried out at the time that legislative measures such as the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (Parliament, 2000a)31 and the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 (Parliament, 2001)32 were receiving considerable 
media attention.   
 
Finally, the respondents were given the opportunity to add any further comments 
that they wished to make by the use of an open question (Q.18).  They were also 
asked to provide information on their course, which year of their course they were 
in, their gender, and their age bracket.  These last variables were used only as a 
means of verifying the character and inter-institutional comparability of the 
student groups. 
 
It was anticipated that the choice of closed questions, and the use of a well-tested 
scale such as the Likert Scale, would enhance the reliability of the data collection 
and analysis, whilst validity would be achieved by defining the questions through 
reference to the theoretical constructs of the overall research questions.  Efforts 
were made to ensure that the questions followed a logical sequence, and in 
particular, that the more difficult, sensitive or personal questions came later in the 
sequence.  Other principles guiding the framing of questions were that they should 
make sense to respondents; they should avoid the use of jargon; they should be 
unambiguous; they should be short and clear; and leading questions should be 
avoided.   
 
                                            
31 <http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000023.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
32 <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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Because of the sensitive nature of some of the questions, and in order to assess 
content validity, the questionnaire was submitted for review by the Research 
Supervisor and Research Director of the project to ensure that it was considered to 
be ethically acceptable as well as valid in its approach.  This led to one or two 
minor alterations.  It was then piloted with a small number of students prior to full 
administration.  The data obtained from these pilot surveys was not included in the 
formal data collection, and again, the piloting led to minor amendments to 
overcome some ambiguities in the wording of questions. 
  
It was decided that it would be preferable to administer the questionnaire in a 
controlled environment and the start of formal student tuition sessions were 
identified as suitable for this.  This was intended partly to ensure a good response 
rate, but given the nature of the specific questions it also gave an opportunity to 
ensure that respondents understood the confidential and anonymous nature of the 
exercise.  Administration of the questionnaire by the researcher herself, rather than 
by their tutors, was considered essential to emphasise distance from university 
officialdom and thereby to promote honesty on the part of student respondents.  
The need to gain access to students during class contact time meant that sampling 
was based on the use of ‘random cluster samples’ (Harvey and MacDonald, 
p.118).  No attempts were made to control for variables such as gender.  Whilst 
this approach could not be considered sufficiently rigorous to allow for 
generalisation to the whole student population, this was not the intention of the 
survey and therefore this sampling method was considered acceptable in the 
specific context.   
 
In order to analyse the data a coding frame was designed (Appendix Five), and the 
SPSS software package was used to record the variables for each respondent and 
to conduct the subsequent data analysis.  Since the intention was only to provide a 
descriptive outline of students’ awareness of policies relating to computer use, 
their actual use of network facilities and their attitudes to regulation of this use, the 
statistical analysis was kept simple.  Thus frequency tables and percentages were 
calculated for each question, but correlations between variables were not generally 
explored.   
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2.5 Scope of the research 
 
Limitations to the scope of the research have already been highlighted, and the 
rationale behind such limitations discussed, so they will only be summarised here.  
Thus, with regard to the policy monitoring, the scope was limited in respect of 
 
• Chronological period – this was limited to the period between 1998 and 2003, 
although some limited reference to earlier policy measures is made in order to 
contextualise subsequent developments; 
• Geographical and political coverage – this was limited to policy formulation 
within the UK, the Council of Europe and at European Union level; 
• Content – despite the potential impact on freedom of access to information and 
freedom of expression on the Internet of other measures such as data protection 
legislation, the monitoring focused on policy specifically aimed at controlling 
access to illegal, offensive or harmful Internet content. 
 
With regard to the academic case studies, these were limited to three Higher 
Education Institutions.  It is recognised that this does not allow for generalisation 
of the results of the study across the UK higher education sector.  However, it was 
not the intention of the researcher to obtain generalisable data. Instead, it was 
hoped to gain an insight into policy formulation processes in order to enhance the 
understanding of the theoretical basis of decision-making and the impact of policy 
measures at each institution, at a specific point in time.  This is equally true of the 
data obtained through the questionnaire survey, which was used to obtain a 
“snapshot” of students’ use of computer networks and their attitudes towards 
regulatory measures. 
 
2.6 Ethical considerations of the research strategy 
 
With regard to the longitudinal monitoring of policy initiatives at UK, EU and 
Council of Europe levels that was conducted through documentary analysis, no 
ethical issues were identified; all sources used were publicly available for 
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consultation.  Similarly, it was not considered that there were significant ethical 
issues attached to the researcher’s involvement in the Council of Europe policy 
formulation process. 
 
However, with regard to the institutional case studies and the involvement of 
student respondents in the questionnaire survey, there were significant issues of 
confidentiality and anonymity to be considered.  At institutional level, a concern 
on the part of university administrators not to risk their institutions being portrayed 
in a negative light meant that assurances of institutional anonymity had to be 
given.  Similarly, at the level of individual respondents, guarantees that their 
contributions would not be openly attributed were a necessary requirement in order 
to ensure their openness with the researcher.  The same was true of student 
respondents to the questionnaire survey: in many cases they were, in effect, 
acknowledging their involvement in illegal activities and their confidence in the 
confidentiality and anonymity of their responses was crucial. 
  
2.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has discussed the different methods used in the overall research 
strategy that was adopted.  In particular, it has aimed to present the rationale for 
the use of these methods, and to consider their appropriateness with reference to 
the extensive methodological literature available.  It has also aimed to make 
explicit the linkage between the different components of the overall study.  
Limitations in the scope of the research have been identified and specific ethical 
issues attached to carrying out the research have been discussed.  Chapter Seven 
will include discussion of the appropriateness of the research strategy in practice, 
and will consider any ways identified in the course of the research in which it was 
felt that the research strategy could have been improved. 
 
The next three chapters will present the findings of the different elements of the 
research, the implications of which will then be discussed in Chapter Seven.   
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CHAPTER THREE: POLICY CONTEXT AND POLICY PROCESS – THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
The Internet has already thrown up a host of legal and political conundrums, but these are 
only a small foretaste of the dilemmas – about privacy, security, intellectual property and 
the nature of government itself – that will have to be faced over the coming decades.  
(Manasian, 2003) 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the longitudinal policy monitoring at 
European Union (EU) and UK national levels, focussing on the debate about what 
governments, regulators or societies in general should ‘do’ about Internet content 
(Newey, 1999).  The investigation was guided by the ‘distributive perspective’, 
with a concern on the part of the researcher to identify and uncover policy 
developments that constrain access to information on the Internet, and that have an 
inhibitory effect on the ability to express oneself freely online in accordance with 
one’s own beliefs and values. 
 
Discussion of EU policy initiatives has been placed before that of UK measures, as 
much of the policy and legislation in this context in the UK has been influenced 
by, or derived directly from, that developed at EU level.  The chapter includes an 
initial discussion of the scope and definition of information policy in general, 
before considering the relevance of information policy specifically as it applies to 
the Internet.   The findings of the policy monitoring with regard to Council of 
Europe initiatives will be presented in the next Chapter.  
 
Discussion of the implications of the findings of the policy monitoring and 
analysis at all levels will follow in Chapter Seven of the thesis, in the context of 
the policy process models introduced previously. 
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3.2 Information policy – some definitional dilemmas 
 
Information policy is the set of all public laws, regulations and policies that encourage, 
discourage or regulate the creation, use, storage and communication of information.   
(Weingarten, 1989) 
 
‘Information Policy’ itself is a concept that suffers from a lack of any common, 
accepted definition (Browne, 1997a).  Although the above definition encompasses 
all aspects of information policy in the broadest sense, it is particularly useful to 
the current study on account of its emphasis on regulation of the use and 
communication of information.  Burger defines information policy in even wider 
terms as those ‘societal mechanisms used to control information, and the societal 
effects of applying those mechanisms’ (Burger, 1993).  Thus recognition is given 
to the two-way policy process: policy is not only embedded in, and influenced by, 
the social, political and cultural environment in which it is formulated, but it also 
acts to modify that environment.  This bi-directional effect is particularly evident 
with respect to the Internet, as noted by Slevin: the Internet both affects, and is 
affected by, government regulation (Slevin, 2000). 
 
Moore identifies a value-driven goal of information policy as comprising ‘the 
development of a legislative and regulatory framework within which the use and 
exchange of information is encouraged, while protecting intellectual property and 
other rights’, thus achieving a balance between the rights and responsibilities of 
individuals and institutions (Moore, 1993, p.284).  He also notes the importance of 
formulating policies capable of accommodating the changing requirements of 
rapidly developing Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).  
 
Overman and Cahill (1990) distinguish between two competing perspectives in 
information policy, those that are primarily restrictive in purpose (for example, 
policies protecting security and ownership of information), and those that are 
distributive in intent (thus, for example, freedom of information and expression).  
They cite the value of privacy as potentially belonging to either perspective, 
depending on context: thus policies that protect the privacy of an individual to 
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access information without surveillance would be distributive in effect, whereas 
those aimed at protecting the privacy of personal data would be restrictive.  The 
tensions inherent as a result of these competing normative and moral assumptions 
that underpin practices in the sphere of information management lead to what 
Overman and Cahill (Ibid) describe as a ‘policy impossibility’.  
 
3.3 Information policy and the Internet 
 
The Internet interprets censorship as damage, and routes around it. 33 
 
Although many national governments, and indeed supranational organisations, 
were initially slow to understand the relevance of the development of the Internet 
to the public policy arena, there has more recently been a widespread enthusiasm 
for implementing measures that encourage or constrain the growth of Internet use 
within their jurisdictions. Lan and Falcone (1997) provide a compelling argument 
justifying the formulation of national policies on Internet access.  Their argument 
is as follows: if it is true that ‘information is power’34 then complete access to all 
information by all people would ensure the equalization of the distribution of 
power.  The Internet is a mechanism that could theoretically provide access to all 
information by all people.   
 
However, governments do not always see universal access to perfect information 
as being in their own best interests.  Indeed, the early history of the Internet has 
shown its potential as an instrument of subversion and resistance.  An example of 
the democratising powers of communications technologies that are not easily 
                                            
33 This quotation has been attributed to John Gilmore (Electronic Frontier Foundation). [Gilmore 
states: "I have never found where I first said this. But everyone believes it was me, as do I." Also in 
New York Times 1/15/1996, quoted in CACM 39(7):13. From <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ 
people/reagle/inet-quotations-19990709.html>, accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
34 Adapted from Francis Bacon ‘Nam et ipsa scientia potestas est’ [Knowledge itself is power] 
Religious Meditations of Heresis.n.d 
. 
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subject to authoritarian control can be found in the dissolution of the former Soviet 
Union, as described by McGowan (1991) who suggests that ‘Telecommunications 
played as much of a role as pickaxes and shovels in bringing down the Berlin Wall 
and the barbed wire of the Iron Curtain’.  There are many examples of the use of 
the Internet to effect the ‘globalisation of opposition’ (Vidal, 2000) and resistance 
to authoritarian or unpopular regimes.  Examples of such use have been offered by, 
among many others, Castells (1997); Sussman (1997); Barkham (1998); Hill and 
Hughes (1998); and Vidal (op. cit.).  
 
Nevertheless, attempts by governments to censor Internet content are bound to 
encounter difficulties, not least as a result of the architecture of the technology 
itself. Designed originally to withstand attack, it could be suggested that the 
Internet is inherently resistant to conventional forms of governance. Globalisation 
of the Internet also brings with it problems arising from differing cultural, legal 
and social norms.  Despite this, the Internet in itself is not a democracy, and even 
in cyberspace it could be argued that power does not reside with those who seek 
access to information but rather with those who determine what information will 
be available and who will have access to it.  An alternative perspective resulting 
from the ‘knowledge is power’ observation was offered by Line in his 1990 
Library Association presidential address in commenting ‘That knowledge is power 
has been recognised as a commonplace since Bacon uttered it.  Control over who 
has knowledge and how much is available is perhaps an even greater source of 
power than knowledge itself’ (cited in Curry, 1997, pp.204-205). A similar 
argument has been put forward by Sturges (1998) who suggests a reversal of 
Bacon’s dictum to reflect a reality where ‘Power is information’, as it is power that 
defines and delimits information, that governs its availability and that determines 
its effects.   
 
Thus, despite the inherent difficulties of ‘censoring’ the Internet, attempts by 
governments and other bodies to impose regulatory authority on the Internet mean 
that it cannot accurately be described as the ‘lawless zone’ that many of the 
original pioneers envisaged it to be (Reidenberg, 1996; Valauskas, 1996; O’Toole, 
1998; Henley, 2000; Campbell and Machet, 1999; Walker, Wall and Akdeniz, 
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2000).  This is partly because, although implementation may be fraught with 
difficulties, cyberspace is not exempt from the existing ‘terrestrial’ laws operating 
in a particular jurisdiction.  The norms promoted by the early Internet pioneers that 
led to a ‘code of practice’ for cyberspace35 also gave rise to the Internet being 
described as ‘one of the most self-regulated and self-protected places in the world’ 
(Valauskas, 1996).   
 
In addition, a number of amendments to existing legislation to accommodate the 
changed electronic environment, as well as new policy and legislative initiatives 
specifically aimed at the regulation of cyberspace at both national and international 
levels, have been adopted in attempts to increase the accountability and control of 
Internet use.  The relative lack of Internet connectivity in the Arab States region is 
given by Lan and Falcone (1997) as an example of the deliberate control that can 
be exercised to prevent access to information.  This kind of control not only has a 
constraining effect on individual freedom, but also risks hindering the 
development of the Internet and the ability of Nation States to derive economic 
and social benefits through the development of e-commerce (Wall, 2000).   
Economic constraints and lack of network infrastructure have already created a 
‘digital divide’ that denies Internet access to a substantial proportion of the world’s 
population36 and that ‘allows a partial commodification of political debate by the 
relatively rich and powerful’ (Walker, 2000, p.146).   
 
3.4 European Union policy development towards the Internet 
 
The following sections describe the outcomes of the monitoring exercise analysing 
the common characteristics of policy initiatives towards Internet regulation that 
have prevailed within the EU policy-making arena.  The results of a retrospective 
                                            
35 These ‘virtual rules of conduct’ have been outlined as: 1.  Do nothing that would in any way 
harm the Internet functionally; 2.  Take care in communicating with others over the Internet 
(observe ‘netiquette’); 3. Respect bandwidth.  Cited in Valauskas (1996). 
 
36 In 2000, 93% of the world’s population had no online access (Castells, 2001, p.261). 
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policy study covering the years 1996-1998 inclusive will be presented initially in 
order to set the context for the analysis of subsequent policy development. It 
should be noted that the scope of the study does not allow for a comprehensive 
analysis of the institutional structure and organisation of the various consultative 
and decision-making organs of the EU37, but concentrates rather on the impact of 
factors seen to be having a direct impact in shaping policy towards the regulation 
of Internet access and content.   
 
A wide range of social and political concerns with consequences for individual 
Internet content and access, including data protection, privacy, data retention and 
surveillance, have also received much policy attention within the EU and beyond, 
and these are discussed briefly.  However, despite the obvious relevance of such 
measures to freedom of expression and freedom of access to information, the 
emphasis of this analysis was on policy measures that have an explicit objective of 
controlling Internet content and access. 
 
3.4.1 The beginnings of the EU debate on Internet content 
 
During the early 1990s the EU focussed much of its ICT policy on the 
competitiveness of European information technology products and the creation of 
the ‘Information Society’, albeit with a recognition that 
 
The notion of a European Information Society comes closer than the information 
superhighway metaphor in reflecting the Commission’s belief that the political and social 
consequences of using modern ICTs go far beyond just economic or technological 
reforms.  These innovations are changing societies as a whole…the way in which we live, 
learn and work.   
(Bangemann, 1995) 
 
                                            
37 However, an abundance of useful information on the EU institutions can be found on the EU 
website <http://europa.eu.int> [Last accessed 5/7/2004], or in publications such as Bainbridge 
(1995) and Borchardt (2000). 
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The concept of a ‘European Information Society’, with its emphasis on the market, 
economic growth and the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector, firmly 
established the context of subsequent initiatives with regard to the Internet. 
Although there was an acknowledgement of the importance of the potential 
political and social impact of the new technologies, much of the emphasis of early 
EU information policy had been heavily biased towards funding Research and 
Development activity to enhance competitiveness, and to address high 
unemployment, rather than on fundamental policy-making (Mahon, 1997; 
Dearnley and Feather, 2001).   
 
The EU was much slower to address issues of Internet content than was the US, 
and the debate in Europe has been more fragmented than it has in the US 
(Charlesworth, 2000a).  This is in part a result of the cultural and linguistic 
diversity of Member States, and in part through the lack of an overriding First 
Amendment protecting freedom of speech. The slower initial penetration of the 
Internet in Europe was another cause of the relatively late entrance of the EU into 
the content regulation forum (Campbell and Machet, 1999).  However, this may 
also have been driven by a common-sense intention to approach the issue with due 
thought and consideration: a Commission communication of 1996 argued that 
‘Over-hasty legislation should be avoided until it is clear where and what type of 
intervention is required’ (European Commission, 1996a, cited in Campbell and 
Machet, 1999). 
 
In addition to this initial caution on the part of the Commission, individual 
Member States have also tended to delay implementing legislation in accordance 
with EU policy relating to Internet regulation.  According to Charlesworth (Ibid) 
this can be attributed to: 
 
• Resistance from entrenched commercial interest groups to perceived threats to 
their existing rights;  
• The fear of national governments of losing their autonomy to control online 
activities; 
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• A lack of understanding of the technical workings of the Internet and its 
implications for societal norms on the part of legislators; 
• The rapid pace of technological development, of which national governments 
and legislators have been unable to keep abreast. 
 
The principle of subsidiarity38 has traditionally favoured leaving the regulation of 
broadcasting and other mass media largely in the hands of national authorities 
(Cincera, 1999).  However, the advent of new technologies, increased technical 
and economic convergence, the increasingly ‘trans-frontier’ reach of media such as 
the Internet and cable and satellite broadcasting, together with the widening scope 
of the EU project beyond the creation of a ‘common market’ – for instance, the 
ambition to ‘promote cultural policies, and to stimulate the creation of consensus 
between European cultures’ (Ibid, p.75) – have all led to a greater level of EU 
intervention in the media arena.  In particular, Pillar Three of the Maastricht Treaty 
(European Commission, 1992), allowing for co-operation in the field of justice and 
home affairs, provides a basis for the Commission’s involvement in co-ordinating 
the efforts of national law enforcement agencies with regard to illegal content on 
the Internet (Campbell and Machet, 1999, p.145; Akdeniz and Walker, 2000, 
pp.345-6). 
 
And so by the mid 1990s the EU had started to express interest in the control of 
‘harmful’ and illegal Internet content, particularly with a view to protecting the 
interests of minors. The debate was initiated by the Commission in 1996, with the 
Commission’s Communication Paper on Illegal and Harmful Content on the 
Internet (European Commission, 1996b), which set the scene for the subsequent 
Action Plan (European Commission, 1997a).  The Communication Paper proposed 
that the solution to controlling access to illegal and harmful content lay in 
 
                                            
38 This stipulates that for areas of joint competence the EU should only take action where the scale 
or effects of a particular policy area makes action at the EU level more effective than individual 
action by Member States. 
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…a combination of self-control of the service providers, new technical solutions such as 
rating systems and filtering software, awareness actions for parents and teachers, 
information on risks and possibilities to limit these risks.  
(European Commission, 1996b) 
 
This initial debate identified several key themes that have continued to characterise 
the approach of the EU to the issue, namely that self-regulation would play a 
central role in content control; that, given the diversity of the Member States, 
‘illegal content’ would be easier to categorise than ‘harmful content’; that, to be 
effective, any system of Internet content regulation would have to be global; and 
that responsibility for content should rest with producers and distributors, and not 
with intermediaries such as ISPs (Charlesworth, 2000, pp.59-60).  It does have to 
be noted, however, that the latter principle has not been without subsequent 
challenge in some Member States39. 
  
In April 1997 the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on the Commission 
Communication that supported the initiatives undertaken by the Commission and 
stressed the need for international co-operation to be initiated and co-ordinated by 
the Commission. In particular, it called on the Commission to propose, after 
consultation with the Parliament, a common framework for self-regulation at EU 
level.  The framework was to include 
 
1. Objectives in terms of the protection of minors and human dignity; 
2. Principles governing the representation of the industries concerned and the 
decision-making procedures; 
3. Measures to encourage private enterprise to develop message protection 
and filtering software; 
                                            
39 As for example in the 1998 case in Germany of Compu-Serve Chief Executive Felix Somm (see 
Traynor, 1998) and the UK court case between Demon Internet Ltd and Godfrey (see Chapter 
Three, p.92-). 
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4. Appropriate measures for ensuring that all instances of child pornography 
uncovered on computer networks are reported to the police and shared with 
Europol and Interpol. 
 
The Resolution also calls on the Commission and the Member States to encourage 
the development of a common international rating system compatible with the 
PICS (Platform for Internet Content Selection) protocol, and sufficiently flexible 
to accommodate cultural differences. In addition, it calls upon the Commission to 
submit proposals for a common regulation of liability for Internet content  
(European Commission, 1997b).  
 
3.4.2 Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity 
 
In October 1996, at much the same time as the Commission Communication was 
being debated, a Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in 
Audiovisual and Information Services (European Commission, 1996c) was 
adopted by the Commission.  The Green Paper was intended to ‘stimulate public 
debate in order to identify the main problems posed by new information services 
and to identify measures needed’ (European Commission, 1997b).  The Green 
Paper culminated in a Proposal for a Council Recommendation (European 
Commission, 1997c), which stated that the role of the EU is to ‘improve the 
effectiveness of national measures by ensuring a minimum level of coherence in 
the development of national self-regulatory frameworks and by encouraging co-
operation at European level’ (Campbell and Machet, 1999, p.151). The Council 
adopted the Recommendation in May 1998.  
 
With regard to Internet content the Green Paper (and subsequent 
Recommendation) requested ISPs to develop codes of conduct so as to better apply 
and clarify current legislation.  It also offered guidelines for the development of 
national self-regulation regarding the protection of minors and human dignity, 
based on three key elements: 
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• The involvement of all interested parties (Government, industry, service and 
access providers, and user associations) in the production of codes of conduct; 
• The implementation of codes of conduct by the industry; 
• The evaluation of measures taken. 
 
Broad recognition was given to the role of the EU in co-ordinating the 
development of national self-regulation, and of the commitment of the EU towards 
ensuring that measures taken are consistent with observance of Articles 8 and 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights40 (Council of Europe, 1950).  
Particular emphasis was placed on measures that support parental control and the 
promotion of access to high quality content, including the further development of 
technology-supported measures such as content rating and filtering systems.  
 
A particularly interesting response to the consultation on the Green Paper on the 
Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual and Information Services  
(European Commission, 1996c) and on the earlier Communication on Illegal and 
harmful content (European Commission, 1996b) was made by the European 
Commission Legal Advisory Board in early 1997 (European Commission Legal 
and Advisory Board, 1997).  This endorsed a number of important principles set 
out in the documents, and raised some additional points for consideration.  Among 
those that it emphasised were: 
 
• Existing general rules such as laws intended to protect minors and human 
dignity should apply equally to all media – the Internet is not a “sphere apart” 
subject only to self-regulation and exempt from national law; 
• The Internet is ‘a positive instrument, empowering citizens and educators, 
lowering the barriers to the creation and distribution of content and offering 
universal access to ever richer sources of digital information’ – thus any action 
taken to deal with ‘atypical’ use should not have a disproportionate impact on 
Internet users and the industry as a whole; 
                                            
40 Relating to the rights of privacy and of freedom of expression (see Chapter Four, pp.108-110). 
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• Responsibility for prosecuting and punishing those responsible for illegal 
content remains with national law-enforcement agencies; 
• The potential empowerment of users through increased transparency of 
government and availability of public sector information should be at the 
forefront of the debate; 
• ISPs are responsible for their own content that they make available for use, but 
they are not responsible for third party content to which they merely provide 
access for use, unless they can ‘reasonably be said to have had knowledge 
about its possibly illegal or harmful content and blocking its use is both 
technically possible and can be reasonably expected’; 
• Information on the Internet should be allowed the same free circulation as 
paper-based information.  The requirements of Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 1950) should guide 
decisions on the proportionality of any measures restricting freedom of 
expression and any regulatory approach to control harmful content should 
abide by the terms of Article; 
• It is important to recognise the distinction made in the Green Paper between 
measures to control content defined as illegal by national legislation, and that 
which is regarded as possibly harmful; 
• Anonymous communication is part of the basic right of freedom of 
communication and necessary to protect an open political process – effective 
technical means to protect this right on the Internet should be ensured; 
• Where content rating is used, the criteria and procedures for rating content 
should remain transparent. With regard to filtering services, information access 
providers should make their use of such devices transparent to their clients; 
they should not oblige their users to use a particular filtering service, and they 
should respect the right to privacy; 
• ISPs and Internet access providers should make software available that allows 
parental control, and should make information about the software available to 
parents and teachers. 
(European Commission Legal Advisory Board, 1997) 
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The paper concludes with a further two ‘guiding principles’ that the Legal 
Advisory Board felt should underpin the debate.  Firstly, that the focus should be 
on practical co-operation rather than on attempts to find a new specific legislative 
solution for the Internet.  Secondly that, although consensus in the broader 
international context is desirable, international discussions should bear in mind 
that ‘an issue is being discussed which although having obvious economic 
implications is mainly an issue of the effectiveness of human rights, cultural values 
and balances between state authority and citizens’ rights’ (European Commission 
Legal Advisory Board, 1997). This response thus gives much stronger emphasis 
and support for the values of freedom of expression and freedom of information 
than the does the original Commission document, as well as a clear endorsement 
of the liberating and democratising potential of the Internet.  
 
In July 2001 the Council of the EU adopted the conclusions of an evaluation report 
produced by the Commission on the application of the Green Paper’s 
recommendations (European Commission, 2001).  An overwhelming endorsement 
of the report by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in April 2002, with 
460 votes in favour of the Commission’s approach, 3 abstentions and no votes 
against, followed this.  In particular, the Parliament endorsed the principle that 
children’s welfare is primarily the responsibility of their legal guardians.  The 
adoption of a self-regulatory approach rather than the use of blocking technologies 
was also strongly commended (European Parliament, 2002), although there was 
little evidence otherwise of the impact of the Legal Advisory Board’s response. 
 
A further evaluation report, analysing the effectiveness of measures of the 
Recommendation that have been implemented in Member States and at EU level 
since 2000, was adopted by the European Commission in December 2003 
(European Commission, 2003a).  At the same time, it was announced by the 
European Commissioner in charge of Education, Culture and Audiovisual Services 
that the Commission intends to follow up the evaluation report by proposing an 
update of the Recommendation during the first quarter of 2004.  In particular, the 
update would concentrate on the right to reply; media literacy; the harmonisation 
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of ratings descriptors; and measures against discrimination and incitement to 
hatred on the grounds of race, sex or nationality in online media (Ibid). 
 
3.4.3 Action Plan on Promoting Safe Use of the Internet   
 
Meantime, a parallel initiative was also being developed by the Commission.  The 
four-year Action plan on promoting safe use of the Internet (European 
Commission, 1997a) was originally intended to cover the period 1998-2001 
inclusive, and was adopted in November 1997 with a budget of 25 million Euro. 
The Action Plan was intended to be complementary to the Recommendation, and 
was shaped by the same underlying principles based on a self-regulatory approach.  
However, whereas the Recommendation was a legal instrument providing 
guidelines for national legislation, the Action Plan was intended as a mechanism 
for targeting financial support towards implementing actions.  Following the 
themes identified in the Communication on illegal and harmful content (European 
Commission, 1996b) it proposed four main action lines to ‘create a safer 
environment’ by combating illegal and harmful Internet content: 
 
• Industry self-regulation – for example, through the creation of a European 
network of “hotlines” to allow users to report content that they consider to be 
illegal, and through the development of industry codes of conduct; 
• Technical measures, such as the development of filtering and rating systems to 
make harmful content easier to identify; 
• Raising user awareness, for example by developing material for use in the 
education sector; 
• Support actions, such as those aimed at identifying the legal implications of 
actions taken under the Action Plan. 
(European Commission, 1997a) 
 
The Action Plan recognised the need for co-ordination and co-operation across 
Member States if actions were to be successful.  Illegal use that it considered 
should be controlled included ‘actions or speech that may be prejudicial to national 
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security; content that threatens the protection of minors (in particular child 
pornography) and the protection of human dignity (in particular race-hate speech); 
actions prejudicial to economic security (e.g. fraud) and information security (such 
as hacking); and actions liable to damage the protection of privacy, reputation or 
intellectual property’ (European Commission, 1997a).  It advocated that illegal 
content be dealt with at source by law enforcement agencies, aided by industry 
self-regulation (for example, by the use of hotlines to alert ISPs to potentially 
illegal content).  Content deemed harmful (that is, content that is potentially 
offensive but not illegal) should be controlled via access restriction (such as 
filtering and ratings technologies) and by raising parental and user awareness, but 
should not be removed on the grounds of allowing freedom of expression.  It noted 
that ‘a definition of ‘harmful’ content will always be subject to the cultural 
differences inherent in the Member States’ (Ibid).   
 
During Parliamentary debate on 1 July 1998 it was noted that, while the Action 
Plan is ‘a step in the right direction’, the fact that EU legislation does not cover 
criminal law makes the promotion of safe Internet use a difficult task.  Indeed 
 
It was the unanimous view of the House that illegal and harmful content on the Internet 
could be damaging to the mental health, safety and economic interests of consumers and 
thus affect the creation of an environment conducive to sound ethical standards.  But 
combating Internet content liable to prosecution was a matter for the member states.  In 
practice, this was made considerably more difficult by the fact that there were not even 
identical or at least comparable legal standards governing important issues in this area 
throughout the EU. 
 (European Parliament, 1998b) 
 
There was here a clear statement that the driver for legislation to control Internet 
content was the desire to promote an environment that favoured the development 
of e-commerce and a growth in Internet use as an impetus to economic 
development.  On its second reading at the Parliament several amendments to the 
Action Plan were tabled: that support should be given under the Action Plan to 
organisations active in the protection of human rights and in counteracting abuse 
of women and children; the most effective means should be used for disseminating 
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information to raise user awareness; Internet providers who voluntarily keep to a 
code of conduct agreed within the industry on undesirable website content should 
be able to apply to the Commission for a ‘quality’ label; and, potentially the most 
far-reaching proposal of all, civil and criminal law within the EU should be 
harmonised with the aim of ensuring safer use of the Internet (European 
Parliament, 1998c). 
 
In order to pursue the aims of developing technical means of content regulation the 
European Parliament awarded a contract to Smith System Engineering to 
investigate the technical feasibility of software to block pornography and racism 
on the Internet.  Working with legal and social policy experts, the engineering 
consultants were charged with providing a study to be used as a briefing document 
for Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) expected to form the basis of 
future policy (Taylor, 1997).  The resulting report Feasibility of censoring and 
jamming pornography and racism in informatics (Pitman, 1997) identified 
possible solutions such as the use of labelling and rating standards such as PICS 
and filtering software such as Net Nanny, CyberPatrol and Cybersitter (Craven, 
1998). The Open Information Interchange (OII) of the European Commission 
published a guide to labelling of electronic data, and rating and filtering as a 
function of labelling (European Commission, 1998a).  However, despite much 
subsequent investment into the development of technical solutions, they have so 
far failed to meet the hopes and expectations vested in them (see Chapter One, 
pp.22-29 for further discussion on this issue). 
 
Following an intermediate evaluation of the results of implementing the Action 
Plan, carried out between November 2000 and April 2001, the Commission 
published a Communication Paper on the follow-up to the Action Plan with a 
proposal that it should be extended for a further two years until 31st December 
2004 (European Commission, 2002a).  In addition to proposing future directions 
for EU strategy on content regulation, the Communication Paper was useful in 
providing a detailed account of projects funded to date under the original Action 
Plan. The intention of the new proposal was to ‘adapt [the scope and 
implementation of the Action Plan] to take account of lessons learned and new 
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technologies, and to ensure co-ordination with parallel work in the field of network 
and information security’ (Ibid).  In reality, the proposed ‘adaptation’ of scope 
comprised a significant extension of application, both in terms of the technologies 
to which the coverage would apply and the nature of the content to be controlled.  
Thus, in future proposed actions would apply to ‘mobile and broadband content, 
online games, peer-to-peer file transfer, and all forms of real-time communications 
such as chat rooms and instant messages’ (Ibid).  Relevant content would now 
encompass racism and violence. 
 
The Commission still claimed the underlying rationale of the Action Plan as being 
that of user empowerment, with the Commission acting as facilitator for, and 
contributor to, European and global co-operation in this arena.  EU actions were 
promoted by the Commission as complementary to national initiatives, with the 
aim of achieving a considerable degree of decentralisation through a network of 
national co-ordinators.  Four areas still requiring action were identified in the 
proposed extended Action Plan: 
 
• Support for hotlines to enable users to report illegal content;  
• Continuing promotion of self-regulation; 
• User empowerment through filtering software; 
• Increasing awareness about safer use of the Internet. 
(European Commission, 2002a) 
 
It was acknowledged that the focus of the new programme should be on self-
regulatory and non-regulatory aspects of safe Internet use, with an emphasis on 
actions intended to raise awareness of safe use, particularly in countries that 
currently lacked appropriate experience and infrastructure.  It was also suggested 
that part of the new initiative should include support for the creation of high 
quality European content intended specifically for children (Ibid).  Enhanced 
networking was to be encouraged among all those involved in the field through the 
establishment of a Safer Internet Forum, and more active involvement of the media 
and content industries was promoted as desirable. 
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In response to the Communication from the Commission, the European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC) proposed a more restrictive approach.  The 
Committee recommended adopting a legal framework that ensured co-legislation 
rather than the self-regulation proposed by the Commission.  It also advocated 
stronger government and industry support for ratings and warning schemes, 
particularly with regard to chatrooms, and the adoption of a stronger line against 
racism on the Internet, which ‘should not be condoned on the grounds of 
protecting freedom of expression’ (European Economic and Social Committee, 
2003). 
 
On 16th June 2003 the Parliament and Council agreed to the original 
communication proposal by taking Decision No 115/2003/EC amending Decision 
No 276/1999/EC adopting a Multiannual Community Action Plan on Promoting 
Safer Use of the Internet by Combating Illegal and Harmful Content on Global 
Networks (European Commission, 2003b).  In addition to the changes already 
described, the Decision amended the title of the Plan to that of the ‘Multiannual 
Community Action Plan on Promoting Safer Use of the Internet and New Online 
Technologies by Combating Illegal and Harmful Content Primarily in the Area of 
the Protection of Children and Minors’ to reflect new emphases.  In its 
communications the Commission appears to have adopted the abbreviated title of 
the ‘Safer Internet Action Plan’ (SIAP) in referring to the new Plan; it is also 
referred to as the ‘Action Plan second phase’.  An additional sum of 13.3 million 
Euro has been made available for implementing the extended actions.  The draft 
Work Programme and initial draft Calls41 were made available in July 2003. 
 
In August 2003 the European Commission announced that, in addition to the 
extension of the Action Plan to 2004, it was making preparations for a follow-up 
programme, the Safer Internet Plus programme42, to cover the period 2005-2008 
                                            
41 <http://www.europa.eu.int/information_society/programmes/iap/index_en.htm> [Last accessed 
5/7/2004] 
 
42 See <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/ 
333&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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(Swetenham, 2003).  The overall objective of this programme remained the 
promotion of safer use of the Internet and other new technologies, particularly by 
children, and to continue the fight against illegal content and ‘content unwanted by 
the end user’ (Ibid).  The stated intention this time was to focus on the end-user, in 
particular parents, educators and children.  In addition to building on the 
achievements of existing actions, the programme was to be opened up to other new 
media, and to new issues such as the control of ‘spam’43 and the expansion of 
network infrastructure to accession countries.  The role of different stakeholders 
would be analysed to determine the role that they could play in the fight against 
illegal, harmful and unwanted content. 
 
3.4.4 The Information Society, the management of the Internet and 
democracy 
 
Reflecting a rather more positive and distributive perspective than that evidenced 
in other EU initiatives, the European Parliament acknowledged in a Resolution on 
the Information Society, the management of the Internet and democracy (European 
Parliament, 1998a) that freedom of expression is one of the foundations of 
democratic societies, and that use of the Internet ‘could open the way to 
strengthening democracy by increasing transparency’.  It also recognised that 
‘globalisation of the Internet requires an international regulatory 
framework…including the protection of cultural and linguistic diversity and the 
protection of human dignity and minors’.  The resolution ‘calls on Member States 
to ensure that the [Internet is] used to promote freedom of speech and information, 
exchanges between cultures, education and civic participation in public life, in 
particular in relation to EU enlargement or international contacts with countries 
whose peoples live under authoritarian and repressive regimes’ (Ibid).  This 
statement represented a much stronger endorsement of the potential of the Internet 
as a tool to support and enhance democracy, and located the role of national states 
                                            
43 Unsolicited email, usually of a commercial nature, sent to multiple email users. 
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as being the promotion and strengthening of the positive benefits of the Internet as 
opposed to a preoccupation with its potential for harm. 
 
3.4.5 The role of libraries in the Information Society 
 
In October 1998 the European Parliament adopted a report (Ryynänen, 1998) that 
also evidenced a more liberal, distributive perspective.  This reported on the Green 
Paper on the Role of Libraries in the Information Society, which had explored the 
issue of public access to the Internet via libraries.   The report called for greater co-
ordination of policy measures by the Member States in providing access to 
knowledge and information via libraries.  It recommended that the Member States 
provide libraries with modern equipment and Internet connections, together with 
‘adequate funding to take advantage of the Information Society’ (Ibid).   
 
It also proposed that the means should be made available to train library staff to 
‘filter out required material’ from the massive volume of information available.  
Noting the poor performance of software filters, and the difficulties posed by 
varying cultural approaches to content control, it considered that ‘there is a 
manifest need for selective and sustained search services which provide access to 
material on the basis of professional librarians’ definitions of acceptable network 
material’ (Ibid). It thus identified the control of access to Internet content as being 
a matter best resolved through human judgement, and in particular saw such 
judgement as being part of the intrinsic role of information professionals.  
However, such bold declarations appear since to have received scant attention 
compared with the more restrictive calls for industry-led content control contained 
in initiatives such as the Action Plan. 
 
3.4.6 The Framework Programmes for Research 
 
Alongside the measures already outlined, the EU Framework Programmes for 
Research have paid considerable attention to the information services sector.  
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These Framework Programmes for Research, Technological Development and 
Demonstration Activities set out the priorities for EU investment in research and 
development over five-year periods.  The Fifth Framework Programme, which 
covered the period 1998-2002, included the creation of a ‘User-friendly 
information society’ as one of four major themes, with a budget of 3,600 million 
Euro, the single largest budget allocation of the four themes (European 
Commission, 2000a).  This emphasis was largely driven by the convergence of the 
computing, communication and content industries and the global nature of the 
information marketplace, which led to recognition of the importance of a coherent 
approach to addressing the development of the Information Society.  This theme is 
also reflected in the priorities of the Sixth Framework Programme, which runs 
from 2002 to 2006 (European Commission, 2002b).  In both these programmes, 
however, activities funded have tended to concentrate on issues of competitiveness 
and the needs of business and industry, leaving issues of Internet regulation and 
the development of content control technologies largely to the Action Plan. 
 
3.4.7 The European Internet Co-regulation Network 
  
At the World Summit for the Information Society, held in Geneva in December 
2003, European Commissioner Erkki Likkanen announced the launch of the 
European Internet Co-regulation Network44 (Forum des Droits sur l’Internet, 
2003).  Supported by the European Commission and the French government, 
through its Forum des Droits sur l’Internet45, the Network aims ‘to promote co-
regulation as a means of gaining the co-operation of all the stakeholders in the 
building of rules on Internet rights and usage issues’ (Ibid).  At the time of its 
launch the network had seven members: Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, 
Sweden and the UK, the latter being represented through the Internet Watch 
Foundation and the Oxford Internet Institute.  Although it is portrayed as having a 
                                            
44 <http://www.internet-coregulation.org> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
45 <http://www.foruminternet.org> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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predominantly co-ordinating role, rather than a regulatory role, it is too early to 
gauge the exact role the Forum will play or what influence it will exert in the 
Internet control arena. 
 
3.4.8 The EU and e-commerce, privacy, interception and surveillance 
 
By 1998 the development and promotion of e-commerce, with the subsequent need 
to create a favourable and appropriate regulatory framework to instil confidence in 
business and consumers alike, began to climb higher on the EU agenda.  An initial 
proposal was put forward in November 1998 (European Commission, 1998b), 
culminating in the adoption by July 2000 of a Directive of the European 
Parliament and the Council on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (“the E-
commerce Directive”) (European Commission, 2000b).  In order to stimulate, 
rather than hinder, the development of e-commerce, the Directive adopted a light-
handed approach with an emphasis on self-regulation that mirrored its approach 
towards issues of content regulation.  Following an Amendment made during the 
consultation phase, the Directive included a specific reference to the protection of 
minors and human dignity, and assured the rights of Internet users to confidential 
electronic communication by using encryption services, should they so choose.   
 
However, the relatively light-handed approach based on self-regulation that had 
characterised EU involvement in regulating the Internet came under threat with the 
terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on September 11th 2001.  The 
period since then has seen a wave of initiatives aiming to increase the powers of 
law enforcement agencies to monitor and intercept electronic communications.  
Thus, for example, in May 2002 the European Parliament approved legislation46 
that gave police the power to access the communications records of all telephone 
and Internet users (Millar, 2002a).  Regardless of the privacy protections afforded 
                                            
46 Electronic communications: Processing of personal data, protection of privacy.  The Final Act 
was published in the Official Journal of the European Union, L201, 31/7/2002. 
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by the Data Protection Directive (European Commission, 1995) the new measure 
allows governments to require telephone and Internet companies to retain detailed 
logs of their customers’ communications for a minimum of 12 months and a 
maximum of 24 months.  In a further direct conflict with the Data Protection 
Directive (Ibid), under the new measure individuals have no right to check whether 
information held about their personal communications is accurate, nor are they 
entitled to legally challenge decisions made about its use by EU authorities 
(Norton-Taylor and Millar, 2002). Ironically, the measure was contained in an 
amendment to a bill that was originally intended to improve the security of e-
commerce transactions and personal privacy.   
 
Such measures were initially explained by national governments and the European 
Parliament by the need to fight terrorism.  However, this justification is now being 
extended to include the demands of fighting all crime, including paedophilia and 
racism (Norton-Taylor and Millar, 2002).  Much of the driving force behind the 
measure came from the UK government (Millar, 2002a; Ahmed, 2002), which had 
already imposed data retention obligations on ISPs in the UK via the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (Parliament, 2001) rushed through the UK 
Parliament in 2001. This was in addition to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act (Parliament, 2000a), which had already established the right of a range of 
public bodies in the UK to intercept, monitor and access communications data.     
 
3.5 Policy development in the United Kingdom 
3.5.1 UK approaches to information policy 
 
In a number of significant initiatives, the UK has embraced the emphasis placed by 
the EU on the development of the Information Society as a tool of economic 
growth and competitiveness, with a secondary proclaimed goal of enhancing social 
cohesion and inclusion. The government gave recognition to the importance of 
support for the development of e-commerce with the statement that  ‘The 
Government’s policy is to encourage electronic commerce, with the ambition of 
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making the UK the best place in the world for electronic trading’ (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2003).  To date, this support has been applied most actively to 
the issue of how to build trust and security into e-commerce activities (Saxby, 
2000, p.44) and has been implemented through the Electronic Communications 
Act 200047, which established the legality of electronic signatures and an approvals 
scheme for cryptography support services (Ibid).  In addition to the Electronic 
Communications Act, in 2002 the government also incorporated the EU E-
commerce Directive (European Commission, 2000b) into UK law following a 
wide consultation exercise.  However, UK government approaches to e-commerce 
have also been influenced by a recognition that the availability of offensive 
Internet content may ‘lead to lack of confidence for the development of e-
commerce within the UK’ (Cabinet Office Performance and Innovation Unit, 
1999). 
 
Despite the recognition of the importance of e-commerce, Bellamy and Taylor 
note that the UK was relatively slow to adopt the widespread use of Information 
and Communication Technologies, or to adapt its practices towards the context  of 
the new Information Age (Bellamy and Taylor, 1998).  Rowlands (1997, p.48) and 
Oppenheim (1998) have both noted the highly decentralised and fragmented nature 
of UK national information policy, involving as it does a wide range of actors and 
an amalgam of statutory law, common law, social norms, administrative practice, 
market forces and international agreements and treaties.  Going a step further, 
Oppenheim (Ibid) has suggested that ‘the UK’s information policy is, in most 
cases, to have no policy’.   
 
This lack of a national information policy was also acknowledged in a policy 
report prepared by the Library and Information Commission in 1999 which stated 
that ‘a UK National Information Policy is urgently required if we are to remain 
competitive in the global information society’ (Library and Information 
Commission, 1999).  However, despite progress made with regard to specific 
                                            
47 <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000007.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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policy issues, by 2003 there was still evidence of an overarching lack of co-
ordination or clear line of responsibility for information policy formulation. 
 
3.5.2 Improving access to the Internet – the People’s Network 
 
A 1997 Library and Information Commission report, The New Library: The 
People’s Network, commissioned by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 
recognised the potential of the new communications technologies for enhancing 
education and lifelong learning; supporting training, employment and business to 
foster economic prosperity; and nurturing social cohesion (Library and 
Information Commission, 1997). In addition to a commitment to extending 
Internet access to all public libraries in the UK, the report placed emphasis on the 
role of the librarian as intermediary in the networked environment and 
recommended that £3 million be provided over five years to support public 
libraries in developing controlled gateways to high quality resources in specific 
subject areas (Ibid).   
 
As a result of the report, the New Opportunities Fund (NOF) was established, 
funded by the National Lottery and managed by the Library and Information 
Commission’s successor, Re:source48.  The aim of the NOF was to implement the 
Government’s commitment to ‘give everyone in the UK the opportunity to use 
computers and access the Internet’ (The People’s Network, 2002).  By December 
2002 the People’s Network reported that 100% of all UK public libraries were 
connected to the Internet49.  
 
 
                                            
48 Since renamed Museums, Libraries and Archives Council (MLA).  See 
<http://www.mla.gov.uk/index.asp> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
49 Figures obtained from <http://www.peoplesnetwork.gov.uk/progress/libraries.asp> [Last 
accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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3.5.3 UK approaches to Freedom of Expression 
 
Prior to the accession into British law in November 1999 of the Human Rights Act 
199850 (Parliament, 1998a) there was no statutory general right of freedom of 
expression within the UK, only legislative measures that imposed restrictions on 
such freedom.  These measures included the Obscene Publications Acts of 1959 
and 1964 (Parliament, 1959; Parliament, 1964); the Race Relations Act 1976 
(Parliament, 1976); the Video Recordings Act 1984 (Parliament, 1984); the 
Malicious Communications Act 1988 (Parliament, 1988a); the Official Secrets Act 
1989 (Parliament, 1989); the Broadcasting Act 1996 (Parliament, 1996a); the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (Parliament, 1994a) (involving 
incitement to racial hatred); and the Defamation Act 1996 (Parliament, 1996b).   
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (Parliament, 1998a) is the instrument that 
incorporates the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
(Council of Europe, 1950) into UK law.  In line with the ECHR, Article 10 of the 
Human Rights Act contains the statement that: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. 
(Parliament, 1998a) 
 
Thus, for the first time, UK citizens had a right to freedom of expression enshrined 
in a Parliamentary Act.  However, the rights conferred through the Act are not 
without limits.  As with the ECHR, in addition to reserving the right of the State to 
require the licensing of radio and television broadcasting, and of cinema 
enterprises, the Act also states that: 
 
                                            
50 <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980042.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
(Ibid) 
 
There remains, therefore, considerable scope for the government to impose 
constraints on the right to freedom of expression, and this right has indeed already 
met with considerable challenge particularly in the light of the ‘war on terrorism’ 
of the early Twenty-first Century.  
 
3.5.4 UK approaches to Internet content control 
 
In line with the EU and the Council of Europe, the preferred measure with regard 
to the issue of Internet content control within the UK has been that of voluntary 
self-regulation (Barrett, 1996; Akdeniz, 1997b), together with support for the 
development of technological solutions such as rating and filtering systems.  
Support for a self-regulatory approach was stated quite clearly in a Select 
Committee on Science and Technology report in 1996 that stated: 
 
 Even if it were desirable, it is unlikely that censorship of Internet content will ever be 
possible, partly on technological grounds, partly because of its global nature. The best 
hope of controlling the circulation of undesirable material on the Internet is self-
regulation. 
(Parliament: House of Lords, 1996, para.5.50) 
 
This contrasts with the US where, despite the provisions of the First Amendment, 
repeated (and mostly unsuccessful) legislative attempts have been made to control 
Internet content.  Within the UK the main responsibility for Internet content issues 
rests with the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) supported by the 
Department for Education and Skills (DfES) and the Home Office (Akdeniz, 
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2001).  Self-regulation in the UK has been implemented via the Internet Watch 
Foundation (IWF) in co-operation with the Internet Service Providers Association 
(ISPA) and the Home Office.  
 
3.5.5 The Internet Watch Foundation 
 
In the UK the active involvement of the ISPs in controlling Internet content was 
called for in a letter sent in August 1996 to all ISPs by Chief Inspector Stephen 
French of the Clubs and Vice Unit of the Metropolitan Police.  The letter contained 
a list of newsgroups that the Vice Unit believed to contain ‘offensive material’, 
and stated that ‘we are looking to you to monitor your newsgroups identifying and 
taking necessary action against those others found to contain such material’ 
(Watson, 1996a).  This move was resisted by the ISPs for a number of reasons, not 
least on account of the ethical and practical difficulties that implementation would 
incur.  The problems involved in attempting to target specific groups were clearly 
illustrated by the Metropolitan Police’s own list of ‘offensive’ sites: this included 
the UseNet group ‘alt.sex.paedophilia’, which was in fact a forum for discussing 
methods of identifying, treating and helping paedophiles and their victims (Ibid).  
Overall, UK ISPs considered that the approach of the Metropolitan Police ‘had 
been founded on a misunderstanding of the technology involved’ (Watson, 1996b) 
and that moves to impose content censorship of the Internet should be debated in 
Parliament rather than randomly applied by law enforcement agencies (Akdeniz, 
1997a).   
 
Instead of co-operating with the terms of the Metropolitan Police’s letter, ISPA51 
requested a meeting with the Metropolitan Police and other interested parties, 
leading to the establishment of the Safety-Net Foundation52 in September 1996. 
The Foundation was set up as an independent organisation to implement proposals 
                                            
51 <http://www.ispa.org.uk> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
52 This subsequently became the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), <http://www.iwf.org.uk> [Last 
accessed 5/7/2004] 
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for controlling Internet content that were jointly agreed by the government, the 
police and the Internet Service Provider associations (ISPA and LINX53), 
including the drafting of a Code of Practice for the industry.  The initial self-
regulatory focus of the IWF was on child pornography, with ISPs agreeing to 
exclude clients who hosted illegal pornographic or paedophile images or messages, 
wherever this was brought to their attention. A hotline was set up to enable 
Internet users to alert the IWF to sites that they suspect contain illegal materials 
and, if found to be so, IWF alerts any ISP hosting the site.  Only if the ISP does 
not co-operate in removing the content at this stage would it be liable for 
prosecution.  During its first year of operation the IWF hotline led to more than 
2,000 items being removed from UK Service Providers (Library Association 
Record, 1998b).  The statistics for the year 2002 revealed that the total number of 
reports made to the IWF had risen to 21,341, leading to 3,774 items being removed 
– 3,768 for child pornography content, five for having ‘adult obscene’ material, 
and one for being ‘criminally racist’ (Internet Watch Foundation, 2003). 
 
In addition, the IWF established an Advisory Board including representatives of 
children’s charities, content providers, regulators from other media, ISPs and civil 
liberties groups to develop a rating system ‘appropriate to the needs of UK Internet 
users’ (European Commission, 1997d).  The IWF was also instrumental in 
bringing together a group of interested parties within Europe to develop the 
INCORE (Internet Content Rating for Europe), under commission from the EU.  
The primary aim of INCORE was to investigate a means of rating Internet content 
that identified illegal material and allowed for the classification of legal material.  
The latter action was to be based on consumer research as to users’ expectations 
regarding the Internet and the kind of material to which they would consider the 
application of ratings to be appropriate (Ibid). 
 
In 1998 it was announced that there would be a governmental review of the IWF, 
with a view to expanding its role to include the control of defamatory material and 
                                            
53 <http://www.linx.net> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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copyright breaches on the Internet (Library Association Record, 1998c). In 
addition, the Foundation joined forces with the International Working Group on 
Content Rating (IWGCR), a coalition of national and international watchdog 
organisations, to establish an international rating system for legal material that 
would allow the end user to define the categories of content that they wished to 
exclude.  This group subsequently led to the formation of ICRA, the Internet 
Content Rating Association54.  It also began working on the development of 
screening software intended to facilitate the monitoring of UseNet articles to aid 
the identification of illegal content, and has developed its role in terms of 
promoting awareness and education with regard to Internet content issues. 
 
The Public Order Act 1986 (Parliament, 1986), as amended by the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, makes it an offence ‘to publish material 
designed or likely to stir up racial hatred’ (Parliament, 1994a).  In January 2000 it 
was announced that the remit of the IWF was to be expanded to include the 
policing of such ‘criminally racist’ material (Travis, 2000). However, the 
definition of what material can be considered as ‘criminally racist’ is more 
complex than the identification of materials involving child pornography, and 
since simple possession of the material is not in itself illegal, prosecution can only 
follow evidence of the intention to ‘publish’ the material to others. The Home 
Secretary at the time, Jack Straw, defended the proposed extension of the remit of 
the IWF by stating that ‘the Internet cannot exist in an anarchistic free speech 
environment’ (Ibid).   
 
In co-operating with the approach of self-regulation via the IWF, participating 
ISPs have taken on some responsibility towards prevention of use of the Internet 
for illegal purposes, whilst managing to ensure that end users are responsible for 
the content they post and responsibility for law enforcement remains with the 
police (Watson, 1996b).  However, they have done so partly in response to the 
threat of enforced regulation, seeing self-regulation as a means of protecting 
                                            
54 <http://www.icra.org> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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freedom of expression from the imposition of more authoritarian measures55.  This 
latter point was vividly illustrated by the comments of the then Commander of the 
Metropolitan Police Clubs and Vice Unit, Mike Hoskins, at a meeting held in 
August 1996 between Scotland Yard and ISPA.  This was immediately prior to the 
letter sent to the ISPs that requested removal of access to named UseNet 
discussion groups. Hoskins stated at the meeting ‘either the industry takes it upon 
itself to clean up the Net or the Police intervene’ (cited in Akdeniz, 1997b).  The 
letter itself included the sentence ‘We trust that with your co-operation and self-
regulation it will not be necessary for us to move to an enforcement policy’ (cited 
in Campbell, 1998b). 
 
However, critics of the IWF approach have raised doubts about the ability of a 
non-public body to maintain sufficient standards of transparency and 
accountability.  Akdeniz has claimed that the UK policy of reliance on the IWF 
forces ISPs ‘to be defendant, judge and jury’ and that removal of content by the 
IWF in the absence of a court order amounts to ‘censorship by the back door’56.  It 
has been argued that locating regulatory initiatives into the private rather than the 
public sector risks not only a loss of accountability, but also the probability that 
commercial pressures may induce a more proactive involvement with content 
regulation (Akdeniz and Strossen, 2000). 
 
3.5.6 Legal liability of ISPs in the UK 
 
The main impetus for the ISPs to co-operate with measures to control illegal 
content on the Internet was uncertainty with regard to their potential liability for 
such content.  Although the ISPs have always maintained that they are ‘common 
carriers’ and should be no more responsible than telephone service providers or the 
                                            
55 From comments made by David Kerr, Chief Executive of IWF, at an Oxford Union Debate 
Beyond Control or Through the Looking Glass held in April 2000. 
 
56 From comments made by Yaman Akdeniz of Cyber-Rights and Cyber-Liberties,  at an Oxford 
Union Debate Beyond Control or Through the Looking Glass held in April 2000. 
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Post Office for the material they carry, it has also been argued that they should be 
held liable for content in a similar way to broadcasters or publishers.  The actions 
of the Metropolitan Police in suggesting that they would ‘move to an enforcement 
policy’ (Campbell, 1998b) if the ISP industry did not impose a satisfactory regime 
of self-regulation certainly aroused concern among ISPs about their own liability.  
This concern was exacerbated in September 1998, when 30 police officers 
launched a dawn raid on a major ISP as part of the child pornography investigation 
‘Operation Cathedral’, seizing computer logs and arresting a member of staff 
(Ibid).   
 
Concern regarding the legal liability of ISPs in the UK intensified when ISP 
company Demon Internet Ltd were found liable for damages and costs in a court 
settlement to physicist Laurence Godfrey.  Godfrey claimed that he had been 
defamed by two anonymous postings on newsgroups hosted by Demon, and that 
Demon had ignored his request to have the postings removed.  The case is 
significant in that it suggested that if ISPs do not respond to requests to remove 
allegedly defamatory content then under Section One of the 1996 Defamation 
Act57 (Parliament, 1996b) they cannot claim ‘innocent dissemination’ but instead 
are responsible as the ‘publisher’ of the content (Gringras, 2003, p.127).  The 
Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd case58 thus highlighted the issue of potential 
liability for libellous content on the part of ISPs.   
 
Following the case, other ISPs, concerned about its implications, responded to 
claims about potentially libellous content by removing the content concerned as a 
precautionary measure.  Examples included the removal of a radical gay 
magazine’s website, an anti-censorship site and a site that highlighted miscarriages 
of justice (Wells, 2000a; Wells, 2000b).  As there is no onus to prove that 
statements complained about are malicious or false before threatening prosecution, 
ISPs are likely to respond to the threat of legal action by removing content without 
                                            
57 <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/96031--a.htm#1> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
 
58 Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd [2001] QB 201, [1999] 4 All ER 342. 
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waiting for a judicial verdict on the content.  This “chill factor” (Wells, 2000b) has 
potentially serious implications for freedom of expression on the Internet. 
 
In another case involving Demon Internet Ltd, Judge Butler-Sloss ruled in July 
2001 that ISPs would not be held responsible if their users revealed the 
whereabouts or new identities of Jon Venables and Robert Thompson, who 
murdered James Bulger in 1993 (Dunne, 2001).  Butler-Sloss ruled that ‘ISPs were 
protected if contemptuous material was posted on web pages – as long as they took 
“all reasonable steps” to prevent the publication of such material’ (Ibid).  It would 
seem that, in line with the self-regulatory policy of the IWF, this means that ISPs 
will be liable for prosecution only if they are informed about an illegal site and 
subsequently fail to remove it.  This removes the onus of ‘policing’ content on 
their servers from the ISPs.  However, it is unclear whether this ruling means that 
they should respond to requests from anyone who wants them to remove content 
that (in the absence of a court decision) the complainant regards as defamatory to 
their reputation. 
 
This lack of clarity was further illustrated in 2002 when ISP Host Europe 
responded to a request from the police to remove the satirical site 
www.thinkofthechildren.co.uk from its server, following a complaint by a member 
of the public (Left, 2002).  Despite no court ruling on the legality, or otherwise, of 
the site’s content, Host Europe shut down the site, fearing that the company could 
be held criminally liable.  The site was subsequently reinstated, albeit with the 
‘suspect’ content removed (Ibid). 
 
3.5.7 Rating systems and filtering software in the UK 
 
In line with the EU, rating systems and filtering software have consistently been 
promoted by UK policy makers as a potential solution to the problem of access to 
‘harmful’ (as opposed to illegal) Internet content, particularly where this access 
applies to minors.  Unlike the approaches of the US or Australian authorities, 
however, there have been no attempts to implement legislation compelling ISPs, 
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schools or libraries in the UK to install filtering software.  With specific regard to 
public access to the Internet within UK public libraries, the Networked Services 
Policy task group of Project EARL was set up in 1996 with a brief ‘to assist public 
library authorities to shape and develop their own public access strategies’ 
(Everall, 1996).  The chief concern of the project was focussed on illegal material 
available on the Internet, in particular hardcore pornography, and the ability to 
create and send offensive materials to others.  At the time of the study, the Group 
found little support among public librarians for filtering software.  However, there 
was a broader level of support for actions such as selecting an ISP that filters at 
server level; supervised access for children; and the establishment of Acceptable 
Use Policies requiring users to sign an undertaking not to abuse the service (Ibid).   
 
Acceptance of technical solutions among librarians appears since to have 
increased: an unpublished survey by Manchester Metropolitan University carried 
out in 2000 found that 71 per cent of libraries had some form of technical control, 
with half of these opting for filters as their favoured solution (Library Association 
Record, 2001).  A People’s Network survey carried out in June 2002 reported that 
65.71% of Library Authorities used filtering software for public library Internet 
access; in addition, 86.67% of Library Authorities had an Acceptable Use Policy 
in place59. 
 
The UK Library Association, prior to its amalgamation with the Institute of 
Information Scientists to form CILIP, did not endorse the use of filtering, although 
they did accept that libraries may be obliged to use such software (Willson, cited 
in Library Association Record, 2001).  However, it was recognised that the issue 
of filtering software in public libraries is contentious, especially with regard to 
children’s use of network facilities.  Thus, at the time of writing (2004), the new 
organisation has not yet determined its policy, preferring to ‘look at the issue again 
                                            
59 Figures available from <http://www.peoplesnetwork.gov.uk/progress/libraries_uk.asp> [Last 
accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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from scratch’60.  To this end it has appointed a Freedom of Information panel that 
will have responsibility for developing policy in this area. 
 
3.5.8 UK educational initiatives 
 
The UK government has also put considerable emphasis on educational measures 
targeted at minors to promote an awareness of safe Internet use.  In 1999 the then 
Education Secretary, David Blunkett, launched an information pack entitled 
‘Superhighway Safety’ containing practical advice for parents and teachers on how 
to reduce children’s exposure to ‘unacceptable’ information (Smithers, 1999).  The 
information pack recommended schools to use written contracts whereby pupils 
pledge to use only specified websites, backed up by regular checks by teachers.  
Schools are also advised to use “walled gardens” and firewalls to block banned 
sites.  Parents are advised to supervise the home Internet use of their children, who 
should be warned not to give out personal details online (Ibid).  
 
The benefits of an approach based on educating children about responsible online 
use were reflected in the publication of a 2001 report by the Institute of Public 
Policy Research (IPPR), an influential Think Tank with close links to the 
government (Livingstone, 2001).   This proposed that children should take a 
‘surfing proficiency test’ at the age of eleven; students who passed should then be 
allowed less restricted access to the Internet than schools currently allow.  They 
would be able to take a one-week summer course to prepare for the test, which, in 
addition to educating them about avoiding potential dangers online, would also 
help them to develop their skills in using the Internet constructively to find 
information.  However, the proposal was received with some scepticism by the 
General Secretary of the Secondary Heads Association who maintained that ‘A 
proficiency test as a passport for unsupervised use of the Internet would simply 
give [children] even more knowledge of how to find sites that they shouldn’t be 
seeing’ (reported by Woodward, 2001).  To date (April 2004) the initiative has not 
                                            
60 Email communication to the author from Guy Daines, Principal Policy Advisor, CILIP, 2/9/2003. 
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been implemented, although it is still being promoted for potential adoption by the 
IPPR61. 
 
However, in January 2003 the government did launch a £1million advertising 
campaign, using television, radio and website messages to warn of the dangers of 
paedophiles using the Internet, and aiming to make parents and children aware of 
how to surf the web safely (BBC, 2003a).  The government’s approach in this 
respect appears to be constructive and positive.  At the launch of the campaign, 
Home Office Minister Hilary Benn said that he hoped the campaign would give 
parents and children basic safety information without demonising the Internet: 
 
The Internet is a great tool, it opens up all sorts of possibilities and we don’t want to scare 
people about using it, we just want to make sure that when you use the Internet you do so 
safely. 
(Cited in BBC, 2003a) 
 
The advertising campaign was accompanied by the production of a new set of 
guidelines for ISPs who offer chat and instant messaging services, including the 
recommendation of using clear warning information on their sites and ways for 
children to report problems encountered online. 
 
Other UK organisations have also been involved in promoting ‘safe use’ initiatives 
for children, a good example being the NCH Action for Children booklet 
‘Children on the Internet: Opportunities and Hazards’ (NCH Action for Children, 
1998). 
 
3.5.9 Privacy, surveillance and monitoring 
 
Although a comprehensive analysis of UK public policy measures relating to 
privacy, surveillance and monitoring of Internet use is outside the scope of this 
                                            
61 See <http://www.ippr.org/research/index.php?current=25&project=72> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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thesis, a brief outline of some of the major recent initiatives in this area is 
appropriate, on account of the importance of their potential impact on freedom of 
expression and freedom of access to information.   
 
The events in the US on 11th September 2001 and the subsequent ‘war on 
terrorism’ have been used to justify a range of measures restricting rights to 
privacy in the online environment in the UK.  However, the initial steps to 
implement these measures can be traced back as far as at least early 1997, when 
the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) requested urgent action to 
introduce legislation enabling police to intercept and monitor emails (Campbell, 
1998b).  This was put on hold because of the General Election of 1997, but was 
resurrected in June 1998 when the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
agreed a ‘memorandum of understanding’ with ISPs, that would enable police to 
monitor customers’ emails, and Web-usage logs on demand (Library Association 
Record, 1998d, p 457; Campbell, 1998b).  The Memorandum also obliged ISPs to 
retain logs of user transactions for a minimum of six weeks (Arthur et al, 1999). 
Concern was expressed by legal practitioners and civil liberties organisations that 
the agreement lacked the normal legal safeguards, as police interception would not 
require a warrant.  The Data Protection Registrar at the time, Elizabeth France, 
expressed strong reservations: 
 
We say it time and time again – [under the Data Protection Act] information can only be 
released on a case by case basis.  Fishing expeditions are not allowed…It is important 
that [email] has the same level of protection for individuals as for any other 
communications – mail and telephone calls. 
(Cited in Campbell, 1998b, p.2) 
 
Subsequent legislation, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 200062 
(Parliament, 2000a), clarified the electronic interception powers of public 
authorities in UK law, when it superseded the Interception of Communications Act 
1985 (Parliament, 1985) in July 2000.  It also implements Article 5 of the EU 
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Directive 97/66/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection 
of privacy in the telecommunications sector63 (JISC, 2001).  Introduced by the 
government as an instrument for controlling the powers of public authorities to 
monitor and intercept communications under a single regulatory regime in 
compliance with human rights legislation (Pallister, 2003), implementation of the 
Act arguably led to an extension of these powers, and imposed additional 
responsibilities onto ISPs. In addition to the authority of the Home Secretary to 
issue warrants for the interception of communications, the Act allows any public 
authority designated by the Home Secretary to access ‘traffic data’ (i.e. source, 
destination and type of any communication) without a warrant (EPIC and Privacy 
International, 2002).  Under the Act ISPs are required to provide a ‘reasonable 
interception capability’; every UK ISP is responsible for installing remote-
controlled equipment that relays all data passing though its computers to a special 
monitoring centre in MI5’s headquarters (Greenslade, 2000).  In addition, it allows 
senior members of the civilian and military police, customs authorities and 
members of the judiciary to demand the plain text of encrypted material, or, in 
certain circumstances, actual decryption keys (EPIC and Privacy International, 
2002). In the event of refusal to provide the decryption key or password to his or 
her computer files, anyone who is unable to prove that it has been lost or destroyed 
will be liable to up to two years imprisonment (Ibid).  Anyone who discloses that 
they have been served with an order to surrender decryption keys or passwords is 
liable for a five-year jail term (Greenslade, 2000). 
 
The ISP industry has expressed reservations concerning the financial costs to them 
of compliance with the ‘reasonable’ provision to facilitate interception required 
under the Act, and the potential impact that such costs, together with the loss of 
privacy afforded to the UK online environment, may have on e-commerce.   The 
ISPA estimated in 2000 that RIPA was likely to lead to the interception of around 
one in every 500 Internet communications (Sommer, 2000).  There is also a 
potential for conflict between compliance with the terms of RIPA and with those 
                                            
63 <http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/9766en.pdf> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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of the Data Protection Act 1998 (Parliament, 1998b) and the Human Rights Act 
1998 (Parliament, 1998a).  
 
However, the provisions of RIPA did not meet all the demands of the police, 
security and intelligence agencies who subsequently requested the Home Office to 
enact legislation that would require all telecommunications companies and ISPs to 
retain all communications data originating or terminating in the UK, or routed 
through UK networks for a period of up to seven years (Norton-Taylor, 2000). The 
terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York in September 2001 gave added 
legitimation and public support to government initiatives to extend monitoring and 
interception powers.  However, these powers were not limited to anti-terrorism 
investigations, but also to police investigating minor crimes, as well as to tax 
collection and public health authorities (Millar, 2001b).  Indeed, in November 
2001 the Home Office acknowledged that there were ‘no plans to limit access [to 
communications data] to cases involving national security’ (Ibid). 
 
In December 2001, after an unusually fast passage through Parliament, the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 200164 (Parliament, 2001) came into force – 
the fast-tracking was such that only two days were given to the Committee Stage, a 
process that would normally extend over a period of weeks (Fisher, 2002, p.17).  
At the time the House Affairs Select Committee was critical of the fact that the 
Bill should be ‘passed by the House in such a short period and with so little time 
for detailed examination’ and stated the opinion that ‘the balance between freedom 
and security in the Bill has not always been struck in the right place’ (Ibid, 2002, 
p.15).   
 
Part 11 of the Act relates to data retention on the part of ISPs and telephone 
service providers, who will be subject to a voluntary Code of Practice on Data 
Retention (this was issued by the Home Secretary in September 2003): the Code 
calls for the retention of user logs for 12 months.  The data to be retained includes 
                                            
64 http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm [Last accessed 5/7/2004].  For a detailed 
account of the legislative process leading to the Act’s introduction see Fisher, 2002. 
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the names and addresses of customers, the source and destination of emails 
received and sent, and the addresses of websites visited, all of which would be 
available to the authorities without the need for a judicial or executive warrant 
(Millar, 2002d).  However, if the Home Secretary is not satisfied that the voluntary 
Code is working, the Act empowers him to enforce data retention. Two 
justifications are provided for extending data retention requirements, namely 
safeguarding national security, and the prevention and detection of crime 
(Parliament, 2001, Part 11, Section 102, 3(a) and 3(b)).  In July 2002, the Director 
of NCIS indicated his dissatisfaction with reliance on a voluntary code, and his 
desire to see ISPs compelled to retain this data for a period of five years (Millar 
and Hopkins, 2002).  At the same time, the Information Commissioner warned the 
Home Office that the data retention provisions of the Act may breach the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (Parliament, 1998a), as data retained strictly for the purposes of 
national security could be accessed by police and intelligence officers 
investigating other crimes such as tax evasion. 
 
In October 2002 ISPA announced that the industry was not convinced of the 
legality or justification of the data retention requirements and would not comply 
voluntarily with the Code of Practice (Millar, 2002d).  In a letter to the Home 
Office, ISPA stated that ISPs were also concerned about the privacy and cost 
implications of retaining the required data.  According to representatives of the ISP 
industry, the true cost to ISPs of storing the communications data required by the 
Code would be far in excess of the £20 million sum estimated by the government 
(Loney, 2002). 
 
In June 2002 the Home Office announced that the list of government agencies 
allowed access under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (Parliament, 
2000a) to Internet traffic data without a warrant was to be extended to over 1,000 
different government departments including local authorities, health and 
environmental organisations and trade bodies.  Once again, the needs of crime and 
terrorism prevention were cited as justifying the proposal (Millar, 2002b). The 
ensuing complaints from the media, the public, civil liberties campaigners and 
representatives from ISPs led to the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, announcing 
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that he had ‘blundered’ and the proposal was withdrawn ‘until the Autumn at the 
earliest’ (Millar et al, 2002).  It was reported widely in media coverage that this 
decision had been influenced by the Home Secretary’s son, an IT specialist, telling 
his father that the proposal would be ‘unworkable’ for the Internet services 
industry.   
 
In response, in March 2003 the Home Office issued a consultation paper, Access to 
communications data: respecting privacy and protecting the public from crime65, 
which proposed to restrict the number of officials who can access communications 
data.  The paper explained that the original proposal had failed to explain clearly 
the limitations that would have applied to public authorities’ access to data.  
Alongside this consultation paper, the Home Office issued another on the retention 
of data requirements, proposing a code of conduct for ISPs and telephone 
companies allowing for a maximum period of twelve months for the retention of 
communications data.  In comparison with the original proposals of June 2002, 
these proposals represented significantly decreased powers of monitoring and 
interception on the part of public authorities and clarified the situation of ISPs with 
regard to data retention.  Nevertheless, civil liberties groups have expressed 
concern that data can be accessed without the requirement of a warrant from a 
judge (Pallister, 2003). Statistics published in 200366 suggest that the police and 
other authorities are making around one million requests each year under RIPA for 
access to data held by ISPs and telephone companies, although the accuracy of 
these figures has been disputed by the Home Office (BBC, 2003b).   
 
These policy initiatives have wide-ranging potential implications for those 
responsible for managing and delivering library and information services, as 
illustrated by an incident that took place in a public library in Plymouth in January 
2003.  Having noticed a library user accessing web sites that displayed ‘tall 
buildings’, another library user contacted the police.  The library web user turned 
                                            
65 <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/consult.pdf> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
 
66 Compiled by the Foundation for Information Policy Research and cited in BBC, 2003b. 
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out to be a foreign student, and usage logs revealed that the ‘tall buildings’ were 
actually the logo used by an Internet radio station.  The police subsequently asked 
library personnel if they could log Internet use made by asylum seekers.  The 
request was refused by library authorities on the grounds of Data Protection and 
Human Rights legislation (Goddard, 2003).   
 
A study on user privacy in the digital library environment carried out at 
Loughborough University between June 2000 and December 2001 investigated the 
attitudes and approaches to privacy of library users and library personnel in 
special, further education and higher education libraries (Sturges et al, 2003).  Of 
the users of further and higher education libraries that were surveyed, 89% 
expressed ‘no, or little, concern’ about threats to privacy in using the library (Ibid).  
Three-quarters of the libraries’ users accepted that ‘the library should monitor the 
use of electronic services to prevent misuse’ (Ibid).  The findings of the study 
suggested that privacy issues were not high on the policy agenda of the respondent 
libraries, only 14% of which had a privacy policy in place.  This contrasts with 
81% of respondent libraries having an Acceptable Use Policy, 68% having an 
email policy and 64% having a Data Protection policy.  The researchers suggested 
that this reflects a situation where libraries are more likely to formulate policy on 
an issue that generates a high level of public anxiety and media exposure, or as a 
response to the demands of legislation (Ibid).  It should be noted that the fieldwork 
for this project was carried out prior to much of the media exposure given to the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (Parliament, 2000a) and the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (Parliament, 2001), and it is likely, therefore, 
that there was little awareness on the part of either library users or personnel of 
legislative initiatives with regard to surveillance or interception of electronic 
communications.  
 
As far as monitoring and interception of electronic communications in the 
workplace are concerned, the Information Commissioner issued a code of 
guidance for employers67 in June 2003 (Dyer, 2003).  The code advised employers 
                                            
67 <http://www.dataprotection.gov.uk/dpr/dpdoc.nsf> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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that they must inform staff in advance if they intend to monitor their 
communications and employees must be told why the monitoring is being done.  
The code also recommended that employers carry out an audit to ensure that the 
benefits of monitoring outweigh the intrusion into privacy.  Covert monitoring can 
only be justified in exceptional circumstances, such as the investigation of criminal 
conduct.  In addition to compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 
(Parliament, 1998b), employers should ensure that their monitoring and 
interception activities are in accordance with the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 200068 (Parliament, 2000a), the Telecommunications (Lawful Business 
Practice) (Interception of Communications) Regulations 200069 (Parliament, 
2000b) and the Human Rights Act 199870 (Parliament, 1998a) (Information 
Commissioner, 2003).   
 
A number of surveys have been conducted to determine the extent of monitoring 
of electronic communication carried out by UK employers.  One example, carried 
out in June 2003 by Klegal and Personnel Today, found that 20% of firms carried 
out daily monitoring, and that disciplinary cases for email and Internet abuse at 
work in the previous twelve months exceeded the total of those for health and 
safety breaches, dishonesty and violence (Dyer, 2003).   
 
3.6 EU and UK approaches compared – some conclusions 
 
Regulation of the Internet has been shown to be a particularly problematic area in 
an already complex information policy arena.  This study of some of the wide 
range of legislative and regulatory initiatives impacting on Internet content and 
access implemented at UK and EU levels demonstrates that the Internet is far from 
being an unregulated zone.  On the contrary, it is subject to constraints imposed by 
a variety of legal instruments, technical architecture, self-regulatory mechanisms 
                                            
68 <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000023.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
69 <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2000/20002699.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
70 <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980042.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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and cultural norms; and of course, the ability to access network infrastructure.  
Policy measures implemented at both national and international level can be seen 
to have either a distributive purpose and effect (for example, the extension of 
network infrastructure); or a restrictive purpose and effect (for example, the 
implementation of filtering software).   
 
Prior to the period under consideration, the main concerns of both national and 
international policy-making with regard to the Internet tended to focus on issues 
relating to infrastructure, regulation and deregulation of communications 
provision, and the obligations of service providers towards universal access.  
These concerns were driven primarily by the needs of commerce and promoting 
the competitivity of industry.  Interest was also starting to be expressed in the 
potential offered by networked computer communications to areas such as lifelong 
learning, teleworking and enhancing citizenship. Where policies did address the 
regulation of content the overwhelming emphasis was on preventing access by 
minors to material with a sexual content, and the continuation – and indeed 
strengthening – of this emphasis was apparent in all regions in the subsequent 
policy study. However, there was already some evidence also of a broadening of 
scope, particularly with regard to the control of racist content. 
 
The level of activity in developing and debating new initiatives within the EU in 
the period between 1996 and 1998 inclusive suggests that the issue of content 
regulation was high on the policy agenda of the EU.  This is not surprising, as this 
was also the point in time when the media-generated ‘moral panic’ was at its 
zenith.  However, the sheer volume of different initiatives that have followed, 
usually emanating from different Directorate Generals and with a different policy 
emphasis, has led to a fragmentation and lack of overall coherence that has 
arguably diluted the impact and effectiveness of the different measures.   
 
The same fragmentation and lack of coherence is apparent in measures proposed 
and implemented within the UK.  Indeed, approaches taken to the regulation of 
Internet content in the UK have closely mirrored those of the EU, in particular 
with regard to the priority given to self-regulation as a control mechanism.  The 
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remit of the IWF reflects the action lines of the EU Internet Action Plan.  
Similarly, the priorities of the policy agenda at UK and EU levels have followed 
parallel lines, moving from an initial focus on developing infrastructure and 
technical expertise in order to promote economic growth and competitivity, to an 
increasing preoccupation with the control of illegal and harmful content; the 
promotion of a regulatory regime that aids the development of e-commerce; the 
promotion of social inclusion through access to Internet content; and finally to 
measures to fight crime and terrorism through communications traffic data 
retention, monitoring and interception.  Where differences in approach have been 
identified, these have generally represented a subtle variation in the balance of 
priorities, for example the emphasis given in the EU to access to harmful content 
by minors, compared with a UK emphasis on the control of paedophiliac content. 
 
In both policy arenas, difficulties and legal confusion can be seen to arise from the 
conflicting aims of legislative initiatives that aim to protect and promote 
information access, including the rights to privacy and to freedom of expression, 
and those whose primary aims are to control access to obscene or criminally racist 
content, or to fight crime and terrorism.  Both the UK and the EU are hampered in 
this respect by the lack of an overarching, coherent information policy that could 
inform the priorities and balances of approaches to information access.  There is 
evidence that content control is still a matter of concern to European and UK 
policy makers, particularly with regard to the notion of ‘harm’ to minors.  Indeed 
the scope of content to be ‘controlled’ appears to be broadening, whilst the need to 
combat terrorism is being cited as justification for encroachments on the protection 
of privacy of electronic communication and online information access.  Such 
measures promoting a more directive regulatory approach to the prevention of 
access to illegal and harmful content, to surveillance and to data retention are 
likely to conflict with the right to freedom of expression conferred through the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)71 (Council of Europe, 1950). 
 
                                            
71 Relevant instruments of the ECHR are discussed in Chapter Four. 
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The policy issues that have presented themselves in the course of this study are 
further reflected in the investigations at Council of Europe level (presented in the 
next chapter) and those at institutional level with regard to HEIs (described in 
Chapters Five and Six).  The interpretation and significance of these combined 
findings will be discussed in Chapter Seven, and final conclusions drawn together 
in Chapter Eight. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN NETWORKED INFORMATION: 
GUIDELINES FOR A EUROPEAN CULTURAL POLICY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the findings of an investigation into policy formulation 
within the Council of Europe72 with regard to public access to the Internet, and to 
freedom of expression in the online environment.  Starting with some general 
background to the Council of Europe, and in particular to the relevant Articles of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Council of Europe, 1950), it 
continues by outlining some of the characteristics of the Council of Europe’s 
approaches to issues of freedom of expression.  It then examines specific measures 
applied by the Council to regulation of the Internet, and illustrates this policy area 
by means of a case study of the formulation of Guidelines for Public Access to and 
Freedom of Expression in Networked Information (Sturges, 2000a). The author 
discusses her experience of involvement in this policy formulation through 
participation in an electronic consultation exercise and in an international 
conference attended by relevant policy makers.   
 
Other relevant initiatives promulgated by the Council of Europe are also discussed, 
including the Convention on Cybercrime of 200173 (Council of Europe, 2001b).  
Although detailed consideration of the Convention is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, the relevant provisions that impact most directly on freedom of expression 
and freedom of access to information are analysed.  A brief outline of the policy 
context in which the Convention was drafted and implemented is also provided, as 
it offers an interesting insight into the fragmentation, confusion and lack of 
                                            
72 <http://www.coe.int> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
 
73 <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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coherence that was found to be particularly characteristic of the Council’s policy 
making processes. 
 
4.2 Background to the Council of Europe 
 
 
…although the Council of Europe has been eclipsed recently by the notoriety and clout of 
the European Union and its institutions, it remains the Continent’s voice of conscience 
and carries immense moral authority on matters of its jurisdiction, primarily the 
monitoring and protection of human rights in member states and even beyond them. 
(Baraschos, 1998, p.31) 
 
The Council of Europe is not to be confused with the European Union (which, 
confusingly, has a body entitled the Council of the European Union): the Council 
of Europe is a quite separate and distinct organisation.  Whereas the origins of the 
EU lay in economic co-operation, the Council of Europe had the protection and 
furtherance of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the core of its mission.  
The Council’s stated aims are: 
 
• To protect human rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law; 
• To promote awareness and encourage the development of Europe’s cultural 
identity and diversity; 
• To seek solutions to problems facing European society (such as discrimination 
against minorities, xenophobia, environmental protection); 
• To help consolidate democratic stability in Europe by backing political, 
legislative and constitutional reform. 
(Council of Europe, 2003a) 
 
The Council does not, however, involve itself in military or defence matters, 
seeing these as the responsibility of NATO (Gomien et al, 1996).  
 
The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organisation, and any European 
state can become a member, provided ‘it accepts the principle of the rule of law 
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and guarantees human rights and fundamental freedoms to everyone under its 
jurisdictions’ (Council of Europe, 2003a; Gomien et al, 1996).  There are currently 
45 Member States74.  The Council works towards achieving its fundamental aims 
through the adoption of conventions and recommendations; the dissemination of 
information about human rights; and the support of research in the area (Gomien et 
al, op cit, p.11).   
 
It was founded in 1949, when the Treaty of London75 establishing the Council of 
Europe was signed by the ten original founding member states.  The following 
year, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms76 (Council of Europe, 1950) was signed in Rome, as a legal instrument 
intended to guarantee civil and political rights. At the time of its founding, the 
Council decided to exclude economic, social and cultural rights from the 
Convention.  According to Gomien et al (1996) this was in order to emphasise 
guarantees of respect for human rights, the rule of law and political democracy in a 
Europe that had been left devastated by war.  It was also considered that some 
European countries were not yet in a position to implement full economic and 
social rights (Ibid).  Robertson (1993, p.499) has suggested that its ideals were 
shaped by an awareness of the need for Western Europe to have in place a means 
of resistance against any future resurgence of fascism, as well as to strengthen 
those civil rights potentially endangered by the Communist regimes of Eastern 
Europe.  
 
Economic and social rights were subsequently provided for via the European 
Social Charter77 (Council of Europe, 1961), signed in Turin in 1961. Taken 
                                            
74 Correct as of August 2003.  A list of Member States can be found at <http://www.coe.int/T/E/ 
Communication_and_Research/Contacts_with_the_public/About_Council_of_Europe/CoE_Map_
&_Members/> [Last accessed 8/8/2003]. 
 
75 <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm> [Last accessed 8/8/2003]. 
 
76 More commonly referred to as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
(ECHR).  Available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm> [Last 
accessed 5/7/2004]. 
 
77 <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/ 035.htm> [Last accessed 23/9/2004]. 
 
 110
together, the Convention and the Social Charter provide a framework for a 
comprehensive guarantor to citizens of Council of Europe member states of most 
of the human rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights78, as 
adopted by the United Nations in 1948.  The Convention is enforced through the 
European Court of Human Rights, via a Commission on Human Rights and a 
Committee of Ministers. Any citizen of a member state who believes that his or 
her rights under the Convention have been infringed by a court ruling or by an 
administrative act, and who has exhausted all the possibilities of redress available 
through their national judicial system, may take their complaint to the European 
Court of Human Rights.  Before the Court hears a case, the complaint must go 
before the Commission, which will gather and evaluate the facts of the case and 
present them to the Committee of Ministers or the Court. If an amicable solution 
cannot be found at the early stages, the Commission or the Council may refer the 
case to the Court, whose decisions are binding on member states. Of almost 26,000 
cases petitioned to be heard by the Court between 1955 and 1998, approximately 
1,900 only were deemed admissible for hearing and fewer than 500 were heard by 
the Court (Baraschos, 1998, p.45).   
 
4.3 The Council of Europe and freedom of expression 
 
The ECHR sets out a list of rights and freedoms that individual member states are 
obliged to guarantee to everyone within their jurisdiction.  Thus, for example, in 
adopting the Convention in 1950 the Council of Europe guaranteed individual 
subjects of member states the right to freedom of expression. Article 10 of the 
Convention states: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.  This Article shall not prevent states from requiring 
the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
 
                                            
78 <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
 111
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
(Council of Europe, 1950, Art.10, paragraphs 1 and 2) 
 
Freedom of expression is thus not considered absolute, but is bound by duties and 
responsibilities towards both the national interest and the protection of the rights of 
others.  However, any restrictions on Article 10 must meet all three conditions of 
prescription by law; the pursuit of a legitimate aim such as the prevention of crime 
or disorder; and necessity in a democratic society.   Case law has demonstrated 
that the member states enjoy a certain ‘margin of appreciation’ in the interpretation 
of Paragraph 2, especially with regard to the ‘protection of health or morals’ as 
applied to restrictions on pornography and obscenity (Voorhof, 1995).  However, 
it is for the European Court of Human Rights to determine whether measures taken 
at national level are justifiable in principle and proportionate.  In the application of 
Paragraph 2, case law has demonstrated that judgement has depended less on the 
nature of the contested speech than on member states’ justification for constraining 
that speech (Harris et al, 1995).  
 
In addition to the restrictions imposed by paragraph 2, Article 15 of the ECHR 
permits member states derogation from the right of freedom of expression and 
information in times of war or other public emergency (Ibid). The freedom to 
publish and distribute materials inciting racial discrimination is also not protected 
by Article 10, and defamatory or blasphemous speech is afforded a lower level of 
protection (Ibid).  Restrictions on freedom of expression and information may also 
be sanctioned under Article 6 (the right to a fair trial), for example on the grounds 
that media coverage may prejudice the opinions of jury members; Article 11 (the 
right to peaceful assembly); Article 16 (which permits restrictions on the political 
activities of foreigners); and Article 17, which prohibits reliance on Convention 
 112
rights where the aim is to subvert or destroy the freedoms that the Convention 
aims to secure. 
 
Article 8 of the ECHR concerns an individual’s right to privacy and family life as 
outlined in the following paragraphs: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
(Council of Europe, 1950, Article 8, paragraphs 1 and 2) 
 
The Court has given recognition to the fact that there may be instances where 
member states have, to a limited extent, a positive obligation to interfere with the 
right to freedom of expression in order to protect the right to privacy under Article 
8 of another individual, which may be violated by publications or revelations in 
the mass media.  In such circumstances the State is expected to find a ‘proper 
balance’ between the two rights (Voorhof, 1995). To date, European Court of 
Human Rights case law has tended to give priority to the right to freedom of 
expression, recognising that, while privacy is important, freedom of expression is 
an essential safeguard of democracy (Travis and Dyer, 2000). 
 
In addition to factual information, Article 10 provides protection for the expression 
of ideas, opinions and political speech.  Information and ideas are given a 
particularly high level of protection when they are made public in the context of a 
political debate, on the grounds that freedom of expression in political and public 
debate ‘is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society’79. This accords 
                                            
79 Lingens v. Austria, judgement of 8 July 1986, Series A, No.103, 8 EHHR 103 (1986), para.42, 
cited in Gomien et al (1996). 
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well with the Habermasian concept of promoting rational decision-making through 
conditions of ‘ideal speech’.  Particular attention has been paid to safeguarding the 
freedom of the press, which is seen as playing a vital role as ‘public watchdog’, 
and member states have been accorded very little margin of appreciation where 
restrictions on the press have been imposed (Copdel, 1999). Voorhof (1995) 
argues that Article 10 is particularly important for the protection of critical and 
non-conformist speech.  This was clearly stated by the Court in the judgement of 
the case of Handyside80 in 1976: 
 
[Freedom of expression] is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or a matter of indifference, but also to 
those that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the population.  Such are the 
demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 
“democratic society”. 
(Cited in Gomien et al, 1996, p.274) 
 
However, this level of tolerance may be lowered with consideration to the actual 
or intended readership of a publication, and the possible effect on that readership.  
This is especially true with regard to obscene or pornographic materials and their 
availability to minors.  In the Handyside case cited above, despite the strength of 
the Court’s defence of the principle of freedom of expression, the Court found in 
favour of the State’s action in suppressing publication under the ‘protection of 
morals’ provision of Article 10, paragraph 2.  Given that the publication in 
question, The Little Red Schoolbook, was specifically targeted at adolescents aged 
twelve to eighteen, the Court held that the nature of its content might have had 
harmful effects on the adolescents who would read it.  The case was also 
instrumental in illustrating the importance placed by the Court on the margin of 
appreciation afforded to national states: the fact that the book had been published 
with impunity in a majority of member states did not preclude the necessity of 
restraining its publication in a minority of states if local circumstances justified 
this (Burnheim, 1997). 
                                            
80 Handyside v. United Kingdom, judgement of 7 December 1976, Series A, No. 24, 1 EHHR 737 
(1979-1980), para.49. 
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Article One of the ECHR obliges member states to secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined within the Convention. Case law has 
demonstrated clearly that this not only imposes an obligation on national 
governments to protect these rights, including that of freedom of expression, but 
also gives them a ‘promotional obligation’ to take positive action to ensure access 
to them81 (Vitiello, 1997).  Thus the state, in addition to not itself restricting 
freedom of expression in violation of Article 10, 
 
…has a duty to secure the conditions which will ensure that the freedom of expression and 
information of the individual is not restricted by other private persons or private 
organisations in a way which violates Article 10 of the Convention. 
(Voorhof, 1995, p.60) 
 
The impact of the ECHR on protecting and enhancing civil liberties in the UK has 
arguably been much greater than any spontaneous national initiatives (Robertson, 
1993, p.497). Between 1975 and 1993, prior to the adoption of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (Parliament, 1998a) which incorporated the provisions of the ECHR into 
UK law, over one hundred changes to UK laws, regulations and administrative 
practices could be attributed to actions brought against the Government under the 
Convention (Robertson, Ibid, p.500). 
 
4.4 The Council of Europe and regulation of the Internet 
 
In the mid 1990s the Council of Europe began to involve itself in policy 
formulation with regard to regulation of the Internet, at much the same time as the 
European Union was becoming active in this arena.  The potential relevance of 
Article 10 in protecting freedom of expression on the Internet has been discussed 
by Sturges (1998) and Vitiello (1997), but as of April 2004 there remained a lack 
                                            
81 See for example VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland [Application 24699/94], 
judgement of 28 June 2001, para. 45.  Available at <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/> [Last 
accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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of established case law on its application to Internet content and access82. It is 
reasonable to presume that this will develop in future, as has happened in the 
United States with challenges brought under the First Amendment to legislation to 
control Internet access and content83.  The period from 1996 onwards did, 
however, see considerable activity on the part of the Council in formulating a 
range of policies relating to control of Internet content and use, the most important 
of which are discussed in the following sections84. 
 
4.4.1 Media Recommendations  
 
In October 1997 the Committee of Ministers adopted three recommendations, 
which focussed on the portrayal of violence in electronic media, the control of 
‘hate speech’, and the promotion of a culture of tolerance, and which were directed 
towards the media85 (Council of Europe, 1997a; 1997b; 1997c). With regard to the 
portrayal of violence in electronic media (Council of Europe, 1997a), the 
Recommendation laid down guidelines for member states to follow in acting to 
limit the gratuitous portrayal of violence whilst respecting the right to freedom of 
                                            
82 Judgements of the European Court of Human Rights can be searched and viewed at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
83 For example, the successful challenge to provisions of the Communications Decency Act on the 
grounds that they were unconstitutional in outlawing speech protected by the First Amendment.  
For more about the case see <http://archive.aclu.org/issues/cyber/burning.html> [Last accessed 
5/7/2004]. 
 
84 A note on terminology: In order to clarify the following sections on Council of Europe policies 
towards regulation of the Internet, it would be helpful to provide a brief guide to the various 
regulatory instruments available to the Council, the most important of which are: 
Conventions - These are legal instruments that are binding on member states that ratify them. 
Declarations - Declarations announce policy directions, principles and intentions, and propose 
areas for future policy development.  They are not legally binding instruments on member 
governments. 
Recommendations - These are also not legally binding on member governments.  The Committee 
of Ministers adopts Recommendations that are addressed to the governments of member states 
suggesting guidelines for national legislation or administrative practice.   
Guidelines - These have the same legal status as recommendations for member governments, but 
do not require formal adoption by the Committee of Ministers, and may be directed at a wider 
audience, such as relevant professional organisations. 
 
85 Recommendations R (97) 19 - 21.  
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expression and information.  It advocated a self-regulatory approach by the media, 
with the setting up of independent regulatory bodies in member states to which 
users can file complaints.  It also highlighted the importance of education about 
electronic media, particularly in helping young people to develop a critical attitude 
to the portrayal of violence (Council of Europe, 1997d). 
 
With regard to ‘hate speech’ the second Recommendation (Council of Europe, 
1997b) contains guidelines for national governments’ action against hate speech, 
including the need to develop an effective legal framework.  In particular, this 
advocates stronger remedies in civil law for the victims of hate speech.  Within the 
legal framework, however, member governments should ‘make sure that any 
interference by public authorities with freedom of expression is extremely limited, 
that it is based on objective criteria and subject to judicial control’ (Ibid). 
 
The third Recommendation (Council of Europe, 1997c) stresses the positive role 
that the media can play in promoting awareness and appreciation of the diversity 
of the ethnic, social, cultural and religious groups that constitute society.  Thus, the 
recommendation emphasises the importance of educating media personnel and 
adopting inclusive personnel recruitment policies to ensure balanced and diverse 
content.   
 
Although these Recommendations were intended to provide a framework for the 
control of the portrayal of violence, the dissemination of ‘hate speech’ and the 
promotion of tolerance across all electronic media, including the ‘new 
communications media’, the wording of the Recommendations tends to focus on 
traditional media such as newspapers and television, although over time the 
increasing convergence of new and existing media may well render this distinction 
less important. 
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4.4.2 A Council of Europe Action Plan 
 
Around the same time in June 1997 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe adopted a Recommendation on the scientific and technical aspects of the 
new information and communications technologies86 (Council of Europe, 1997e).  
This committed the Council to ‘seeking common responses to the challenges and 
opportunities presented by the development of new information technologies’.  
Notably, the Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers support and 
reinforce the work regarding the impact of the new technologies on human rights 
and democratic values of the European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media 
Policy, who were due to meet in December 1997.  At this meeting, which was held 
in Thessaloniki, Media Ministers passed Resolutions and approved an Action Plan 
‘to familiarise the public with the new Communications Technologies and to check 
misuse of their services’ (Council of Europe, 1997f).  The Conference resolutions 
expressed concern about the use of technology by those who promote violence and 
intolerance, and who lack respect for human dignity (Sturges, 2000b).  
 
As with the EU Action plan on safe use of the Internet (European Commission, 
1997a), the Council of Europe Plan emphasised the need for self-regulation, 
universal access to network services, public education and awareness, and the 
adaptation of national legislation to the demands of new technologies.  In line with 
the Media Recommendations outlined above on the portrayal of violence and the 
control of ‘hate speech’, the Ministerial Conference pledged to combat the use of 
network services to disseminate hate speech and pornography. The balance of 
emphasis of the Council of Europe plan is however on freedom of expression in 
the networked environment rather than on safe use of the Internet, in contrast to 
the EU Action Plan (Sturges, 1998a).  This supports the Council’s claim that, for 
the Council, the highest importance is placed on the guarantee of freedom of 
expression in the new services and the need to avoid any interference by public 
                                            
86 Recommendation 1332 (1997), adopted 23rd June 1997.  Available at <http://assembly.coe.int/ 
documents/adoptedtext/ta97/erec1332.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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authorities beyond that which is permitted under the ECHR (Council of Europe, 
1997f).  
 
4.4.3 Freedom of expression and communications networks 
 
As part of its commitment to the promotion of public access to information and 
freedom of expression, and the recognition of the importance of new information 
technologies as a means to enhance this access, the Council of Europe’s Culture 
Committee appointed a consultant to prepare a report on Freedom of expression 
and the communications networks87.  Drafted in December 1997 by Prof. Paul 
Sturges of the Department of Information Science at Loughborough University, 
the resulting report was accepted by the Culture Committee in October 1998.  
Endorsing the Council of Europe’s commitment to the notion of ‘universal 
community service’ as a guiding principle, the report gives strong emphasis to the 
positive aspects and democratising potential of the Internet. This is set in the 
context of a discussion of the early years of the panic-induced Internet debate and 
the policy responses to this debate. 
 
The report analyses potential approaches to address the issues and fears emanating 
from access to Internet content through legislative, technical and ethical means.  
The adoption of new legislation as a solution is rejected on the grounds both of the 
potential impact on freedom of expression and the difficulty of implementation, 
particularly when issues of jurisdiction are taken into account.  Technical measures 
such as filtering and blocking are not regarded as a fully acceptable solution either, 
although recognition is given to their potential, if limited, value in specific 
circumstances: for example, if they are freely chosen by end users to control their 
own use or that of children in their care.   
 
                                            
87 Available at <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co-operation/culture/Completed_projects/NIT/ 
Sturges98_18.asp#TopOfPage > [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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Instead the report favours the adoption of ethical approaches such as self-
regulation based on codes of practice, and the promotion of user education.  In 
particular, it is suggested that the Council of Europe develop a Charter or 
Recommendation on ‘Self-regulation of the Networked Information Environment’.  
According to Sturges, this would set out the ways in which national governments 
could facilitate effective self-regulation, and would clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of different stakeholders, such as industry and user organisations, 
end users, legislative bodies and law enforcement agencies (Sturges, 1998a).  The 
ideas expressed in the report were disseminated and debated in a variety of 
professional settings, including conferences sponsored by the Council of Europe 
throughout 1998 in Budapest, Oslo, Riga and Strasbourg.  Comments made on 
those occasions were subsequently incorporated into the draft ‘Helsinki Charter’, 
discussed below.   
 
4.4.4 Public access to and freedom of expression in networked information 
 
The advice to prepare a ‘Charter’ was taken up by the Council and progressed 
through the ‘Public access and freedom of expression’ working strand of the 
Culture Committee’s New Information Technologies programme.  Prof. Sturges 
was requested to prepare a draft Charter for consultation.  This initial draft was 
prepared in consultation with colleagues and relevant professional contacts, and 
the draft was circulated for informal review to a number of individuals (including 
the author of this thesis) in September 1998.  The draft was then presented at the 
17th meeting of the Council’s Culture Committee in April 1999. The formal 
consultation procedure of the subsequent revised draft involved an electronic 
consultation process with relevant professional bodies and individuals; an 
international Conference, at which it was to be debated; and the formal Council of 
Europe committee ratification procedures.  This consultation process is discussed 
in greater detail in the following sections. 
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4.4.4.1 The draft ‘Helsinki Charter’ 
 
Focussing primarily on issues related to the provision of public access to the 
Internet, the draft Charter that was submitted for the electronic consultation 
exercise88 had at this point the formal status of a draft Recommendation89 to 
member states.  It was referred to at this time by the Council as the ‘Helsinki 
Charter’ after the location of the Conference at which it was to be debated.  Its 
guiding principle was clear from the preliminary outline of scope, which included 
the statement that 
 
The Charter’s concern is that a widespread desire, both official and popular, to eradicate 
illegal content and avoid distasteful and possibly harmful content should not be allowed to 
damage full and free access by all users of public access points to any legal content they 
choose. 
 
The draft endorsed the principle of free (in the sense of being unrestricted) and 
universal access to networked information within the limits of the law, and that 
decisions on what content to access should rest firmly with the end user.  In 
particular, young people should not be subject to any restrictions that are not 
applied to the community as a whole, although they should be warned in advance 
of the potential risks of online contacts made with other users.  The staff of Public 
Access Points should not assume the responsibilities of an ‘in loco parentis’ role. 
 
The draft does recognise that some specialised institutions, such as schools or 
HEIs, may need to impose some limits on access for practical reasons.  Thus, for 
example, they may need to limit access to content and use that is not relevant to 
                                            
88  Included in the thesis as Appendix Six. 
 
89 Although the ‘Charter’ was originally envisaged as having the status of Recommendation, this 
was subsequently amended to the status of Guidelines.  In addition, it was envisaged at one point 
that it would be entitled the Helsinki Charter, although this nomenclature did not endure.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, the author has used whichever terminology was current at the point in the 
document’s life cycle that is being written about. 
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the institution’s aims and objectives, or which may hinder the institution’s ability 
to serve users pursuing the primary purposes of the institution. 
 
Attention is paid to the principles of providing a properly managed and staffed 
environment for public access to networked information in order to create a 
positive and supportive atmosphere.  This includes the responsibilities of staff for 
identifying and facilitating access to quality networked information, particularly 
for young people, for example through the creation of gateway pages.  Whilst staff 
of Public Access Points have a duty to request that users accessing illegal content 
should discontinue such access, whenever they are made aware of such use, they 
should not invade users’ privacy by exercising general oversight of what content 
users are accessing.  Wherever intervention in an individual’s use has been deemed 
necessary, this should be carried out according to a predetermined procedure, and 
should be subject to immediate review so as to assess any further action that might 
be needed.  The layout of Access Points should be designed to minimise the 
disturbance to other users of access to ‘disturbing’ (but legal) content, including 
image and sound files.  This may, in some instances, require that users be 
prevented from making such access. 
 
The use of filtering software to block access to content is described as ‘an 
unwarranted interference with the individual’s freedom of access to information’ 
and should not be applied at Public Access Points, unless explicitly required by 
law.  However, the use of ‘recommender’ software packages to filter for positively 
evaluated networked content is considered to be of value and to be encouraged at 
Public Access Points. Rating or labelling is seen as facilitating this 
‘recommendation’ process with an appropriate metadata platform, such as PICS, 
being used to obtain ratings data about a site.  Staff should alert users to the 
existence of warning pages that are attached to many sites containing disturbing 
content.  In particular, the existence of these warning pages and of age verification 
schemes attached to some controversial content should be drawn to the attention of 
parents anxious about their children’ access to such content. 
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Institutions responsible for providing Public Access Points should have a clearly 
articulated Internet Use Policy, which should be communicated to users by public 
display.  In developing Internet Use Policies, Public Access Point managers should 
involve relevant bodies (such as professional associations, trade unions and library 
advisory boards).  They should also seek guidance from existing Internet Use 
Policies, guidelines and ‘netiquette’ codes.  According to the draft, Internet Use 
Policies should include clear statements on matters such as access to illegal 
content and the use of workstations for other illegal activities, and on the need to 
exercise consideration towards other users.  Access policies should respect user 
rights, including the right of privacy.   
 
4.4.4.2 The electronic consultation 
 
The draft Charter as described above was made available on the Council of Europe 
website for consultation in May 1999.  Although the electronic consultation period 
was originally scheduled to take place between 29th March 1999 and May 21st 
1999, technical delays meant that the draft was not made available for consultation 
until mid-May.  This had the effect of seriously curtailing the opportunity for 
interested bodies to respond to the draft.  This restriction on the opportunity to 
participate in the consultation was exacerbated by the inability of the Council to 
rectify problems with the technical operation of the consultation website, further 
inhibiting the ability of interested parties to submit their responses.  
 
Once the draft was available on the Council consultation site the researcher drew 
the attention of subscribers to relevant UK electronic mailing lists to its presence.  
On 14th May 1999 the following notice was posted on the Internet: 
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Subject: Freedom of Expression and Public Access to the Internet 
Apologies for cross-posting. 
Please forward this message to other relevant groups/individuals/lists. 
 
The Council of Europe has commissioned a draft Charter on public access and freedom of 
expression in the networked environment.  The Charter is intended to provide guidance for 
the managers of public access points, the governing bodies to which those managers 
report, and the Governments which lay down the policy frameworks within which public 
access is provided.  Consultation on the draft Charter is currently taking place, and it is 
hoped that comments will be received from actual or potential public access point users, 
those with a professional, business or civil interest in the provision of public access, and 
by anyone else responsible for providing or managing public access points.  Comments 
will be used to further develop the Charter, so that it can be accepted as Council of Europe 
policy.   
 
The draft Charter and opportunities to comment can be found at: 
http://culture.coe.fr/postsummit/nti/en/project/helsinki/edraft_charter.htm 
Please take the time to view the draft and provide feedback in order that the widest 
possible consultation may take place. 
 
The lists to which the message was posted were chosen on the basis of the 
researcher’s professional awareness, together with scanning of the description of 
UK academic mailing lists available on the mailbase web site90.  They included: 
                                            
90<http:// www.mailbase.ac.uk> [currently hosted at http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk, last accessed 
5/7/2004] 
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List Name Description91 
lis-link Library and Information Science news and discussion 
pin [Policing the Internet] For those interested in ethical, moral and political 
responsibilities related to the development of 
interactive information and communication 
technologies in UK Higher Education 
lis-pub-libs For discussion of topics of general interest (with a 
particular focus on networked services) to public 
librarians in the UK and elsewhere  
itsupport For staff involved in supporting IT in the UK 
academic community and beyond  
dc-general For discussion of all issues relevant to the 
development, deployment, and use of Dublin Core 
metadata. 
lis-bailer Discussion group for lecturers and research staff in 
Departments of Information and Library Studies in the 
UK  
lis-fid92 To promote discussion of Information Management 
and Library and Information Science in an 
international context 
lis-european-programmes A forum for sharing information on all aspects of 
European programmes, projects and funding 
opportunities of interest to the UK LIS sector 
Table 4.1: Consultation Mailing Lists 
 
The draft Charter that was posted on the consultation website allowed respondents 
to comment in a hyper-linked textbox on each section of the Charter under the 
headings: 
                                            
91 from that provided at <http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
92 International Federation for Information and Documentation 
 
 125
 
• General comments 
• Principles of access 
• Young people’s access 
• Access in specialised institutions 
• Management of public access points 
• Disruptive use 
• Filtering 
• Content rating 
• Warning pages 
• Internet Use Policies 
 
Contributors were expected to abide by three basic rules of participation, namely: 
taking responsibility for the content and accuracy of any information posted; 
keeping responses relevant to the topic; and not straying beyond the limits of civil 
discourse. 
 
It was intended that the views of participants responding to the consultation would 
be moderated and posted at 48-hour intervals in the forum section of the 
consultation site, and that these views would subsequently be part of the 
programme of the Helsinki Conference.  In the event, the combination of late 
posting of the consultation draft and technical problems with the consultation site 
meant that very few attempts were made by organisations to respond, and when 
attempts were made respondents were unable to post successfully.   
 
However, researchers at the Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility 
(CCSR) at De Montfort University, UK93, having tried unsuccessfully to use the 
consultation site to post comments, made direct email contact with the researcher 
in order to input into the consultation.   Their response made the following 
observations: 
 
                                            
93 <http://www.ccsr.cse.dmu.ac.uk> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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Principles of access 
“…one of the principles of access should be privacy.  Users should be able to 
access whatever materials they choose without being monitored or records being 
kept of what they access unless there is prior evidence from another source that 
their activities violate the law or policies consistent with this Charter to protect the 
network or safeguard resources for the purpose for which they were allocated.”  
 
This comment was incorporated into the final version of the Charter, with 
paragraph 1.3 stating that ‘Those providing Public Access Points should respect 
the privacy of users and treat knowledge of what they have accessed or wish to 
access as confidential’. 
 
Young people’s access 
[Para. 2.3] “…mainstream schooling should integrally include education for all 
children on how to avoid being preyed upon, including in networked contexts.” 
 
Although this statement was not included in its precise meaning, it did lead to a 
revised paragraph 2.4.  Although the role of parents in alerting their children to the 
potential risks of online contacts made with strangers is emphasised, the paragraph 
now contains the statement that ‘Parental warnings about online contact with 
strangers should be reinforced as part of the education and training processes.’ 
 
Access in specialised institutions 
[Para. 3.2] “We are pleased that there is recognition of the need of specialised 
institutions to restrict use that might ‘hinder the institution’s ability to serve users 
pursuing its primary purposes’.  However, we are anxious that specialised 
institutions do not impose limits on access beyond the extent needed to ensure that 
resources are committed to their primary purpose…’   
 
This suggestion was incorporated directly into the final draft, which now includes 
a new paragraph 3.3 that reads ‘Specialised institutions should not, however, 
impose limitations beyond the extent needed to ensure resources are committed to 
their primary purpose’.  
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Management of Public Access Points 
[4.3] “…it is not appropriate for great reliance to be placed on commercial 
gateway pages and sources of information when non-commercial sources are 
available, and thus that any gateway pages created should take this into account.” 
 
This comment was not explicitly stated in the revised draft, as the original wording 
of paragraph 4.3 already stated that ‘The staff of Public Access Points should be 
pro-active in identifying and facilitating public access to quality networked 
information content, particularly for young people.  It is appropriate for 
information professionals to create gateway pages for this purpose’.  This 
statement, which subsequently became paragraph 4.4 in the revised draft, was felt 
to elucidate clearly the principle that it was not intended that gateway pages would 
be based on commercial sources. 
 
Disruptive use 
[Para. 5.1] “We are concerned that the current wording of this clause does not say 
anything about staff monitoring use for no reason beyond nosiness.  Thus we 
would be anxious that the final sentence of 5.1 is re-worded to read ‘However it 
would be an unwarranted invasion of users’ privacy for staff to monitor the nature 
of the content accessed unless there is pre-existing good reason to suppose illegal 
content is being accessed (or access in a specialised institution is taking resources 
from the primary purpose of the institution)’. 
 
In this instance, the final draft did not incorporate this comment, but retained the 
original less emphatic wording.  Thus in the revised draft, paragraph 5.2 contained 
the statement that ‘Staff should not be required to [researcher’s italics] exercise 
general supervision of usage with the express intention of identifying the use of 
illegal or otherwise distasteful content’. 
 
Filtering 
[6.2] “We encourage the use of recommender systems, but only provided there is 
no commercial bias in such recommendations”.   
 128
 
This statement did not lead to an alteration of the wording used in the revised 
Charter. 
 
Warning pages 
[8.1, 8.2] “We have read reports of disturbing content being accidentally accessed 
without warning pages: we consider it important that staff do not discount or 
unduly downplay this possibility”. 
 
This comment led to a revised statement (paragraph 6.5 in the final draft) that 
‘When assisting users, the staff of Public Access Points should be prepared to 
draw their attention to the warning pages attached to many sites that contain 
controversial content, but should make it clear that not all such sites carry warning 
pages’. 
 
Internet Use Policies 
[9.1-9.5] “We are anxious that all such policies should be consistent with this 
Charter”. 
 
This comment led to the insertion of the phrase ‘consistent with the principles of 
this text’ into paragraph 7.1 of the revised Charter, which now reads ‘A Public 
Access Point should be operated within a clearly articulated and publicly available 
policy, consistent with the principles of this text [researcher’s italics], and 
expressing the balance of responsibilities between staff and users. 
 
Other issues 
The CCSR response also voiced concerns about the potential for age verification 
systems ‘exposing individual subscribers to the potential of fraud, if they are not 
operated by companies that have a high reputation in other spheres that they wish 
to maintain’.   
 
This led to the insertion of paragraph 6.6 into the final draft, which read ‘The age 
verification systems attached to some sites with controversial content also warn 
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users that they might wish to avoid such content, but users should be made aware 
of the risks associated with supplying personal data to such systems if they are not 
operated by reputable organisations’. 
 
It can be seen that not all of the suggestions were incorporated into the final draft: 
this was on account of the need to balance these comments with the outcome of 
subsequent debate at the Helsinki Conference. However, the CCSR response 
clearly made a useful contribution to the process of drafting the final Charter.  The 
emphasis that CCSR placed on privacy rights, for example, together with the 
weight given to protecting professional values and judgement over commercial 
interest, influenced the wording of the final draft. The value of this contribution 
illustrates the fact that it was very regrettable that the consultation process was so 
fraught with practical and bureaucratic difficulties, thus preventing other 
contributions.   
 
The willingness of the draft’s author to take account of suggestions for changes of 
wording, and the readiness of information professionals to offer their expertise to 
the formulation of the guidelines, are an indication of the strong potential of the 
use of electronic consultation mechanisms.  However, this exercise also illustrated 
the crucial importance of ensuring effective management of the process, with the 
use of robust technical systems and an appropriate timeframe to allow for the 
resolution of difficulties encountered.  
 
4.4.4.3  The Helsinki Conference 
 
The next stage in the consultation process was the presentation and discussion of 
the Charter at a Conference entitled Public access and freedom of expression in 
cultural institutions that was held in Helsinki, 10th –11th June 1999. Although the 
problems experienced with the electronic consultation exercise limited its 
usefulness in practice, the Conference afforded the opportunity for a much wider 
range of individuals and organisations to contribute their ideas and opinions on the 
Charter (although given that these individuals and organisations were selected and 
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invited by the Council, there was the possibility of an element of bias being 
introduced into the exercise).   
 
 The Conference was co-organised by the Finnish Ministry of Education and 
Culture, the Council of Europe and the Nordic Council of Ministers.  In its 
broadest aims, the Conference was intended ‘to provide a forum for debate and 
exchange of experience on the implications of the digital era for public access to 
and freedom of expression in networked information in the cultural sector’ 
(Council of Europe, 1999a).   
 
In addition to submitting the Charter to the Conference for debate and validation, 
the Conference also aspired to explore questions such as:  
 
• How can society capitalise on the opportunities offered by new information 
technologies to improve both access to and freedom of expression in 
networked information? 
• How to develop policy that promotes access to and freedom of expression 
in networked information? 
• How to avoid incurring payment for access to networked information such 
that a digital divide is engendered that will inhibit the participation of some 
citizens in the democratic process? 
 
As well as members of the Council of Europe’s Cultural Policy and Action 
Division, the Conference was attended by representatives of the governments of 
Council of Europe member states, representatives of cultural institutions, industry 
representatives, academics, and a wide range of invited experts.  These included 
the Director of the IFLA Committee on Free Access to Information and Freedom 
of Expression (FAIFE)94 and the Acting Chief Executive of the UK Internet Watch 
Foundation (IWF). 
 
                                            
94 <http://www.ifla.org/faife/index.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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The Charter was discussed in a range of sessions relating to different aspects of the 
provision of public access to the Internet and freedom of expression, in addition to 
special sessions held specifically to present and debate the content of the Charter.  
In presenting here the substance of the comments made during these discussions, 
the following typology has been used: 
 
• Responses favouring less restrictive or more liberalising approaches to 
access to networked information; 
• Responses favouring more restrictive approaches to access to networked 
information; 
• Responses seeking to broaden the scope of the content of the Charter; 
• Responses concerned with clarity of definition of terms or concepts; 
• Responses seeking to amend the emphasis of the Charter with regard to 
specific domains. 
 
These are potentially subjective categories, and in some instances there will be 
overlap between them (for instance, comments advocating the duty of 
governments to promote cultural diversity could be regarded as a liberalising 
approach and a call to broaden the scope of the Charter). In such instances 
judgement has been exercised and the comment placed in the most obviously 
appropriate category.  Wherever possible, the comments have been attributed to 
the delegate putting forward the comment. 
 
Responses promoting less restrictive or more liberal approaches to access to 
networked information 
• FAIFE condemns any attempts by governments to censor the Internet 
(FAIFE representative); all censorship should be opposed on the grounds 
that it is wrong to impose our own views about content onto others 
(representative from Portugal); 
• In accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child95, Article 
13,  the Charter’s approach advocating the same right to information on the 
                                            
95 Available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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part of children as adults is welcome; it is considered better to discuss 
appropriate use with children rather than rely on published warnings 
(representative from the Public Libraries Association in the Netherlands); 
• Emphasis on the role of education, information and guidance in the 
provision of Internet access for children is welcome (UK IWF 
representative); 
• Self-rating by content providers and self-selection by users is an 
appropriate means of addressing the access of ‘harmful’ content (UK IWF 
representative); 
• The importance of the role of privacy and confidentiality in promoting 
freedom of expression should be stressed (representative from Portugal); 
• The Charter should build on existing ethical approaches to the Internet such 
as ‘codes of netiquette’ (UK IWF representative); 
• Section 5.1 (on disruptive use) should be rephrased more positively with 
the emphasis on encouraging a ‘decent’ environment – it is questionable 
whether the staff of Public Access Points should take on the value-laden 
role of ‘policing’ use.  Alternatively it should be removed altogether as 
differing legislative regimes make ‘illegal’ content very difficult to define 
(delegate from McLuhan Program in Culture and Technology, University 
of Toronto, Canada). 
 
Responses promoting more restrictive approaches to access to networked 
information 
• A regulatory approach rather than a self-regulatory approach is required 
where access to the Internet by children is concerned (representatives from 
Italy, Slovakia); 
• It is not appropriate that cultural institutions should have a duty to provide 
access, and therefore the wording of 1.1 of the draft Charter should read 
‘should not hinder access’ rather than ‘should provide access’ 
(representative from Slovakia); 
• Unrestricted access is a noble aim, but a distinction needs to be drawn 
between different types of cultural institutions: in cultural institutions that 
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are funded by public money, there is a duty to make a human judgement 
about networked material, in the same way that librarians select books for 
their collections  (representative from Romania); 
• There is a need to make a distinction between Public Access Points in 
general areas and those in specifically child-oriented spaces, which should 
use positive filtering based on quality of content (UK IWF representative); 
• Media convergence could make it more appropriate to adopt the same 
regulatory instruments for the Internet as for other media (UK IWF 
representative, representative from Italy). 
 
Responses seeking to broaden the scope of the content of the Charter 
• Governments should have a duty to make citizenship information available 
to all on the Internet; the Charter should define the range of compulsory 
information governments should make available on the Internet (several 
representatives made comments similar to these); 
• Governments should have a duty to provide access to government 
information free of charge, and to provide access to networked information 
free of charge in schools (representative from Hungary); 
• Cultural institutions should have a duty to maximise cultural content and to 
make cultural material available through digitisation (representative from 
Romania); 
• In addition to Article 13 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas of all kinds), the Preamble should make 
reference to Article 17, the right of children to access to information and 
material from a diversity of national and international sources (FAIFE 
representative); 
• The Charter should emphasise the right of children to education and 
competence, and the right to discover new information and ideas for 
themselves (representative from the Netherlands Public Libraries 
Association); 
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• The Charter should stress the rights of users to education and literacy 
(representative from Slovakia); 
• Governments should have a duty to promote electronic literacy 
(representative from Hungary); staff of Public Access Points have a duty to 
promote electronic literacy, especially with regard to older users (delegate 
from McLuhan Program in Culture and Technology, University of Toronto, 
Canada); 
• Public provision of access to the Internet should extend beyond cultural 
and educational institutions, and into areas such as pubs, factories, 
launderettes etc. (UK IWF representative, delegate from McLuhan 
Program in Culture and Technology, University of Toronto, Canada); 
• The Charter needs a positive statement on the importance of making 
culturally specific material available, the encouragement of diversity and 
the widening of access through greater universal affordability, availability 
and usability (delegate from McLuhan Program in Culture and 
Technology, University of Toronto, Canada). 
 
Responses concerned with clarity or appropriateness of definition of terms or 
concepts 
• Recommendations to governments of member states (ii) should read ‘to 
encourage that self-regulation of public access points is genuinely 
possible…’ rather than ‘to ensure…’; 
• The definition of Public Access Points should explicitly include local 
government specialised institutions; 
• ‘Principles of Access’ (Section One) should be entitled ‘Principles of 
Public Access’; 
• Principles of Access 1.1 should explicitly include educational institutions 
(representative from Hungary); the Title of the Charter does not reflect the 
inclusion of educational institutions (Council of Europe representative); 
• Principles of Access 1.3 (‘access to networks should not be denied, or 
content excluded from access, on any ground other than the law in force’) 
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is problematic – what about unjust laws?  Whose law should be taken into 
consideration?  (Council of Europe representative); 
• The Preamble should make reference to the UNESCO recommendation on 
the protection of artists’ work, and therefore a statement on the 
responsibility to improve the conditions of artists’ working lives should be 
included (representative from UNESCO); 
• The recommendations to governments of member states (iii) (iv) (v), which 
all relate to the development of technical measures, should be amalgamated 
into a single recommendation (representative from the Netherlands’ Public 
Libraries Association). 
 
Responses seeking to amend the emphasis of the Charter with regard to specific 
domains 
• The prominence of libraries as cultural institutions should be made more 
explicit (Slovakian representative); 
• The emphasis should be on the responsibilities of the staff of Public Access 
Points to educate the public in order to encourage responsible use of 
networked information for the benefit of communities; 
• The emphasis of the Charter needs to be on the positive aspects of public 
access to the Internet and its democratising potential (comment made by 
representatives from the Netherlands, Canada and Finland); 
• The emphasis of the Charter should be on items related to the avoidance of 
censorship, in accordance with the principles of the UNESCO Public 
Libraries Manifesto96 that states that public library collections and services 
should not be subject to any censorship.  These principles are equally valid 
in relation to new information technologies (FAIFE representative); 
• The Charter should be seen as a political document, that forces 
governments to take action to combat social exclusion by promoting equal 
access to networked information (representative from Hungary). 
 
                                            
96 Available at <http://www.ifla.org/documents/libraries/policies/unesco.htm> [Last accessed 
5/7/2004] 
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During debate at the conference a majority of delegates focussed on emphasising 
the value of a commitment to human rights, freedom of expression and a ‘values-
driven’ democratic model of the information society.  At the same time, a 
significant minority of delegates expressed serious concern at the suggestion of 
unsupervised and unfiltered access by minors: the clauses on children’s access 
were those that provoked the most heated debate. The guidelines sought to treat 
children as individuals with the same rights to information as adults, and stressed 
parental guidance supported by education, guidance and training for both parents 
and children, as paramount.  However, there was a strong lobby for legislation and 
the implementation of filtering software to limit use of the Internet by minors.  
Strenuous calls were also made to broaden the scope of the Charter, for instance to 
encompass broader issues of social exclusion, educational policy, freedom of 
information and cultural diversity.  
 
The comments made in the course of the Conference debates with regard to the 
Charter were collated by the researcher, together with those made by the CCSR in 
the course of the electronic consultation, and sent to Prof. Sturges (Appendix 
Seven).  The Charter was subsequently redrafted and the revised draft submitted to 
the Culture Committee for approval in October 1999. Further suggestions as a 
result of this submission were incorporated into subsequent drafts. It was also 
agreed that the ‘Charter’ would have the status of “guidelines” rather than 
“recommendation”: it was felt that the rapidly changing context of developments 
in information technologies made it most appropriate to offer guidance to policy 
makers, politicians and professionals in drafting legislation or governmental 
policies.  Thus, the guidelines do not have a binding character or legal implications 
for member states. They were finally approved by the Culture Committee at their 
meeting in March 2000 and by the Council for Cultural Co-operation in May 2000.  
 
The original draft Charter submitted for debate in the Conference and the final 
approved text of the Guidelines have been appended to this thesis (Appendices Six 
and Nine) so that readers may view for themselves the detail of differences in 
wording, emphasis and tone of the two documents.  Although the researcher was 
unable to attend the October 1999 meeting of the Culture Committee at which the 
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revised draft was discussed, changes arising from that meeting are outlined in 
Appendix Eight, together with some rationale for the inclusion or omission of 
suggested changes.   
 
A summary of the main substance of changes that occurred between the original 
consultation draft, and that finally approved in May 2000 is provided below, 
organised according to the section heading of the final document in which the 
changes have been incorporated. 
 
Introduction 
 
An explanatory introduction has been included in the final draft to further clarify 
the purpose and scope of the draft, as well as to outline the guiding principles of 
freedom of expression, universal access and self-regulation that underpin the 
initiative.  In addition, the references have been expanded to include the 
incorporation of the Council of Europe Declaration on a European Policy for New 
Information Technologies (1999)97; the European Union Action Plan on 
Promoting Safe Use of the Internet (1999); and the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1945), Article 19.  The reference to the ECHR was 
expanded to include Article 14 (the prohibition of discrimination) in addition to 
Article 10 (the right to freedom of expression), and the reference to the United 
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) was expanded to include 
reference to Article 17 (the right of the child to access to material and information 
from a diversity of national and cultural sources) in addition to Article 13 (the 
right to freedom of expression). 
 
Definitions 
 
The main changes made to the definitions provided to aid understanding and 
clarity of the guidelines are as follows: 
                                            
97 Available at < http://cm.coe.int/ta/decl/1999/99dec3.htm > [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
 
 
 138
 
Cultural institutions  This definition has been extended to clarify the inclusion of 
relevant institutions that are funded by central government, local government or 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).  The definition has also been expanded 
to include, in particular circumstances, certain publicly- or privately-funded 
educational institutions (these were previously included under a separate 
definition). 
 
Free access  The definition of content to which the provisions of free access apply 
has changed from that which is ‘subject to no restrictions other than those set out 
in the laws in force in the relevant jurisdictions’ to that which is ‘subject to no 
restrictions other than those recognised as acceptable by the international 
conventions cited in the introduction to these guidelines’. 
 
Illegal content  The revised definition of illegal content does not make reference 
to content prohibited by reference to laws governing official secrecy, but has 
added a reference to content protected by laws on confidentiality. 
 
Public Access Points  This has been expanded to explicitly include networked 
workstations made available for public access for educational purposes, in addition 
to those provided for cultural, leisure or professional purposes. 
 
Telecentres  A note has been added to this definition to highlight the fact that the 
primary purpose of such centres is economic rather than cultural. 
 
Section One: Principles of public access 
 
The heading for this section now includes the insertion of the term ‘public’ in 
order to offer greater clarification of its scope. 
 
The wording of the first clause in this section (1.1 in both versions) has been 
amended to read ‘Cultural institutions providing public access to networked 
information and communication should do so for all, without regard to…’ instead 
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of ‘cultural institutions should provide public access to networked information and 
communication to all, without regard to…’. This removes the possibility of 
inferring from the text that all cultural institutions have an onus to provide public 
access to networked information and communication.  In addition, ‘age’ has been 
removed from the list of unacceptable exclusion characteristics. 
 
The wording of 1.2 in the final version (1.4 in the earlier draft) has been amended 
to read that it is ‘the responsibility [researcher’s italics] of individuals…to decide 
for themselves what they should, or should not, access’.  The previous version read 
that it is ‘the right [researcher’s italics] of individuals… to decide for themselves 
what they should, or should not, access’. 
 
The revised draft includes the insertion of three new clauses.  The first one (1.3) 
puts an onus on Public Access Point providers to ‘respect the privacy of users and 
to treat knowledge of what they have accessed or wish to access as confidential’.  
The second new clause (1.4) adds an obligation onto Public Access Point providers 
to ‘provide assistance for everyone to acquire the skills required to use such 
services’.  Finally, 1.5 places a responsibility onto Public Access Point providers 
to promote access to information content generated by local, regional and national 
public authorities ‘in the interests of an informed citizenry and a healthy 
democratic process’. 
 
However, two clauses from the original version have been removed from the final 
draft.  The first deleted clause (1.2 in the original) read ‘The principles of universal 
and free (in the sense of unrestricted) access to information which have been 
developed to apply to books and other documents in libraries and archives apply 
equally strongly to access to networked information’.  Clause 1.3 in the original 
version, which has now also been deleted, stated that ‘Access to networks should 
not be denied, or content excluded from access on any grounds other than the law 
in force’.  
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Section Two: Children’s access 
 
The heading for this section has been changed from ‘Young People’s Access’ to 
‘Children’s Access’ on the grounds that the latter refers more precisely to minors, 
whereas the former could include those of up to around 25 years of age. 
 
The wording of the first clause of this section (2.1 in both versions) has been 
altered in such a way as to significantly dilute the original emphasis on the rights 
of children to full access to networked content.  Thus, whereas the original clause 
read ‘No restrictions should be applied to the use of Public Access Points by 
young people other than those applied to the community as a whole’, it now reads 
‘Children choosing to use those Public Access Points that are provided for whole 
community use should, as far as possible [researcher’s italics], be able to do so 
under the same conditions as other users.  Nevertheless, in order to avoid access to 
harmful and/or illegal content, filtering systems requesting the use of personal age 
codes should be provided at Public Access Points’. 
 
Clause 2.2 in the earlier draft has also been reworded to reflect a change in 
emphasis.  The original clause read ‘The staff of Public Access Points should not 
assume an ‘in loco parentis’ role which would require them to anticipate the advice 
parents might or might not give their children about particular information 
content’.  This has been rephrased as clause 2.3 in the new version to read 
‘Although it is the responsibility of parents to advise their children about choices 
in the use of networked information and communication, the staff of Public Access 
Points should provide guidance for children’. 
 
Similarly, clause 2.3 in the original draft has been reworded, this time placing a 
stronger onus on parents, rather than information professionals, for educating 
children about responsible use.  The original clause 2.3 read ‘…because the 
Internet offers real time communication, as well as access to stored information, 
information professionals should be prepared to warn young people about the 
potential risks of online contacts made with other users’.  In the revised version, 
clause 2.4 reads ‘Because networks offer real time communication, as well as 
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access to stored information, parents should take particular trouble to advise their 
children about the potential risks of online contacts made with strangers. Parental 
warnings about online contact…should be reinforced as part of the education and 
training processes’. 
 
Two new clauses have also been added to this section, both concerned with the 
obligations of Public Access Point providers as intermediaries and educators for 
children using their facilities.  Thus 2.2 states that ‘Children have a right to expect 
that Public Access Points will provide instruction and assistance in developing 
those skills which will enable them to become confident and capable users’.  In a 
similar vein, 2.5 states that ‘Access points provided specifically for children 
should provide them with levels of guidance and assistance in locating content 
appropriate to their needs’.  
 
 
Section Three: Access in specialised institutions 
 
This section now contains an additional clause (3.1) pertaining to the particular 
responsibility of specialised institutions to develop and digitise content in their 
fields, and to promote access to that content.   
 
The original two clauses in this section have also been expanded, primarily to 
afford greater clarity and specification to the nature of restrictions to access that 
they may impose.  Thus, for example, 3.2 now reads that it may be necessary for 
such institutions ‘to develop a policy which confines the permitted range of access 
to that which is relevant to the institution’s aims and objectives…’.  This contrasts 
with the original wording that merely stated that it may be necessary for such 
institutions ‘to impose some limits for practical reasons’.  Moreover, the revised 
clause imposes a duty on such institutions to make users aware of any restrictions 
imposed ‘by the public display of the relevant policy statements’. 
 
Similarly, the revised clause 3.3 imposes a more clearly defined limit on 
restrictions to access in such institutions.  Whereas the original clause merely 
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limited the grounds on which limitations may be imposed (that is, the need to 
commit their resources to the service of their primary purposes), the revised clause 
also limits the extent of limitations, which should not exceed ‘beyond the extent 
needed to ensure resources are committed to their primary purposes’. 
 
Section Four: Management of Public Access Points 
 
With regard to the management of Public Access Points a new clause (4.2) has 
been inserted to highlight the responsibility of those responsible for the education 
and training of information professionals to ‘ensure that the programmes they 
provide contain elements designed to produce well-prepared managers and staff 
for Public Access Points’.   In addition the wording of the original clause 4.2 (now 
4.3) has been amended slightly for greater clarity.  In the original clause it was 
noted that the management and staff of Public Access Points have a responsibility 
‘to facilitate public access to networked information and communication so that 
individual users are in a position [researcher’s italics] to make their choices freely 
and confidently’.  This now reads ‘…so that individual users have the necessary 
skills and a suitable environment in which [researcher’s italics] to make their 
choices freely and confidently’. 
 
Section Five: Disruptive use 
 
Significant revision has been made to the wording of the section outlining the 
responsibilities of Public Access Point providers to intervene in cases of disruptive 
use.  The effects of this rewording are to put greater emphasis on the importance of 
providing a ‘positive and encouraging atmosphere’ (as stated in the new clause 
5.1).  It also places stronger emphasis on the importance of having a ‘pre-
established and transparent’ process for handling any necessary intervention 
(covered by the new clause 5.3).  The principles behind the original clauses 
however, have been maintained in the revised version.  Thus, staff of Public 
Access Points are not required to exercise general supervision of usage with the 
deliberate aim of identifying illegal or offensive use, but, where such use is drawn 
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to their attention, ‘they have an obligation to request the cessation of illegal use 
and to encourage more discrete use of disturbing content’. 
 
Section Six: Filtering, rating and warning pages 
 
In the revised version of the guidelines, the original sections six, seven and eight 
covering filtering, content rating and warning pages have been brought together 
under a single section six. 
 
With regard to the use of filtering software, clause 6.1 has been amended.  In part, 
this is to clarify that the imposition of filtering software by the managers of Public 
Access Points [researcher’s italics, used to illustrate inserted wording] is an 
unwarranted interference with an individual’s freedom of access to information.  
However, the precise meaning behind the clause has also altered.  Thus, whereas 
the original clause specifies that filtering software should not be applied at Public 
Access Points unless explicitly required by law, reference to legal provisions have 
been removed from the revised clause.  Instead the new clause aims to provide 
greater user empowerment and choice, through the insertion of the statement that 
‘If filtering and blocking systems are to be made available, it should only be as an 
option that individuals can choose and calibrate at their own preferred levels’. 
 
The encouragement of the exploitation of systems for positive recommendation of 
relevant and high quality content, including the use of metadata for labelling and 
rating content, remains.  Although the original clauses 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 (all relating 
to the rating of content) have been amalgamated into a single clause, 6.4, the 
substantive meaning of the clauses has been retained. 
 
However, the two clauses relating to the use of warning pages and age verification 
systems (6.5 and 6.6 in the revised version) have been reworded in such a way as 
to change the emphasis away from a potentially complacent reliance on warning 
pages.  Thus, 6.5 now reads that the staff of Public Access Points ‘should be 
prepared [researcher’s italics] to draw [users’] attention to the warning pages 
attached to many sites that contain controversial content, but should also make it 
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clear that not all such sites contain warning pages [researcher’s italics]’. In the 
original version, clause 8.1 read ‘The staff of Public Access Points should draw the 
attention of those users who express anxiety that they might inadvertently access 
disturbing content to the warning pages which are attached to many sites that fall 
into this category’.  Similarly, the clause relating to age verification systems has 
changed its tone from one of reassurance (‘[The staff of Public Access Points] can 
also publicise, to parents anxious about the sites which their children might access, 
the existence of warning pages and age verification systems attached to some 
controversial content’) to one of caution.  The new clause 6.6 reads ‘The age 
verification systems attached to some sites with controversial content also warn 
users that they might wish to avoid such content, but users should be made aware 
of the risks associated with supplying personal data to such systems if they are not 
operated by reputable organisations’. 
 
Section seven: Internet Use Policies 
 
The main changes to this section of the text involve the omission of two clauses 
(9.4 and 9.5) that in the original text suggested specific issues that should be 
included in an Internet use policy, namely: the use of workstations for illegal 
purposes or to access illegal content; user rights of confidentiality and privacy; and 
the need for users to exercise consideration towards other users.  Instead, clause 
7.1 in the revised version has been rephrased to read ‘A Public Access Point 
should be operated within a clearly articulated and publicly available policy, 
consistent with the principles of this text, and explaining the balance of 
responsibilities between staff and users [researcher’s italics, to indicate new 
content]’.  The section no longer attempts to make any further definition as to the 
detailed content that should be included in such a policy.  
 
4.4.4.4  Summary of changes to the Guidelines arising from the consultation 
 
It can be seen that the text of the guidelines altered significantly as a result of the 
consultation process, and indeed the document’s status altered from one of 
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Recommendations to one of Guidelines.  Many of the textual changes were made 
to enhance the clarity of wording to prevent unintentional (or wilful) 
misinterpretation of the meaning or spirit of the guidelines.  Changes have also 
been incorporated to achieve greater consistency and coherence with other 
international actions and conventions, whilst simultaneously removing some of the 
provisions that could potentially have provided the ability to hide behind the 
provisions of unjust or overly restrictive national legislation.  
 
The final draft of the guidelines does represent an attempt at achieving the difficult 
balance between the right to freedom of expression and the responsibilities of 
Internet users towards the rights of others, particularly with regard to the right not 
to experience offence or discrimination.  The guidelines are now broader in scope 
than had originally been envisaged.  They now encompass the rights of users to 
access a range of diverse cultural content and the responsibilities of Public Access 
Point providers, together with local and national governments, to provide 
networked public information.  There is a stronger emphasis on educational use, 
user empowerment and the role of the information professional as intermediary in 
providing guidance and training in the use of networked facilities.  A greater level 
of importance is attached to policy development and the transparency of policy 
than was the case in the original draft, for example in the reworded section on 
specialised institutions.  However, it has to be noted that as a result of the 
outcomes of the consultation process, in spite of the widening of scope of the 
guidelines (or indeed, because of this widening), there has been an overall dilution 
of the original emphasis on freedom of expression, especially with regard to access 
by minors to networked information. 
 
The Council of Europe regarded the Conference as the first of a series to validate 
ideas and policy guidelines with regard to New Information Technologies, and 
considered the involvement of external experts in the consultation process as an 
example of freedom of expression and democracy in practice98. There is indeed a 
                                            
98 Comment made in opening presentation at the Conference by Ms Vera Boltho, Head of the 
Cultural Policy and Action Division, Council of Europe. 
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strong degree of correlation between comments made, both at the electronic 
consultation stage and at the Helsinki Conference, with subsequent revisions 
applied to the text of the draft.  It would not seem unreasonable, therefore, to 
regard this case as a genuine example of democratic consultation in practice.  
However, although this approach is laudable, it should be noted that the entire 
process took from September 1998 to May 2000 to reach a version of the text that 
was acceptable to the Council of Europe and to relevant stakeholders. In a fast-
moving area such as new information technologies this is hardly an ideal scenario.  
Similarly, the effective failure of the electronic consultation meant that the views 
of stakeholders were not heard, whilst government and institutional representatives 
had full opportunities to comment and seek modifications. 
 
The intention was to make the guidelines available to all professionals, to be 
followed by further texts for professionals emanating from the New Information 
Technologies programme intended to help member states formulate policy and 
harmonise approaches. The programme has already resulted in a number of policy 
documents and expert reports in areas such as the promotion of cultural diversity99 
and the training of artists and cultural workers in the new technologies100, as well 
as another set of guidelines, this time relating to cultural work within the 
information society101.   However, with regard to the Guidelines on Public Access 
to and Freedom of Expression in Networked Information, the time, cost and effort 
that went into their drafting and the consultation process does not appear to have 
been reflected in the impact that they have made on practice in the cultural or 
information sectors.  Having invested considerable resources in the drafting and 
consultation processes, the Council of Europe did not appear to make any parallel 
investment in the dissemination or promotion of the Guidelines.  Although 
                                            
99 < http://cm.coe.int/ta/decl/2000/2000dec2.htm > [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
 
100 <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co-operation/Culture/New_Technologies/N.I.T/ 
Working_strands/NT_and_creativity/bongiovanni99_1.asp#TopOfPage> [Last accessed 
26/8/2003]. 
 
101 < http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co-operation/Culture/Resources/Texts/CC-
CULT(2000)49rev_EN.pdf?L=EN> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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reference has been made to them in the professional literature in the UK (Stoker, 
1999; Vitiello, 2000; Sturges, 2000a; Sturges, 2000b; Sturges, 2001; Sturges, 
2002) most information professionals and policy makers appear to be largely 
unaware of their existence102.  Indeed, even relevant professional associations such 
as CILIP do not acknowledge them in the professional practice area of their 
website103.   
 
4.4.5 Declaration on a European Policy for New Information Technologies 
 
In May 1999, at the same point in time as the original draft ‘Helsinki Charter’ was 
being made available for consultation, the Committee of Ministers adopted the 
Culture Committee’s Declaration on a European Policy for New Information 
Technologies104 at its 104th session in Budapest (Council of Europe, 1999b). The 
Declaration was intended to act as a stimulus for the development of a policy 
framework for the application of new technologies in the field of culture and 
education.  The same themes and emphases of the final text of the Guidelines on 
Public Access to and Freedom of Expression in Networked Information are echoed 
in the wording of the Declaration.   
 
Thus, the Declaration opens on a positive note by welcoming the potential of the 
new information technologies to promote democracy, freedom of expression and 
cultural diversity.  It also identifies the potential risks of widespread adoption of 
new technologies.  In response to these risks it calls for the development of 
regulatory frameworks based on a combination of legislation, self-regulation, 
codes of conduct and the development of technical standards and systems.  These 
are portrayed as essential to ensure the preservation of respect for human rights, 
especially freedom of expression, whilst also ensuring the protection of minors, the 
                                            
102 This impression was confirmed in an email from the author of the Guidelines, received 
27/8/2003. 
 
103 <http://www.cilip.org.uk/practice/practice.html> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
 
104 Available at < http://cm.coe.int/ta/decl/1999/99dec3.htm e> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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protection of individual privacy and protection against racial discrimination in the 
online environment.  It calls for the commitment of governments of member states 
to the free flow of information and ideas through the development and promotion 
of access to educational content and to a diversity of cultural and linguistic 
content.  As with the Guidelines recognition is paid to the importance of education 
and training to ensure that users develop the required skills and competence to 
make critical and discerning use of networked content. 
 
4.4.6 Recommendation on self-regulation concerning cyber-content 
 
Another outcome of the Action Plan agreed in Thessaloniki in December 1997 was 
Recommendation (2001)8 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on self-
regulation concerning cyber-content (self-regulation and user protection against 
illegal or harmful content on new communications and information services)105 
which was adopted in September 2001 (Council of Europe, 2001a).  This 
recommends the governments of member states to encourage the establishment of 
self-regulatory organisations that include representatives from Internet Service 
Providers, content providers and users.  In particular, these organisations should be 
encouraged to develop codes of conduct for the industry, and to monitor 
compliance with the codes. 
 
Although this Recommendation is not aimed specifically at issues related to the 
provision of public access to the Internet, many of the proposed mechanisms for 
content regulation are similar to those in the Guidelines on public access (Sturges, 
2000a). They also accord well with the provisions of the EU 
 Action Plan and UK measures such as the role of the Internet Watch Foundation.  
The development of measures to aid content identification and selection, such as 
content descriptors, search tools, filtering and conditional access tools is 
                                            
105 Available at <http://cm.coe.int/ta/rec/2001/2001r8.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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encouraged in the Recommendation, albeit with a clear statement that the use of 
filters should be the choice of the end user.  A means to allow complaints about 
content to be made and acted upon, such as a system of hotlines, operated in co-
operation with law enforcement agencies, is recommended.  The Recommendation 
also encourages the creation of effective procedures for out-of-court mediation and 
dispute arbitration for content-related matters.  Finally, member states are 
encouraged to undertake actions to encourage public awareness of self-regulatory 
mechanisms, content descriptors, filtering and access restriction tools, hotlines, 
and arbitration and mediation services (Council of Europe, 2001a). 
 
A questionnaire survey106 that was administered to members of the Steering 
Committee on the Mass Media of the Council in February 2001 by the Group of 
Specialists on Online Services and Democracy evaluated the extent to which 
member states had already implemented measures proposed in the 
Recommendation.  Replies were received from twenty-two Council of Europe 
member states, plus one from Canada (a Council of Europe observer state).  The 
analysis of responses suggests that the policy measures proposed in the 
Recommendation are in line with the actions being implemented in the respondent 
states.  In particular, there is a strong compliance with the strategy of using self-
regulatory mechanisms for addressing issues of Internet content regulation, such as 
Industry and user-based regulatory bodies, codes of conduct and hotlines.  None of 
the respondent states implemented official prior control of content, and there was 
broad agreement with the principle of self-regulation and international co-
operation in addressing the problems posed by illegal and harmful content 
(Council of Europe, 2002a). 
 
                                            
106 Available at <http://www.coe.int/T/e/human%5Frights/media/4%5FCyberfora/1%5FSelf%2 
Dregulation/3_Country_information/2_Summary_&_analyses/default.asp#TopOfPage> [Last 
accessed 27/8/2003]. 
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4.4.7 Declaration on Freedom of Communication on the Internet 
 
In May 2003, following a consultation period on a draft document, the Committee 
of Ministers adopted a Declaration on freedom of communication on the 
Internet107 (Council of Europe, 2003b).  Originally drafted by the Group of 
Specialists on Online Services and Democracy, the Declaration’s main objective is 
very much in line with other Council of Europe initiatives in attempting to achieve 
a balance between freedom of expression and information on the Internet, and 
other rights guaranteed by the ECHR such as the protection of children. In 
particular, the Declaration condemns practices that are aimed at restricting or 
controlling Internet access for political reasons (Council of Europe, 2003c).  The 
main guiding principles of the Declaration are: 
 
• Member states should not subject Internet content to restrictions that 
exceed those applied to other content forms; 
• Member states should encourage self-regulation or co-regulation for 
content disseminated on the Internet; 
• Public authorities should not exercise prior control of Internet content, 
other than through the installation of filters for the protection of minors in 
places accessible to them, such as schools or libraries; 
• Member states should foster and encourage access for all to Internet 
services on a non-discriminatory basis and at an affordable price; 
• Freedom to provide services via the Internet should be encouraged – the 
provision of services via the Internet should not be subject to specific 
authorisation schemes on the sole grounds of the means of transmission, 
and service providers should be allowed to operate in a regulatory 
framework that guarantees them non-discriminatory access to national and 
international telecommunications networks; 
                                            
107Available at <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Communication_and_Research/Press/News/2003/ 
20030528_declaration.asp> [Last accessed 27/8/2003]. 
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• Internet Service Providers should not be obliged to monitor Internet 
content to which they provide access or which they transmit or store, 
although they may be held liable for a failure to remove or disable access 
to information or services once they become aware of their illegal nature; 
• To ensure protection against online surveillance, member states should 
respect the wish of Internet users to remain anonymous (however, this does 
not prevent member states from taking measures to trace those responsible 
for criminal acts in accordance with national law, the ECHR and other 
international agreements in the fields of justice and the police). 
(Council of Europe, 2003b) 
 
Thus, once again, the proposed measures reflect the spirit of other regulatory 
measures at EU, UK and Council of Europe levels, particularly with regard to the 
emphasis on self-regulation.  The last bullet point above, however, is potentially 
problematic when considered together with another simultaneous but considerably 
more restrictive Council initiative, the Convention on Cybercrime. 
 
4.4.8 The Convention on Cybercrime  
 
At a conference of the G8 in Paris in May 2000 the need for nations to co-operate 
in the struggle against a range of different forms of ‘cybercrime’, such as computer 
viruses, computer-based fraud, hacking and the dissemination of child 
pornography or racist propaganda, was discussed.  In his opening address the 
French interior minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, insisted that it was the duty of 
national governments to make it clear to their citizens that the Internet is not a 
lawless zone (Henley, 2000).  It was noted that efforts to tackle cybercrime on the 
international front are hampered by the lack of international agreement on what 
constitutes a criminal act – thus, for example, the dissemination of Nazi 
propaganda is illegal in France, Germany and the Netherlands, but is protected in 
the US under the First Amendment (Ibid).  Chevènement reported that, in order to 
address this situation, the Council of Europe was drafting a treaty that aimed to 
harmonise national laws against cybercrime, and urged the G8 members to adopt 
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the treaty.  The Council’s intention, according to Chevènement, was to produce 
‘…a global text so there cannot be ‘digital havens’ where anyone planning shady 
business could find the facilities to do it’ (cited in Henley, Ibid). 
 
The origins of this treaty, the Convention on Cybercrime108 (Council of Europe, 
2001b) began with a decision by the European Committee on Crime Problems 
(CDPC) in November 1996 to set up a committee of experts to  tackle cybercrime.  
It was agreed early on that the issues involved were of such a potentially serious 
nature, and were of such global reach, that they should be dealt with by the 
mechanism of a legally binding instrument such as a convention (Council of 
Europe, 2001c).  Work on the draft treaty began in April 1997, and it was finally 
agreed in Budapest in November 2001. 
 
The remit of the Convention extends well beyond the subject matter of this thesis 
and it would not therefore be appropriate here to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of all of its content109. However, the potential impact of some of the provisions of 
the Convention on freedom of expression on the Internet is sufficiently great to 
warrant some consideration of those aspects (it has, for example, been described 
by Castells (2001, p.178) as ‘the most far-reaching, comprehensive attempt to 
control communication over the Internet to date’). 
 
The Convention identifies three primary aims in addressing the problem of 
cybercrime: 
 
1. To harmonise the domestic, criminal, substantive law elements of offences 
and connected provisions in the area of cybercrime; 
                                            
108 Available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm> [Last accessed 
5/7/2004]  
 
109 A useful analysis of the Convention can be found in Akdeniz (2003) The Council of Europe’s 
Cyber-Crime Convention 2001 and the additional protocol on the criminalisation of acts of a racist 
or xenophobic nature committed through computer systems.  Available at < http://www.cyber-
rights.org/cybercrime/coe_handbook_crcl.pdf > [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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2. To provide for domestic, criminal, procedural law powers necessary for the 
investigation and prosecution of such offences as well as other offences 
committed by means of a computer system, or for which evidence is in 
electronic form; 
3. To set up a fast and effective regime of international co-operation in 
combating cybercrime.  
(Council of Europe, 2001c). 
 
Despite being called the Convention on Cybercrime, many of the provisions 
extend to crimes committed using a computer, or for which evidence is held in 
electronic form, irrespective of whether electronic communications networks are 
actually involved.  The nature of offences that the Convention is intended to 
address include illegal access or interception of computer systems, data or systems 
interference, computer-related forgery and fraud, and offences related to copyright 
and neighbouring rights.  In particular it establishes for relevant parties the rights, 
conditions, requirements and safeguards with regard to data storage, data 
disclosure and access to stored data, the collection of traffic data, and the 
interception of content data. 
 
The Articles in the Convention that are of the greatest potential relevance to 
freedom of expression are those that concern Internet content, in the form of child 
pornography, and those related to the collection of evidence in electronic form.  It 
should be noted that all the Articles are subject to the provisions laid out in the 
ECHR, and the powers provided through the Convention on Cybercrime can only 
be applied to specific criminal investigations.  Unlike the blanket provisions for 
data retention of the UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (Parliament, 
2001), the Convention only provides for data ‘preservation’110, and is not intended 
to lead to widespread surveillance of Internet content or use (Esposito, 2003).  
 
                                            
110 Data preservation is used to signify the retention of data relating to specific individuals 
identified to ISPs, as opposed to indiscriminate data retention (cf. Walker and Akdeniz, 2003, 
p.177). 
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In accordance with the ECHR, any restrictions imposed through the Convention on 
Cybercrime on the right to freedom of expression must be prescribed by law and 
be necessary in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority 
and impartiality of the judiciary (Council of Europe, 1950, Article 10, para.2).  
Similarly, any restrictions imposed through the Convention on the right to privacy 
should conform to the conditions laid out in Article 8 of the ECHR.  Thus, they 
must be necessary in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others (Council of Europe, 1950, Article 8, para.2). 
 
Article Nine of the Convention on Cybercrime commits member states to 
criminalizing the production of child pornography for distribution through a 
computer system; the offering or making available of child pornography through a 
computer system; the distribution or transmission of child pornography through a 
computer system; the procurement of child pornography through a computer 
system for oneself or for another; or the possession on a computer system, or on a 
computer data storage medium, of child pornography.  All of these actions have to 
have been committed intentionally and ‘without right’ for prosecution to be 
legitimate, and ISPs who have ‘served as a conduit for’, or hosted a website or 
newsroom containing such material, without the required intent, cannot be held 
liable (Council of Europe, 2001c).  Member states also have some discretion with 
regard to the criminalisation of procurement and possession alone and the 
definition of what constitutes child pornography. 
 
With regard to data preservation, Article Sixteen of the Convention requires 
member states to 
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…adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable its competent 
authorities to order or similarly obtain the expeditious preservation of specified computer 
data, including traffic data, that has been stored by means of a computer system… 
(Council of Europe, 2001b, Article 16) 
 
The maximum length of time that data should be required to be stored is 90 days, 
although enforcement agencies may be permitted to renew the data preservation 
order.  Legislation should require that whoever is the recipient of a data 
preservation order should maintain confidentiality with regard to the order.  In 
addition, Article Seventeen requires the implementation of legislation that imposes 
a duty of ‘partial disclosure’ of traffic data retained under Article Sixteen to the 
relevant authority. 
 
Article Eighteen requires member states to implement measures that empower 
competent authorities to order the submission from individuals of specified 
computer data in their possession or control, whether it is stored on a computer or 
on a storage medium such as a floppy disk.  Authorities should also be empowered 
to order ISPs to submit ‘subscriber information’: this information can include the 
subscriber’s identity, postal address, telephone number and billing and payment 
information.  Authorities should also be given the power to search, and if 
necessary seize, computer systems and computer storage media (Article Nineteen).  
The same Article gives authorities the power to order anyone with knowledge 
about the functioning of the relevant computer system, or measures taken to 
protect data held on the system, to provide the necessary information required to 
search and seize the system or data. 
 
The provisions of Article Twenty oblige member states to implement measures 
that empower authorities to compel ISPs, as far as their technical capabilities 
allow, to collect or record real-time traffic data or to co-operate and assist 
authorities in the collection or recording of such data.  Service Providers should be 
obliged not to disclose the fact that such an order has been made.  Article Twenty-
One, relating to the interception of content data, goes further still, although it is 
acknowledged that this Article should be applied only in relation to ‘a range of 
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serious offences to be determined by domestic law’ (Council of Europe, 2001b, 
Article 21).  In such circumstances, authorities should be empowered to compel 
the same degree of co-operation from ISPs as for real-time traffic data in Article 
Twenty, but this time with disclosure of the content of such communications 
traffic.  Again, ISPs should be compelled to maintain confidentiality of the 
investigation. 
 
In addition to all the above provisions, Article Twenty-Three requires member 
states to co-operate with each other ‘to the widest extent possible for the purposes 
of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer 
systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal 
offence’ (Council of Europe, 2001b, Article Twenty-Three). 
 
The original Convention did not include racism or xenophobia in its provisions for 
content regulation, because of concerns expressed about the potential impact on 
freedom of expression (Esposito, 2003).  According to Akeniz (2003), this was 
largely in response to pressure from the United States, on account of the potential 
conflict with the provisions of the First Amendment.  However, in November 2002 
the Committee of Ministers adopted an additional protocol111 to the Convention, 
requiring member states to criminalise the dissemination of racist and xenophobic 
material through computer systems, and the use of computer systems to 
disseminate threat or insult motivated by racism or xenophobia.  This includes the 
denial, minimisation, approval or justification of genocide or crimes against 
humanity, especially those that occurred between 1940 and 1945 (Council of 
Europe, 2002b).  Because of the requirements of ‘intention’ ISPs are accorded the 
same level of immunity from liability as prevails for the main Convention.  The 
provisions of the protocol are also subject to the constraints imposed by the 
ECHR, in particular those of Article 10 pertaining to freedom of expression.  The 
Council believes that, by establishing in the protocol the extent to which racist and 
xenophobic content violates the rights of others, its impact will be to help to 
                                            
111 Available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/189.htm> [Last accessed 
5/7/2004]. 
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protect individual rights and freedoms on the Internet (Esposito, 2003).  By April 
2004 twenty-two countries had signed up to the protocol112. 
 
Clearly, computer-based crime is a major and growing issue for individuals, 
corporations and national governments, and the problem is compounded when 
such crime is committed and propagated on global communications networks.  
However, the Convention on Cybercrime is somewhat surprising in that it appears 
to extend well beyond the normal remit of the Council of Europe.  Although, of 
course, the commission of any crime is likely to infringe on the rights of those 
affected by the crime, nevertheless the terms of the Convention do not appear to 
focus clearly on the Council’s primary mission of the protection of human rights 
(and could be argued to detract from it).  Indeed, it has been suggested that the 
Convention on Cybercrime is incompatible with the provisions of the ECHR and 
data protection legislation, and that the balance has been struck in favour of law 
enforcement rather than fundamental human rights (Akdeniz, 2003).   
 
More surprising still is the lack of public consultation and awareness actions that 
accompanied the drafting and signature of a convention with such potentially 
important and far-reaching impact.  According to Akdeniz (Ibid), submissions 
made by Non-Governmental Organisations were largely ignored by the Council of 
Europe during the brief consultation period (which in itself was not widely 
publicised). Moreover, arguably the most important provisions (that is, those 
relating to the interception of communications) were not made public until the end 
of the consultation period.  He also criticises the Convention on the grounds of 
lack of legal clarity in the wording of some of the provisions; the over-extensive 
scope of some of the provisions; the lack of safeguards with regard to requirements 
for judicial warrants; the potential impact on e-commerce of government access to 
encryption keys; and the lack of provisions requiring ‘dual criminality’113 with 
regard to the provisions for mutual assistance. 
                                            
112 A regularly updated list of these countries can be found at <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/ 
searchsig.asp?NT=189&CM=&DF=> [Last accessed 27/4/2004]. 
 
113 ‘Dual criminality’ requires that the actions under investigation should be illegal in both 
jurisdictions e.g. law enforcement agencies cannot request assistance from law enforcement 
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4.5 Council of Europe approaches: some conclusions 
 
As with the European Union, the Council of Europe was relatively slow to act with 
regard to the ‘problem’ of the Internet: this reflects the relatively low priority 
accorded to the issue by national governments of member states in the early days 
of the Internet.  However, from the mid-1990s onwards there has been greater 
weight accorded to the issue and, in particular, a greater recognition of the 
importance of international co-operation in decision-making with regard to the 
Internet.  Thus, in addition to the EU and the Council of Europe, bodies such as the 
G8 group of states, the OECD and the United Nations (notably UNESCO and the 
WIPO) have all paid increasing levels of attention to regulatory issues concerning 
the Internet.   
 
With regard to the Council of Europe, it is difficult not to conclude that 
fragmentation among different departments has reduced the impact and clarity of 
the considerable range of initiatives that are forthcoming from the various sections, 
each with their own (and in some cases, competing) priorities.  For example, the 
Media section, the Culture section, the Legal Affairs Executive and the Committee 
on Crime Problems are all among those working on issues related to Internet 
content regulation.  In addition, the case study of the development of the 
Guidelines on Public Access illustrates how high levels of bureaucracy and the 
need to resolve the competing interests of different stakeholders tend to result in 
very slow policy development, especially where sensitive issues such as access to 
Internet content by children and young people are concerned.  The outcome of 
such policy development is also at risk of being very different from the original 
intentions of those who initiate the undertaking, as illustrated by this case.  
 
However, with the possible exception of the Convention on Cybercrime, the 
various initiatives do, nevertheless, illustrate quite a high level of coherence, both 
across the various Council of Europe actions and with EU initiatives.  In particular, 
                                                                                                                        
agencies in another country in investigating an action that is not a crime in the country from which 
they are requesting assistance. 
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the emphasis on self-regulation and actions to raise awareness and promote 
education is repeated, although a higher priority to freedom of expression can be 
seen in the Council of Europe actions than is evident in the EU actions.  The 
Council of Europe tends also to be more positive in its statements concerning the 
benefits of networked information, particularly as concerns the promotion of 
democracy and cultural diversity.   
 
The Guidelines on Public Access in particular can be commended in offering a 
clear statement of principles to assist those responsible for Public Access Points to 
provide free and non-censored access to information available on the Internet, 
whilst addressing issues of anxiety about the possible harmful effects of such 
access.    However, the case study highlighted the need to devote time and 
expertise to the technical aspects of electronic consultation, if such an approach is 
to represent a genuine attempt at soliciting the viewpoints of the full range of 
stakeholders.  It also demonstrated the importance of paying as much attention to 
policy implementation, dissemination and evaluation as to policy development.  It 
was clear from the study that much of the potential value of the Guidelines had 
been lost as a result of the lack of importance given to the dissemination stage of 
the policy cycle. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INSTITUTIONAL POLICY FORMULATION – THREE 
CASE STUDIES 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters have explored the development of Internet regulation 
policy at the national and European level.  This chapter presents the findings from 
the institutional case studies, exploring the development, implementation and 
impact of measures to control and regulate the use of network facilities and access 
to Internet content, with particular regard to ‘unacceptable’ or illegal use, in three 
UK Higher Education Institutions.  It was intended that investigation at this micro 
level would illuminate some of the operational difficulties in formulating and 
implementing policy in this area, and would provide an insight into the impact that 
such policy measures were having on individual Internet users.   
 
Before presenting these findings the Chapter includes a brief outline of the 
background to national policy specifically applicable to higher education on this 
issue in the UK, and some of the challenges that higher education in the UK has 
faced with regard to Internet use.  The findings of the case studies are presented on 
a within-case basis, in order to establish a holistic picture of the ethos and context 
in which each institution operates.  However, the discussion of these findings 
offered in Chapter Seven will be made on a cross-case basis, with an emphasis on 
the theoretical relevance of the models of policy making that were found to 
prevail, and the impact on intellectual freedom that the chosen strategies appeared 
to be having.  
 
The data collection within the three institutions, and its subsequent analysis, was 
directed by the research questions to be investigated. The specific issues explored 
were: 
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• What methods are currently in place to control or monitor Internet use, and 
what level of awareness is there within each institution of such measures? 
• What problems (if any) have been experienced as a result of ‘unacceptable’ 
or illegal use by students or staff of Internet facilities, and, where relevant, 
what actions have been taken as a result of this use? 
• How has policy in this area been developed, and who are the key players 
involved in the decision-making process and in the implementation of 
policy? 
• What forces – both internal and external to the institution – impact to 
influence policy decisions? 
• What impact do these decisions have on individual Internet users in the 
institutions, in particular with regard to their freedom of enquiry? 
 
The case studies were carried out through interviews with a range of personnel and 
a representative from the student body at each institution, in addition to the 
analysis of a range of policy documents with potential implications for Internet use 
in the institutions (Appendix Two provides a table of respondents interviewed at 
each institution; Appendix Three provides a table illustrating the range of 
documents analysed for each institution).  The analysis of this data was made 
using an inductive approach, identifying themes that arose from the documents and 
transcripts themselves.  In particular, there was a concern to gain insights into the 
policy formulation process at the institutions, rather than to focus narrowly on the 
specific content of policy documents.  The experiences and opinions of students 
were explored further via the questionnaire study.  The findings of this study are 
presented in Chapter Six, and are complementary to the findings presented in this 
Chapter. 
 
The three institutions are referred to as Institution A, B and C, in order to protect 
their anonymity, and the identity of participants in the case studies is not revealed, 
although their role within their own institution may be outlined.  The chapter also 
introduces the discussion of policy models that will be further elaborated in 
Chapter Seven (Discussion of Findings). 
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5.2 The higher education context: some policy background 
 
Academic institutions in the UK that receive their network services via the Joint 
Academic Network (JANET) are bound by the terms and conditions of the JANET 
Acceptable Use Policy (AUP).  The current version of the AUP (version 7.0114) 
states that:  
 
‘It is the responsibility of User Organisations to ensure that members of their own user 
communities use JANET services in an acceptable manner and in accordance with current 
legislation’.   
(Wood, 2003, para.4) 
 
The Policy allows for use of the JANET network for any legal activity that is in 
furtherance of the aims and policies of the User Organisation, other than those 
activities defined by the Policy as constituting ‘unacceptable use’.  Such activities 
include: 
 
• The creation or transmission (other than for properly supervised and lawful 
research purposes) of any offensive, obscene or indecent images, data or 
other material, or any data capable of being resolved into obscene or 
indecent images or material; 
• The creation or transmission of material which is designed or likely to 
cause annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety; 
• The creation or transmission of defamatory material; 
• The transmission of material such that this infringes the copyright of 
another person; 
• The transmission of unsolicited commercial or advertising material either 
to other User Organisations, or to organisations connected to other 
networks; 
• Deliberate unauthorised access to facilities or services accessible via 
JANET; 
                                            
114 Available at <http://www.janet.ac.uk/documents/use_policy.pdf> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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• Deliberate activities with any of the following characteristics: wasting staff 
effort or networked resources; corrupting or destroying other users’ data; 
violating the privacy of other users; disrupting the work of other users; 
using JANET in a way that denies service to others; continuing to use an 
item of software or hardware after UKERNA has requested that use cease 
because it is causing disruption to the correct functioning of JANET; any 
other misuse of JANET or networked resources, such as the introduction of 
viruses. 
(Wood, 2003) 
 
Individual institutions are responsible for taking ‘all reasonable steps’ to ensure 
compliance with the policy, and for ensuring that ‘unacceptable’ use of JANET 
does not occur.  Penalties that may be imposed on institutions for contravention of 
the JANET AUP range from suspension of network services through to referral for 
legal action.  
 
In 2000 the Joint Information Services Committee (JISC) published a Briefing 
Paper for Senior Managers in UK Further and Higher Education Institutions 
(Charlesworth, 2000b) to draw attention to the implications of recent legislation 
and case law with regard to the Internet.  Noting the rapid development of law 
related to the Internet of relevance to academic institutions, the paper also 
identifies the increasingly sophisticated technology available to end users and the 
potential that this offers for engaging in illegal activities such as hacking, 
copyright infringement and the dissemination of illegal content.   
 
With regard to the liability of Higher Education Institutions and their staff for 
illegal content accessed or disseminated via their network services, the provisions 
of the Obscene Publications Acts of 1959 and 1964 (Parliament, 1959; Parliament, 
1964), and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (Parliament, 1994a), among 
others, apply.  Under these Statutory Instruments the transfer of obscene material 
electronically from one computer to another, via a network or the Internet, can be 
regarded as ‘publication’, even if an individual simply makes the material 
available for transfer or downloading electronically by others (Charlesworth, 
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2000b).  The two main defences are ‘innocent publication’ (where the person who 
published the material did not know that it was obscene and had no reasonable 
cause to believe that its publication would result in liability) or publication in the 
public good.  Thus, while providers of Internet services are unaware that illegal 
material is being made available via their system, they cannot be held liable.  
However, once they are told that this is occurring, they must take action to stop it, 
otherwise they leave themselves liable to prosecution (Ibid). 
 
In consequence, the advice of JISC to academic institutions includes: 
 
• State clear warnings as to the likely disciplinary consequences of viewing, 
storing or transmitting obscene material on University equipment, both in 
staff contracts and in Codes of Conduct for computer use; 
• Do not abdicate responsibility for checking of content, as it may be viewed 
that a deliberate policy of not undertaking any scrutiny negates the defence 
of lack of reasonable grounds for suspicion; 
• Make occasional searches of electronic records of the titles of files they 
host, and the domain names of sites from which information is cached, to 
check for suspicious file and domain names; 
• Whenever such files are found, take action to ascertain their contents and, 
if necessary, remove them; 
• Provide clear and effective mechanisms for individuals to report illegal 
material and ensure that, when such reports are made, fast and effective 
action is taken. 
 
In addition, the advice stresses that institutions should pay particular attention to 
material that appears to amount to child pornography, as mere possession of such 
material is an offence.  In addition to removing such material, the incident should 
be reported to the police (Ibid). 
 
The first major UK law case to take place regarding the use of university 
computers to access or disseminate child pornography on the Internet took place in 
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1996. Alban Fellows and Stephen Arnold were charged with a total of 18 offences 
under the Protection of Children Act 1978 (Parliament, 1978), the Obscene 
Publications Act 1959 (Parliament, 1959), and the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 (Parliament, 1994a).  After being contacted by the US Customs, 
Vice Squad Officers raided the Department of Metallurgy at Birmingham 
University and discovered thousands of pictures of children engaged in obscene 
acts stored on the computer system.  During the trial Fellows admitted four 
charges of possessing indecent photographs of children with a view to distributing 
them, and one of possessing obscene photographs of adults for publication.  
Arnold admitted distributing indecent photographs of children.  Fellows was 
subsequently sentenced to three years imprisonment, and Arnold for six months115.  
The case was important in UK law, in that it established the precedent that 
computerised images could legally be regarded as photographs (Akdeniz, 1997b) 
and confirmed the principle that making the material available over the Internet 
amounted to its publication (Charlesworth, 2000b).  It was also important for the 
role it played in initiating concern in the higher education sector about the use of 
University computer and network facilities for illegal purposes. 
 
There have subsequently been a number of relatively high profile cases of 
individuals being prosecuted as a result of their accessing and storing child 
pornography on university computer facilities (for example, see Guardian, 1999; 
BBC, 2003c; Sheffield Today, 2003).  In one of these cases, the accused was, at the 
time of committing the offence, a Pro-Vice Chancellor at one of the case study 
sites for this research project.  In another of the cases, the defendant claimed that 
he had downloaded child pornography as part of an academic research project into 
hardcore pornography.  However, he failed to prove to the court’s satisfaction that 
the pictures were for research purposes (Quinn, 1999).  To date, the criminal 
justice system has proceeded by charging the individuals directly responsible for 
the misuse, rather than holding the institution liable for illegal activities committed 
via their computer systems. 
 
                                            
115 Regina v Fellows and Arnold [1997]  2 All England Law Reports 548. 
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There have also been an increasing number of cases of university staff losing their 
jobs for accessing legal, but ‘unacceptable’ Internet content, or for accessing the 
Internet for personal use to the detriment of carrying out work duties.  In one such 
case, six lecturers at one University were suspended over accusations that they had 
accessed pornography on University computers in breach of its code of practice 
that restricts staff use of computers to research, teaching, study and administration 
purposes only (Times Higher Education Supplement, 2001a). 
 
There have, however, also been some examples of problematic instances where the 
restrictions of ‘acceptable use’ have been in direct conflict with the requirements 
of teaching programmes and academic enquiry.  Dearnley (1999) describes the 
difficulties he encountered attempting to teach information science students about 
censorship and the ethical issues posed by the availability of pornographic and 
obscene materials on the Internet.  As part of their academic programme, the 
students were encouraged to browse the web for pornographic and obscene 
material (but not to collect or store images or text that they came across).  They 
were encouraged to try to locate actual pornography and sites containing academic 
debate relating to it.  They were also asked to comment on the ease of finding 
‘free’ sites containing pornography; the safeguards in place on commercial 
pornographic sites with regard to access restriction to adults; and the availability of 
obscene materials such as paedophilia and bestiality. However, this part of his 
teaching activities was declared ‘unacceptable’ by Senior Management at the 
institution, who felt that the risk to the institution posed by such activities was too 
great.  In two separate memoranda Dearnley was informed that ‘…academic 
pursuits are not above the law’, and that ‘…the way in which you have been using 
Internet pages in your units covering censorship is unacceptable to the University 
and cannot be followed in the future’ (Ibid).  This is in spite of the fact that the 
JANET AUP defines unacceptable use in paragraph 9.1 as: 
 
The creation or transmission (other than for properly supervised and lawful research 
purposes) of any offensive, obscene or indecent images, data or other material… 
(Wood, 2003, emphasis added by researcher) 
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In another example, a PhD student at Glasgow University was subject to an 
internal enquiry following media reports that he had emailed convicted 
paedophiles.  The student, who was researching paedophilia, was cleared of 
accusations of misusing his position as a researcher and of breaching the 
University code of discipline or code of conduct in his use of their computers.  He 
was, however, instructed to modify his research methods, and to obtain approval 
for ‘sensitive aspects’ of his research from the University’s Research Ethics 
Committee (Times Higher Education Supplement, 2001b). 
 
In a more recent case, Northumbria University removed content from an 
academic’s web pages without his prior knowledge.  The pages concerned 
included an essay on war myths and an article on war propaganda from the 
coalition involved in the 2003 war against Iraq.  The academic concerned, who had 
strong anti-war opinions, claimed that these were used as teaching materials (Baty, 
2003).   
 
With regard to liability for defamatory content, the Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd 
case116 appeared to establish the principle that, because Demon had chosen to 
receive and store the newsgroups containing the defamatory postings, and had the 
power to delete messages from them, it was in law a ‘publisher’ and thus liable for 
the content in question.  The case was interpreted by JISC as indicating that 
academic institutions should take ‘some minimum steps to monitor information 
content’ to obtain liability protection, and that if they are informed of defamatory 
content on their servers, they must take all reasonable steps to remove or deny 
access to it (Charlesworth, 2000b). 
 
Other means by which JISC recommends that academic institutions may limit their 
risk of liability for defamatory content include: 
 
• Restricting the number and nature of UseNet newsgroups that they carry; 
                                            
116 See Chapter Three, p.92 -. 
 
 
 168
• Paying careful attention to the content of official institutional web pages; 
• Restricting the use of personal web servers and personal web pages on 
institutional hosts; 
• Publishing details of a contact to whom complaints may be made, and 
ensuring that appropriate action is taken immediately after receiving a 
complaint. 
(Ibid) 
 
These measures are also recommended in order to limit the risk of institutions 
being held liable for copyright infringements that take place through their network. 
 
With regard to the monitoring and interception of Internet and email use, 
universities must ensure that such activities conform to the terms of the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) (Parliament, 2000a) or the 
Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of Communications) 
Regulations 2000117 (Parliament, 2000b) (JISC, 2001).  However, actions under 
these instruments must also take into account the provisions of the Data Protection 
Act 1998118 (Parliament, 1998b) and the Human Rights Act 1998119 (Parliament, 
1998a). 
 
Unlike its predecessor the Interception of Communications Act 1985 (Parliament, 
1985), RIPA is applicable to private and internal networks.  Both RIPA and the 
Lawful Business Practice regulations allow for the monitoring and interception of 
network communications, but only if specific circumstances and conditions apply.  
In order to ensure that any monitoring or interception or telephone or network use 
is in accordance with the terms of RIPA and the Lawful Business Practice 
regulations, JISC’s advice to higher education institutions includes: 
 
                                            
117 Available at <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2000/ 20002699.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
 
118 Available at <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980029.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
 
119 Available at <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980042.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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• Have a clear and readily available set of policies relating to email and 
Internet use, and draw the attention of users to these at regular intervals; 
• Ensure that network users (including staff, students and visitors) are given 
effective and ongoing notification of the possibility of their 
communications being intercepted; 
• Consider the necessity of altering the written statement of terms of 
employees to obtain their explicit consent to interception; 
• Take reasonable steps to ensure that, where possible, persons external to 
the institution who are involved in communication with the institution are 
informed that communications may be monitored or intercepted; 
• Appoint an individual as compliance officer to be responsible for the 
implementation of policies and procedures under the Act, and to whom 
interception warrants may be addressed. 
(Charlesworth, 2000b) 
 
It should be noted that, as the field work for the institutional case studies took 
place between March 2000 and September 2001, the institutions involved were in 
a relatively early phase with regard to the implementation of national policy, and 
case law in this area was not well developed.   
 
5.3 Case study (1): Institution A120 
5.3.1 Institutional Context 
 
The first case study took place within a University College, referred to within the 
thesis as ‘Institution A’.  At the time of the study, the Institution had a student 
body of approximately 10,000 studying at both undergraduate and postgraduate 
level.  
                                            
120 Some of the findings presented in the course of this section have been previously published in 
the proceedings of the 9th International BOBCATSSS Symposium on Library and Information 
Science (see Cooke, 2001). 
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The mission statement of the University College claimed that: 
 
[The] University College offers access to quality teaching and research within a 
committed regional and international environment which is caring, supportive of 
scholarship and provides students and staff with the opportunity for personal and 
professional development. 
 
The institution had traditionally emphasised its ethos as a ‘caring’ institution, both 
with regard to its approach to student welfare and academic progress, and with 
regard to the support offered to members of staff.  Around 50% of the student 
population was comprised of home students living in the local area; additionally, 
approximately 50% was comprised of mature students.  
 
Overall governance of the institution fell under the Council of Governors, with the 
executive function effected by the Director/Chief Executive.  At the time that the 
fieldwork took place, there were a further five members of the Board of Directors 
each with specific areas of responsibility. One of these Board members was an 
Assistant Director with responsibility for library and media services, computer 
support services, student support, academic services and the Students’ Union.  It 
was this latter Assistant Director whose remit gave him the most immediate 
influence and control over the areas under investigation in the case study.  At the 
time that the fieldwork for the case study was carried out (Spring 2000) a recent 
appointment had been made to a new position of Information Strategy Co-
ordinator, with responsibility for policy development relating to the use of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). 
 
There were a number of different forums within the University College in which 
policy decisions were made or ratified, the most important of which was the 
Senate, in which major policy decisions relating to academic matters were taken.  
Other major committees included the Planning Board, which debated strategic, 
resource and estates issues and the Academic Audit Committee, concerned with 
quality assurance and monitoring.  Individual Faculties held their own Boards of 
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Studies, and sub-committees were held for areas such as Teaching and Learning, 
Staff Development, Research and Equal Opportunities.  
5.3.2 Information policy and strategy 
 
At Institution A, the Information Strategy Steering Group (which reports directly 
to the Planning Board) was responsible for all areas related to information policy.  
This Steering Group had representation from the heads of relevant central service 
departments, but did not include representatives from academic staff or from the 
student body. It had established a number of sub-groups to develop strategy and 
policies for specific areas of information systems provision.  The outcome of this 
Group had been the drafting of an Information Strategy that was accepted by the 
Planning Board in 1999.  The Strategy is summarised in a ‘vision statement’ as 
follows: 
 
Information will be readily available to staff, students and relevant external parties as 
appropriate, in an understandable format, accurate, complete, and delivered in a timely 
manner. 
 
The main focus of the Strategy was on increased co-ordination of information 
management and systems; increased use of learning and information technologies; 
enhanced user training and support, both for staff and for students; standardisation 
of software and hardware; improvements in access to IT facilities; and improved 
security of information systems.  In addition, the Strategy committed the 
University College to updating its Regulations for the Use of Computer Facilities 
in order to ‘avoid misuse of facilities and help improve security’. 
 
The College was connected to JANET and the Strategic Plan included a 
commitment to provide 24-hour open access to computing facilities during College 
semesters.  However, this goal had not been met, and the network infrastructure 
and hardware provision available to users at the time of the fieldwork was 
recognised to be insufficient to meet demand.  This state of affairs was reflected in 
comments made by a number of interviewees, who saw inadequate technological 
provision as being a significant inhibitor to information access.  Further barriers to 
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information access were outlined in a report by external consultants, who 
identified problems such as shortcomings in the planning and co-ordination of 
information systems, a lack of clear policies and standards for the provision and 
use of information systems, and a lack of user training and support.    It was in 
direct response to this situation that the post of Information Strategy Co-ordinator 
had been created. 
 
5.3.3 Conditions of Use for Computing Facilities 
 
The University College had written Conditions of Use for Computing Facilities.  
At the time that the fieldwork took place these made no mention of possible 
monitoring of Internet use (although they did state that the institution ‘reserves the 
right to examine computer files if it suspects they contain material which 
contravenes college regulations or infringes the law’)121.  The Information Strategy 
Co-ordinator, responsible for policy formulation in this area, did identify the 
importance that monitoring was going to have, as a result of the implications of the 
Data Protection Act 1998 (Parliament, 1998b).  The Conditions of Use made no 
reference to the extent to which personal use of facilities for recreational purposes 
was deemed acceptable or to any policy on blocking or filtering of Internet 
content. Users were informed that ‘The creation, display, production and 
circulation of offensive material in any form or on any medium is forbidden’, but 
no attempts were made to define the interpretation of ‘offensive material’.  The 
Conditions of Use did make reference to the JANET AUP, and required network 
users to observe the conditions of use that this imposed. 
5.3.4 Policy awareness and implementation 
 
Despite the existence of the Conditions of Use for Computing Facilities, the case-
study interviews demonstrated a lack of awareness on the part of both staff and 
                                            
121 The document was revised in September 2001 to take into account the provisions of the RIPA, 
and now advises computer users that ‘communications on the University College computer systems 
may be monitored and/or recorded…’ 
 
 173
students of any University College policies relating to computer and Internet use.  
There was also evidence of decisions regarding issues such as blocking and 
monitoring of access being made on an ad hoc basis by individuals without a 
formal remit to make such decisions.  Within the University College, approaches 
to the issue of website blocking, in particular, were characterised by a lack of 
formal policy backing.  When asked whether she was aware of restrictions in place 
regarding access to Internet sites, even the Information Strategy Co-ordinator, with 
direct responsibility for the formulation of policy relating to Internet use, 
commented ‘I know [the Internet Services Manager] does block odd things…I 
must admit I let her get on with it’.   
 
The student representative interviewed was not aware of the existence of any 
regulations for the use of computer facilities, claiming never to have had these 
drawn to her attention in any way.  However, an interview with the Faculty 
Librarian suggested that attempts are made to draw the attention of students to the 
existing rules by posting the rules on the College Website and displaying them in 
computer rooms and in the library.  Both agreed, however, that induction training 
in the library and computer rooms did not address the appropriate use of computer 
facilities.  
 
The academic staff representative, who was also Chair of the local branch of 
NATFHE, was emphatic in his denial of having seen any guidelines on the use of 
email facilities or the possible monitoring of email: 
 
No. I have seen nothing that says email should only be used for College purposes. I have 
seen nothing that indicates formally that email is being monitored… 
(Academic staff representative) 
 
Moreover, the same interviewee claimed to have been told that it definitely is 
acceptable to use network facilities for purposes unrelated to employment:  
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Now it was always made clear actually when I was trained in email here originally that 
this was provided at no charge to the College, and therefore there was no problem in 
using it… 
(Ibid) 
  
Although he accepted that there might be instances when monitoring of email and 
Internet use could be justified, he was concerned about the lack of clarity as to 
what personal use may or may not be acceptable.   
 
The majority of respondents were also unaware that an institutional code of 
practice on Freedom of Speech existed, although most respondents claimed 
confidence in their right of freedom to access information as required and to give 
voice to their own opinions.   
 
5.3.5 Filtering and blocking of web-based information 
 
Although no formal written policy existed authorising the blocking of access to 
Internet content for University College users, and filtering software was not 
installed, comments made by respondents indicated that a certain amount of 
blocking was taking place.  This was done for a variety of reasons, usually related 
either to the cost of access, security issues or the potential offensiveness of the 
content.  Access to chat protocols was blocked, as was access to free web-based 
email services such as hotmail. 
 
The Information Strategy Co-ordinator responded to a question on content 
blocking by commenting: 
 
When you talk to [the Internet Services Manager] you’ll find that over the years that she’s 
been responsible for the server, there are some areas, some sites, that she’s restricted 
access to...she knows what people like and what people don’t like. 
 
Later in the interview she added: 
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I think [the Internet Services Manager], from the pornographic side, for example, has 
agreed to restrict access.  Of course, you’re aware that in the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Faculty T. [a member of academic staff researching issues related to 
pornography] always needed access to pornographic sites… 
(Information Strategy Co-ordinator) 
 
These suggestions that ad hoc blocking was taking place were confirmed when 
interviewing the Internet Services Manager.  When asked whether she was aware 
of any restrictions to specific sites, she responded that ‘we use a configuration that 
we set up to enforce that’.  On probing as to the basis for blocking specific sites, 
she acknowledged that pornographic sites drawn to her attention were blocked.  
There was also evidence of blocking measures to protect the sensitivities of 
individual members of staff within the Computer Support department, who were 
required to administer the student printing system: 
 
…there are sites that disturb some people.  The young man who used to work in the room 
there was African Caribbean.  He sold the print-outs to students…And someone had 
printed off stuff on the Ku Klux Klan, and he found that very disturbing. 
(Internet Services Manager) 
 
And similarly: 
 
We’ve got a young man who works in there, and he’s RAF Reserve, and he was quite upset 
by some IRA stuff that was coming out.  Which is actually quite valid research for 
students, particularly for Social Sciences and Humanities, and it’s very difficult...I really 
would rather not censor in any way.  
(Ibid) 
 
Despite her reluctance to act as censor, and the recognition that access to such 
content could be a valid component of students’ academic tasks, she had blocked 
access to the sites concerned.  Moreover, when asked whether decisions to block 
access were taken in consultation with anyone else, she acknowledged that they 
were taken ‘just off my own bat’ and information on which sites had been blocked, 
or for what reasons, was not passed on to anyone else.  This was despite her own 
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recognition that ‘where it goes over the edge for one person is very different from 
another’. 
 
The academic staff representative was concerned about the possible blocking of 
content: 
 
[The blocking of pornographic sites] raises other questions…there may be colleagues, 
academics, who want to access these sites who have now been impeded in their work. 
(Academic staff representative) 
 
This tension between the demands of academic study and research, and decisions 
to block access to content on the grounds of potential offence, was evident in the 
experiences of the Faculty Librarian in her work with students.  She described an 
incident that took place in the Library, with a student complaining about another 
student who was accessing pornography: 
 
He was one example of a student accessing this material and it was upsetting other 
students.  I said, you know other students are getting upset, it’s not appropriate that you 
access this material in the library...He said it was for his studies and I was inclined to 
believe him because he was a social work student. 
(Faculty Librarian) 
 
In this instance, the student concerned was advised to speak to his tutor about 
gaining access to a computer in an area where other students would not be around 
to get upset.  A similar approach was taken in the case of a design student, whose 
tutor had suggested that he discuss his information needs with the Faculty 
Librarian before accessing content in the Library.  The student was researching 
‘fetishism...and rubber stuff’, and was advised that ‘the public access computers 
were not appropriate for what he wanted to do’.   
 
The Students’ Union representative also provided an example of a genuine 
instance of needing to access material that might be regarded as offensive by some 
users: 
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...[someone] who runs an Aids Clinic or something, did a survey about our students...a sex 
survey basically, sex and drugs, about how often students had sex and that kind of thing, 
and then how many drugs they’d taken and all this, and I wanted to write it up in a report 
but compare it with the national picture, so I was going [to the library] looking up sex and 
drugs.  
(Students’ Union representative) 
 
Students using the Library had reported feeling intimidated and uncomfortable, as 
a result of other students accessing pornography.  The Faculty Librarian 
commented: 
 
There was an incident in the Library with a [male] social work student, a female student 
felt uncomfortable…I don’t think there were many other students around, it was later in 
the day and she felt intimidated.  This chap was looking at pornography and she felt 
intimidated by that… 
(Faculty Librarian) 
 
The Faculty Librarian reported problems encountered in the Library with students 
unable to access chat rooms and even some sites directly related to their studies.  
Such problems had been compounded by an apparent lack of communication 
within the University College concerning such decisions, library staff only 
becoming aware that sites were blocked when students attempted to access them: 
 
We knew this blocking was going on in the library, but we didn’t really realise what else it 
was blocking while they were blocking the chat lines…we didn’t realise it would block 
access to other material that could be useful. 
(Faculty Librarian) 
 
There were no written documents available to either staff or students outlining the 
policies on the blocking of access to chat rooms or to web-based email.  Lack of 
awareness of blocking decisions had led to users, including members of staff, 
being unable to differentiate between technical difficulties preventing access, and 
access that had been denied as a result of a deliberate policy decision. Confusion 
as to whether access was being denied, or whether they were experiencing 
technical difficulties, was described by the member of academic staff: 
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I find with the Internet use, whether it’s to do with our technology, but when you try to 
contact places, the number of failed contacts you get.  It does seem to be more from here 
than it does when I’m using it at home, so is that because of the usage of the technology, 
or the controls? I don’t know. 
(Academic staff representative) 
 
5.3.6 Monitoring of Internet use 
 
A similar lack of clarity and communication was apparent with regard to the 
University College policy on monitoring of Internet use.  Employment contracts 
and computer use regulations that were in place at the time of the fieldwork made 
no reference to possible monitoring of Internet access, although the Internet 
Services Manager confirmed that such monitoring did take place.  The Information 
Strategy Co-ordinator, whilst being unaware of current monitoring practice, did 
acknowledge that this issue was likely to be addressed in the near future, in part as 
a response to the Data Protection Act 1998 (Parliament, 1998b). In the meantime, 
she noted ‘what people often aren’t aware of is that all the emails can be read by 
the Postmaster anyway’.  Moreover, the interview with the Postmaster [the Internet 
Services Manager] revealed that she was ‘occasionally’ requested by members of 
Senior Management to monitor the email use of individual members of staff.  She 
cited one instance: 
 
…they asked me that time just to say who this person was in contact with and why.  It was 
actually someone who was spending most of the day doing email rather than the job they 
should be doing. 
(Internet Services Manager) 
 
This suggests that concerns that had been drawn by other lecturers to the attention 
of the academic staff representative had some foundation, although suspicions of 
more widespread monitoring were hard to validate.  He commented: 
 
Other colleagues have told me...there are some in certain faculties who can monitor the 
Internet use.  Though I suspected that was happening anyway on an institutional basis 
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because there is a real interest for employers in ensuring that the Internet is not being 
used in a certain way, for certain purposes...I think [the Internet Services Manager] is 
probably doing that.  
(Academic staff representative) 
 
Nevertheless, despite expressed concern at the possible uses of such monitoring, 
he was of the opinion that there was no institutional policy preventing personal use 
of institutional email facilities, commenting that ‘certainly there has not been in 
the institution any statement that you may not use email for personal use, or any 
other use that [staff] may wish to make as well’.   
 
The Faculty Librarian had not received any guidance or instructions as to 
acceptable use of the University College network facilities, or the possibility of 
having such use monitored, but was aware of the technical possibility of being 
monitored, and regulated her use accordingly: 
 
I’m under the impression there isn’t a systematic checking, but I’m quite aware about 
email and Internet, that the technology exists to check.  So I wouldn’t kind of send things 
by email that I wouldn’t want to fall into the wrong hands. 
(Faculty Librarian) 
 
With regard to the specific monitoring of access to web content, as opposed to use 
of email, the Internet Services Manager stated that this had been happening, 
although it was a result more of technical problems than a concern with the nature 
of content accessed. Monitoring of web use on a regular basis was not regarded as 
feasible, as ‘we don’t really have the tools to do it’.  On-the-spot monitoring by 
librarians of content accessed in the Library was also seen as impractical and 
ineffectual.  The Faculty Librarian reported that ‘...we just don’t have the time to 
wander round and police what’s going on...And if they see a librarian wandering 
round they’re just going to go ‘click’ and it’ll disappear’. 
 
A self-acknowledged lack of computer literacy on the part of the Head of Equal 
Opportunities – who acknowledged that he had his emails and relevant information 
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from the web printed out by his Assistant for his review – meant that he had not 
given any consideration to policy on unacceptable use of email, or to issues related 
to pornographic or extremist Web content.   
 
5.3.7 Other factors impacting on Internet Use 
 
Respondents identified a wide range of factors that impacted on access to Internet 
content within the University College, including both internal and external forces. 
Policy making with regard to network use had been influenced by the conditions 
laid out in the JANET conditions of service and AUP, and, according to the 
Information Strategy Co-ordinator, the approaches favoured by bodies such as 
UCISA and JISC had also influenced policy decisions. The role of governmental 
legislative initiatives was highlighted, in particular the importance that the Data 
Protection Act 1998 (Parliament, 1998b) holds for information policy decisions 
within the higher education sector.  
 
Other factors identified by respondents included security issues and the use of 
access control mechanisms such as passwords; cost factors; licensing and 
copyright restrictions; technical limitations; technical ability and the availability of 
end user support and training; the requirements of confidentiality; and a lack of co-
ordination and communication between departments involved in policy decisions 
and implementation. These many and varied forces all played some part in 
determining the ease of access to online information experienced by students and 
academic staff at the University College.  
 
5.3.8 Institution A – some conclusions 
 
Although some of the factors limiting access to Internet content that are described 
above were beyond the control of the University College, it was clear that the 
impact of some of the decisions that had been taken to block access to specific 
sites risked constraining the freedom of enquiry of both academic staff and 
students.  This applied to both politically sensitive and sexually explicit content.  
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Moreover, this impact had been significantly compounded by the lack of 
transparency and communication of blocking decisions. 
 
Subsequent to the carrying out of the fieldwork, an illustrative example arose of 
the impact on academic freedom of measures to regulate access to Internet content 
at the University College.  A member of the library staff who was embarking on a 
Masters research project, exploring ‘alternative librarian websites and stereotyping 
of the profession’ (personal email, 2003), contacted the author of this report to 
seek advice.  In order to carry out his research work, he needed to browse a 
number of web sites, some of which he felt might contain sexual content, ranging 
from the mild to the fairly explicit.  He had contacted the Computer Support 
department, in order to alert them to the fact that he might be accessing some 
sexual content and explained the context for this access.  To his dismay he had 
been informed that he should ‘desist immediately from using [the University 
College] facilities and equipment (including any used by you elsewhere that is the 
property of [the University College]) for such purposes and delete any information 
that you have accessed’ (cited from personal email, 2003).  His attention was then 
drawn to the University College Regulations and Conditions for the Use of 
Computing Facilities, in particular: 
 
‘The creation, display, production and circulation of offensive material in 
any form or on any medium is forbidden.’ 
 
No provision is made within the Regulations and Conditions for bona fide 
academic research on controversial topics.   In addition to this advice, the enquirer 
was reminded of the disciplinary procedures cited in the Regulations and 
Conditions that could be invoked in the event of failure to observe the terms and 
conditions of the Regulations.  This response had left him feeling ‘despondent and 
isolated’, and he was contemplating having to change his dissertation topic to one 
that would not pose such an obstacle. 
 
The overall picture portrayed by respondents of policy making with regard to 
Internet access within the University College was one of disjointed and fragmented 
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approaches with a lack of a consistent or coherent approach to the resolution of 
issues raised by attempts to control or limit access. Decision-making appeared to 
be largely reactive to events and to the demands of individuals, rather than being 
indicative of a rational attempt at problem solving. 
 
In this respect, the model of policy formulation evidenced characteristics of the 
‘garbage can’ process (Cohen et al, 1972; March and Olsen, 1976; Kingdon, 1984; 
Burger, 1993; Parsons, 1995; Rowlands and Turner, 1997; Sabatier, 1999). As 
illustrated in fig. 1.2 on p.31, within this model, the place that an issue occupies on 
the policy agenda depends largely on the importance attached to the issue by 
various players in the policy process, and problems tend to be ‘constructed’ in 
order to justify solutions.  In the context of this case study, the lack of importance 
attached to issues of control of access to Internet content by other actors in the 
Information Strategy formulation sphere meant that decisions relating to blocking 
of content were left to the Internet Services Manager, whose chief preoccupations 
were the security and integrity of the server, as well as protecting her own staff 
from potential offence.  She did not welcome the role of ‘gatekeeper’ and 
recognised the need for better policy definition that ‘creates some boundaries’ [her 
words] and which would thereby protect her from comeback from users.   
 
5.4 Case study (2): Institution B 
 
5.4.1 Institutional context 
 
The second case study site, referred to throughout the thesis as ‘Institution B’, was 
a large, campus-based University.  Institution B was research intensive with a high 
international profile for both teaching and research.  The University prided itself 
on its strong links with industry, commerce and professional bodies.  At the time 
that the fieldwork was carried out at the institution (between September 2000 and 
March 2001) there were approximately 11,700 undergraduate and postgraduate 
students registered with the University, the vast majority of whom were studying 
full-time.  The University attracted a high number of international students, 
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particularly at postgraduate level, and there was a strong gender bias with almost 
twice the number of male students to female students.   
 
The University Mission, as stated in the Strategic Plan 1999-2004, was 
 
To increase knowledge through research, provide the highest quality of educational 
experience and the widest opportunities for students, advance industry and the 
professions, and benefit society. 
 
The Strategic Plan maintained that the University’s ethos is characterised by ‘a 
physical and intellectual environment that allows academic freedom and 
scholarship to develop…’ and stated that this ethos is embodied through the 
‘fostering [of] an open and responsive culture which enables individuals freely to 
exercise their intellectual curiosity…’ 
 
The principal Academic and Administrative Officer of the University was the 
Vice-Chancellor, who was also Chair of Senate.  There was a Deputy Vice-
Chancellor with a broad policy brief for planning and strategic resource issues: his 
areas of responsibility included that of Information Services and Systems.  In 
addition, there were two Pro-Vice-Chancellors, one with responsibility for 
research and the other with responsibility for teaching. 
 
5.4.2 Information policy and strategy 
 
In carrying out the fieldwork at this institution, it was evident that the approach to 
policy formulation and implementation with regard to computer use differed 
considerably from that at Institution A.  The case study interviews, and the 
documents scrutinised, at Institution B all indicated that a significant amount of 
time and attention had been devoted to defining, implementing and promoting 
policy decisions with regard to the use of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT). In addition to a demonstrable maturity of its information and 
computing policy-making procedures, Institution B also had the most developed 
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ICT infrastructure of all three case study sites, with network access in 98% of 
bedrooms in University-owned student residential halls. 
 
The University had a clearly defined Information Strategy that emphasised its 
commitment ‘to provide high quality IT services in support of research, teaching 
and administration’.  IT services were the responsibility of the Division of 
Information Services and Systems.  At the time of the fieldwork a new Director 
had been appointed to this Division and a major review of IT support was 
underway.  The Information Strategy had also just been revised.   
 
Policy decisions with regard to Information Services and Systems were proposed 
by the Information Services Committee (chaired by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor), 
and ratified by the University Council, the highest policy-making body of the 
institution.  At the local level, Faculty IT Co-ordinators (who were part of 
Computing Services) were responsible for establishing strategy and policy within 
their particular Faculty.  This was ratified at the Faculty IT Committee, which was 
chaired by the Dean of Faculty and attended by members of academic staff from 
the Faculty.  There was no student representation on the Faculty IT Committee. 
 
In addition to the Information Strategy, the University had a range of policies and 
codes of practice with implications for the management and regulation of Internet 
use.  These included a University Computing and IT Acceptable Use Policy 
(AUP); a Hall Network Service AUP; Policy and Guidelines for Dealing with 
Computer Pornography; and a Harassment and Bullying Policy.  It was clear that 
considerable attention was paid to promoting these policies, with very visible 
notices drawing attention to their existence displayed in almost every corridor of 
every campus building.  Information on acceptable use of IT was also provided in 
the introductory leaflet on IT services provided to new students by the Computing 
Services Department (‘Launching in…to IT, information and learning at…’).   
 
Institutional policies regulating computer and IT use were seen by ICT personnel 
and Senior Management as being essential in order to protect the University from 
potential legal liability, as well as to prevent the University being subject to 
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adverse publicity in the event of incidents of misuse.  In addition to systems 
personnel, Senior Management, academic staff and Trade Unions representatives 
had all been involved in the negotiation of policies such as the Harassment and 
Bullying Policy and the Computing and IT Acceptable Use Policy, on account of 
the potential workplace implications.  In the period prior to the fieldwork, there 
had been a lack of student representation in such policy formulation, but this gap 
had recently been recognised, and, according to the Student Union Network 
Administrator, there was now a commitment to include such representation in 
future negotiations.   
 
Policy formulation had been directly influenced by recent legislation, as well as by 
institutional bodies such as JISC and UKERNA.  The local Vice Squad had also 
been consulted in some instances.  UKERNA had been closely involved in 
determining policy with regard to issues arising from the provision of network 
services in student residential halls.  The Student Halls Service Manager remarked 
that ‘…UKERNA tell us what sort of things they think we should and should not 
be doing legally...and in particular, the issue of port scanning122 came from them’.  
Despite a more proactive stance being evident at Institution B, policy decisions 
were nevertheless often the result of specific incidents arising in the University.  
According to the Head of Network Services: 
 
…a lot of the policy that I know of arose because of individual cases.  Especially the halls 
service, which was very new to us at the time.  And things happen in the halls that make us 
think, well maybe we should have written that up. 
(Head of Network Services) 
 
 
 
 
                                            
122 ‘Port scanning’ is the systematic scanning of computer ports (connection points) to identify open 
doors into a computer.  Port scanning has legitimate use in network management, but can also be 
malicious in nature with the intention of identifying a weakened access point through which to 
break into a computer. [Definition from that in Webopedia at <http://www.webopedia.com>, last 
accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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5.4.3 Policy and Guidelines for Dealing with Computer Pornography 
 
In its Policy and Guidelines for Dealing with Computer Pornography123 the 
University aimed to clarify its position in regard to this issue with the following 
policy statement: 
 
The University seeks to maximise the opportunities afforded by new information and 
communications technologies for teaching and research.  In affording these opportunities 
to its students and staff it also requires that they be used responsibly and legally.  In 
particular, making material available via the computer which may be offensive, obscene 
or abusive is not acceptable and may well render the perpetrator liable under the law. The 
ability to undertake a particular action does not imply that it is acceptable. 
 
The Policy and Guidelines document made reference both to the University 
Acceptable Use Policy and the JANET Acceptable Use Policy, as well as to the 
University’s Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment (subsequently the 
Harassment and Bullying Policy).  The document stated clearly that the University 
‘will not condone the use of its computing resources to access, store or transmit 
material of a pornographic nature for personal use’ [researcher’s italics].  No 
definition was given of what the University would consider to be pornographic 
material for the purposes of implementation of the policy (although reference was 
made elsewhere in the document to the nature of obscene material as defined by 
the Obscene Publications Acts 1959 and 1964).  The policy advocated the 
reporting of Internet content that is suspected to be illegal to the Vice Squad of the 
local Police Force (who were involved in the drafting of the Policy and 
Guidelines). In particular, this applied to pornographic material of a paedophile 
nature or pornographic material containing references to bestiality.  As part of the 
policy, a commitment was made to providing training for relevant personnel to 
learn more about the policy and how to deal with incidents that may arise.  The 
interview with the library representative suggested that this training did, indeed, 
                                            
123 This section describes the Policy and Guidelines in force at the time of the fieldwork.  The 
document has subsequently been updated and is currently [July 2004] entitled Code of Practice on 
ICT Pornography. 
 
 187
take place at regular intervals, and had been very effective in raising awareness of 
the issues involved. 
 
Noting the commitment to providing ‘…an environment in which academic 
freedom, scholarship and initiative can flourish…’ made in the University Mission 
Statement, the Policy and Guidelines stated that legitimate study or research into 
pornography and its associated issues provide the only permissible reason for 
accessing such material.  However, ‘…individuals must be able to show that the 
access is necessary to their work or studies…’ and were expected to take care to 
ensure that such material was not displayed in a way that would offend others.   
 
According to the Head of User Support, who was responsible for the initial 
drafting of the policy, much of the impetus for the policy arose from a CVCP 
report into equal opportunities, which resulted in the establishment of the 
University’s Sexual Harassment Panel and the subsequent appointment of a full-
time Harassment Adviser (who was interviewed in the course of the field work).  
This also happened to coincide with the point in time (around 1994) in which 
Internet use was beginning to expand across the University.  There was a growing 
impression that ‘…a lot of harassment cases seemed to rest on people being sent 
porn, or porn being displayed…so the Computer Porn Policy was developed as an 
adjunct to the Sexual Harassment [Policy]’ (Head of User Support).  
 
Fears regarding the potential legal liability of the University had been a strong 
policy driver with regard to the drafting of the Policy and Guidelines on dealing 
with Computer Pornography. The Head of User Support acknowledged awareness 
that ‘as a University, we were running quite severe risks by not having proper 
policies’.  These fears, together with recognition on the part of the Head of User 
Support of the importance of University-wide ‘ownership’ of the policy, had 
resulted in the involvement of the Harassment Adviser, a member of security staff, 
representatives from the local police Vice Squad, and a member of Senior 
Management of the University in the policy formulation.  This involvement had 
also been achieved as a result of awareness-raising by JISC, together with events 
that had taken place within and beyond the University itself: 
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Fortunately, at that time, JISC was doing some work to bring this to the attention of the 
great and the good, and so it wasn’t just me saying ‘if we don’t do this, then the VC or the 
Registrar might end up in gaol’… one of the reasons for it was the fact that enough things 
had happened in the world to bring it up to, if not at the top, close to the top of the list of 
things that are important.  To the Registrar in particular, but also the Senior Management 
generally…We had a number of incidents which illustrated the dangers… 
(Head of User Support) 
 
However, this sort of reactive stance was criticised by the representative of 
academic staff on the grounds that ‘hard cases make bad law’, and that it was 
‘highly inappropriate [to formulate policy] around your aversion to the worst 
possible recent cases’. 
 
5.4.4 Computing and IT Acceptable Use Policy 
 
In a similar vein to the Policy and Guidelines for Dealing with Computer 
Pornography, the University’s Computing and IT Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) 
acknowledged the importance of respecting ‘the traditions of academic freedom’.  
The AUP complied with the conditions of both the JANET AUP and the Combined 
Higher Education Software Team (CHEST) Code of Conduct, and applied to all 
staff and students of the University without distinction of user status.  The policy 
did not prohibit personal use of computer network facilities but established that 
this should be regarded as a privilege subject to withdrawal rather than as a right, 
and that such use ‘must not interfere with the user’s duties or studies or any other 
person’s use of computer systems and must not, in any way, bring the University 
into disrepute’.  Priority was always to be given to users needing facilities for 
academic work.  On joining the University all students and staff were required to 
sign acceptance of the conditions of the AUP. 
 
The Policy was drafted initially by the Head of User Support in Computing 
Services, with input from other members of Computing Services personnel and a 
member of academic staff, and was then scrutinised by the Information Services 
Committee, prior to final ratification by the University Council.  Acceptable and 
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unacceptable use of University computers and network resources were clearly 
defined in the policy, the definitions given coinciding generally with those of the 
JANET AUP.  However, it is clear that much consideration had been given to the 
precise definitions, which were often afforded greater clarity or expansion than 
those provided in the JANET policy.  Thus, for example, it was noted that the 
propagation of offensive, obscene or indecent material (except in the course of 
recognised research or teaching) would normally be considered to be a much more 
serious offence than the retention of such material.  Similarly, whereas defamation 
was defined as unacceptable use, it was noted that ‘genuine scholarly criticism is 
permitted’.  The interview with the academic staff representative, who had been 
involved in the policy formulation, suggested that these refinements reflected his 
input.  The definitions were also accompanied by specific examples of use that 
would be considered unacceptable. 
 
In addition to the general provisions of acceptable use, the policy also deals with 
issues of  
 
• Authorisation and authentication – a user must not ‘masquerade’ as another 
user, withhold his or her identity or interfere with audit trails; 
• Privacy – establishing the right of access to all files by authorised systems 
personnel, and to access to staff files by other members of staff only after 
the granting of relevant authorisation and where a breach of the law or of 
the AUP is suspected.  Student privacy was not regarded as a right and 
‘students should not expect to hold or pass information, which they would 
not wish to be seen by members of staff’; 
• Behaviour – users were expected to take adequate precautions against 
malicious software, such as virus programs.  In line with the University’s 
Equal Opportunities Policy and Harassment and Bullying Policy, they 
were expected to refrain from distributing material that was ‘offensive, 
obscene, abusive or illegal’.  In addition, users should not make 
unauthorised copies of information belonging to other users. 
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The Policy made clear reference to the provisions of a number of legislative 
instruments, and summarised the main provisions relevant to the AUP.  These 
included the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (Parliament, 1990); the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 (Parliament, 1994a) (with regard to harassment); the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (Parliament, 1998b); the Trade Marks 
Act 1994 (Parliament, 1994b); and the Data Protection Acts 1984 and 1998 
(Parliament, 1984; 1998b).  The document also gave attention to the 
implementation of the AUP, with clearly delineated responsibilities for supervision 
and management of the policy’s enforcement.  
 
It was suggested by one respondent that the need for universities to formulate an 
AUP was, at least in part, a response to the moral panic promulgated through the 
media: 
 
I have no doubt at all that universities, not this one in particular, have felt compelled to 
construct an AUP in part because of that moral panic, which I think is very 
damaging…They do, I think, inhibit use inappropriately. 
(Academic Staff Representative) 
 
The policy document was accompanied by another, entitled IT Acceptable Use 
Policy Procedures, which outlined in some detail the procedures to be followed in 
the event of a suspected breach of the AUP and the potential penalties that may be 
applied in the event of a confirmed breach.  This document also outlined the role 
and responsibilities of departmental ‘AUP Advisers’, who are involved in much of 
the local implementation of the AUP.  In each department, one member of 
academic staff was appointed to this role, which carried responsibility for: 
 
• Ensuring that everyone in the department was aware of the role of the AUP 
Adviser; 
• Raising awareness of the AUP and issues associated with it; 
• In most cases, dealing with any incidents of unacceptable use that arose in 
the department; 
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• Ensuring that cases in the departments were all dealt with in a consistent 
way; 
• Developing local guidelines for the treatment of cases; 
• Ensuring that appropriate student cases were reported on the relevant form 
provided by Computing Services; 
• Referring major cases to Computing Services or to the Head of 
Department; 
• Ensuring that all records kept were maintained in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act 1998, and that all data subjects were made aware that 
records are kept. 
 
As with the Policy and Guidelines on Dealing with Computer Pornography, 
protection against legal liability had been a strong driver in formulating the 
Computing and IT AUP, and the associated procedures: 
 
…if we were going to be sued for defamation, or prosecuted for racial harassment or 
whatever, or the complicated things to do with copyright, then we can all be held 
liable…The things which we were told are most important, I think originally it was 
educating members of the University so they know what their responsibilities are, and to 
be able to demonstrate that you’ve told them what their responsibilities are.  And 
secondly, having procedures to deal with things… 
(Head of User Support)  
 
5.4.5 Hall Network Service Acceptable Use Policy 
 
Problems with ‘unacceptable’ computer use at Institution B had intensified as a 
result of the extensive networking of student residential halls, and this move 
towards network provision in halls had also resulted in a shift away from public 
access computers in laboratories and in the library as the primary locus of 
computer misuse.  In particular, Computer Services personnel were concerned to 
prevent students from providing server-based services from their Hall Network 
connection: 
 192
 
…most of the day-to-day problems that we have are coming from students misbehaving in 
the Halls Service and one of the things that they are not supposed to do is to provide 
server-based services to each other, or to the outside world…we have taken action so that 
all such server-based traffic is blocked, essentially on a hall-by-hall basis. 
(Head of User Support) 
 
The Student Halls Service Manager considered that the move away from a public 
to a private space, and the fact that students are paying to use the Halls Service, 
had engendered an attitude change: 
 
Because students in Halls, it’s their own accommodation, they’re in their own room and 
they’re using their own equipment.  And they pay to use the network.  So it’s an attitude 
thing, because they think they have a right to do what they want.   
(Halls Service Manager) 
 
As a result of such usage, a Hall Network Service AUP was added during 2000 
relating to specific aspects of Computing and IT use connected with the Hall 
Service.  In addition to complying with the conditions of the University Computing 
and IT AUP, students using the Halls Network Service are explicitly required to 
undertake not to use any ‘applications that are provided with the specific purpose 
in mind of breaking copyright legislation, such as Napster’124.  In addition, the 
policy states the right of the University to “port scan” any machine and browse 
services running on the machine.  Students who connect a wireless access point to 
the network point in their room are reminded that they will be held responsible for 
all network activity coming from their network point.  They should not allow 
anyone else (other than Computing Services personnel) access to their Hall 
Network connection, and must not configure their machine to provide any service 
                                            
124 Napster is software that facilitates distribution and downloading of music on the Internet.  
Developed by a student, the software was made freely available on the Internet.  Following legal 
action taken by the recording industry in 2001, Napster was withdrawn.  It was subsequently re-
established as a legal, commercial service in alliance with the multinational media corporation, 
Bertelsmann.  Meanwhile, a number of similar (free) music downloading sites, such as Kazaa, 
rapidly replaced Napster.  The search engine Yahoo! reported that ‘Kazaa’ was the most popular 
search term on the web during 2003 (BBC, 2003d). For more detailed discussion of this issue, see 
Lam & Tan (2001).  For discussion of the impact of music distribution and downloading on the 
Internet in a University environment, see Oppenheim and Robinson (2003). 
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to other users in their hall, on campus or on the wider Internet.  Connection to 
external services that use a significant amount of bandwidth, and which cannot be 
demonstrated as relevant to academic work, is prohibited, as is use of the Halls 
Service to attempt to gain unauthorised access to computing systems, data or other 
resources. 
 
5.4.6 Harassment and Bullying Policy 
 
The University’s Harassment and Bullying Policy commits the University to 
‘fostering an environment where staff and students and those associated with 
University activities can work, study and live free from intimidation, aggression, 
coercion and victimisation’ and undertakes to eliminate all forms of harassment 
and bullying.  The policy originated within the Personnel Services department, and 
was given final approval by the Equal Opportunities Council.  Members of 
academic staff and of the Trade Unions had been involved in the formulation of 
the policy, on the grounds that ‘You have to have people from academic 
departments involved…because unless you do that, and they buy into it, then 
you’ll never get it through’ (Harassment Adviser). 
 
Sexual harassment is defined by the policy as ‘unwanted behaviour of a sexual 
nature, or behaviour of a hostile or offensive nature based on gender’. According 
to the policy, the display of pornographic materials, including computer 
pornography, can constitute sexual harassment.   
 
Racial harassment is defined by the policy as ‘unwanted behaviour of a hostile or 
offensive nature based on race or ethnic origin by a person of one racial or ethnic 
origin against a person or people of another’ and includes (among other actions) 
written threats or insults, racist jokes, the display of offensive graffiti or insignia 
and incitement of others to commit racist behaviour.  Similar definitions are 
provided for religious harassment, disability harassment and harassment on the 
grounds of sexual orientation.  
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The policy defines stalking as a form of harassment that involves pestering an 
individual, either in person, in writing including in electronic formats or on the 
telephone: it notes that this form of harassment is being more commonly reported.   
 
The policy is implemented through a Harassment Panel, composed of trained 
members of staff from all areas of the University.  It is intended to be educational 
in impact: 
 
…telling people what harassment looks and feels like, rather than ‘thou shalt not do’…So 
it says ‘this is what it looks like, this is what it feels like and this is how we deal with it’, it 
doesn’t say ‘you are a new member of staff, you shall not therefore…’ Also, it’s training 
sessions, rather than saying I don’t want you to do this, but if you see this happening then 
you have the responsibility to report it… 
(Harassment Adviser) 
 
5.4.7 Filtering and Blocking of web-based information 
 
The University does not use any proprietary website filtering or blocking software, 
on the grounds that it would not be ‘appropriate to a University environment’, but 
they do block some network traffic ‘on a case-by-case basis’ (Head of User 
Support).  A technical solution is regarded as being problematic, inappropriate and 
ineffective in a University context: 
 
…with the students, it’s where do we stop, if you start blocking?  It’s very difficult to draw 
a line.  There aren’t really any very good systems that block materials which don’t block 
other things that you don’t want blocked as well. 
(Head of Network Services) 
 
However, at the time of the fieldwork, Computing Services personnel were 
investigating the possibility of blocking student access to Napster125, on the 
grounds that its usage of bandwidth downgrades the network, which ‘reflects on 
                                            
125 This action was subsequently implemented, together with the blocking of other similar services. 
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the service’ (Student Halls Service Manager).  They were also concerned about the 
potential legal consequences of providing access to a service that was being used 
by students to download copyright-protected materials.    
 
The reluctance to engage in wholesale filtering or blocking of web use meant that 
Computing Services personnel did not generally receive user complaints about 
content being blocked, although there were exceptions to this: 
 
The nearest we’ve had to that is someone who sent us an email saying they’d been trying 
to get to a pornographic site and he couldn’t get through, and was it us blocking it?…he 
made no suggestion that this was anything to do with his academic work, sort of ‘I can’t 
get to this site that I’ve subscribed to, is it you blocking me?’ and it wasn’t as it happened. 
(Head of Network Services) 
 
The SU representative who was interviewed confirmed that he was not aware of 
any problems encountered by students being unable to access sites relevant to their 
academic work, as did the member of library staff who was interviewed.   
 
5.4.8 Monitoring of Internet Use 
 
Respondents from technical services reported that there is no policy of systematic 
monitoring of email or web use at the University, but systems personnel will 
respond to reports or complaints and – in the words of the Head of User Support – 
‘a normal part of your job is to keep an eye open for anything strange’.  The 
emphasis of such policing relates to detecting use of the network to provide server-
based services, or to engage in port scanning or hacking activity.  Computing 
Services personnel are relatively unconcerned with the content of email 
communication or recreational web browsing (‘Someone could be full-time 
looking at sport or whatever, but that wouldn’t concern us’ – Student Halls Service 
Manager). The decision concerning to what extent they should ‘police’ the 
network was recognised as being one that was fraught with difficulty: 
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The extent to which we actually police the network is a very big issue…Because 
sometimes, if you do police it a lot, you become responsible for what’s on there, because 
you say you’re looking.  So if you don’t police it then you can’t claim responsibility, even 
though you’ve told them what not to do.  But also you do need to police it to a certain 
extent, because you don’t want it to get completely out of hand.   
(Student Halls Service Manager) 
 
In contrast with earlier years, at the time of the field work they had recently made 
a decision to engage in less proactive monitoring activity, and to concentrate their 
efforts more on educating students (and staff) with regard to acceptable use.  One 
way that they were trying to accomplish this was through the display of very 
prominent AUP acceptance pages as students register for the use of network 
services.  According to the SU Network Administrator, the prevalence of 
Acceptable Use notices and the emphasis given to educating students had led to a 
more proactive approach on the part of a substantial proportion of students with 
regard to self-policing their own use, and to reporting unacceptable use on the part 
of other users.  The academic staff representative also confirmed that there was a 
‘general culture’ of awareness of the possibility of email and Internet use being 
monitored.  He did, however, express some concern that this had caused some 
anxiety among personnel in his department, and was of the opinion that it did deter 
some legitimate access of controversial material. 
 
In a parallel with the findings of the case study in Institution A, the member of 
library staff at this Institution did not consider it feasible to conduct much in the 
way of policing of Internet use within the library.  With over 100 open access PCs 
scattered throughout a large building, it was logistically difficult to monitor use.  
However, as with Institution A, some incidents of inappropriate material being 
accessed had come to light as a result of the administration of printouts of material.  
On these occasions, the persons printing out the offensive material had been 
written to, and asked to ‘explain their actions’.  None of these incidents had led to 
students defending their use of the material on the grounds of academic need: in 
contrast, their approaches had been those of accepting it was a ‘fair cop’, and 
agreeing to refrain from such use in future.   
 197
 
Within the library, staff adopted a ‘deliberately vague’ approach with students 
concerning monitoring of use, in order to create an environment in which students 
are uncertain about the extent to which monitoring is taking place, leading them to 
‘self-censor’.  According to the member of library staff interviewed this approach, 
together with the installation of the Halls Network Service, had led to a dramatic 
reduction in the frequency with which instances of misuse occurred with the public 
access workstations in the library.   
 
The technical set-up of the University network requires all network traffic to use 
compulsory proxy connections, and this means that systems personnel are able to 
keep a log of all web use from the University network.  This log is kept for ten 
days, and, according to the Head of Network Services, has been used 
retrospectively to provide evidence of misuse.  The member of library staff 
interviewed confirmed that there had been a couple of occasions on which it had 
been necessary to consult the logs to investigate use of the network by library 
personnel, although on both occasions no evidence of misuse had actually been 
detected from the logs. 
 
Email traffic does get logged as a matter of course, and, on occasion, Computing 
Services personnel will view the content of individual messages, for example to 
determine whether it is junk mail. At the time of the fieldwork, there was no 
statement on employment contracts to the effect that email might be monitored, 
although it was recognised that this would need to be changed in response to 
recent legislation.  However, staff were required to sign an agreement stating that 
they had read and understood the Computing and IT AUP, and agreed to be bound 
by it.  Induction training of new staff was also used to raise their awareness of the 
AUP.  Staff email lists were neither moderated nor monitored by Computing 
Services personnel – this was seen as a matter for individual departments to 
handle. 
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5.4.9 Computer Misuse at Institution B 
 
This institution has a high proportion of technically able students of computer 
science; at times this had caused problems.  To quote the Head of User Support: 
 
…what we had last year…are people who know enough to go and find bits of software 
which will go around, well port scanning’s the main thing…most of them are ‘innocents 
abroad’ in the sense that they think they’re just exploring this great world around them, 
and mostly if you speak to them appropriately, plainly enough, then they respond… 
(Head of User Support) 
 
This theme of ‘innocents abroad’ was echoed by the Student Halls Service 
Manager, who commented: 
 
We have some very technically competent students in the University, and they’re 
experimenting, seeing what they can do.  And some of it is meant innocently, but they’re 
offending people without realising that they are. 
(Student Halls Service Manager) 
 
One example of computer misuse had involved a group of students who were 
found to be hacking into the computer at their former school.  In such instances, 
Computing Services work closely with academic departments in any disciplinary 
action that is taken, in particular through the departmental AUP Adviser system.  
As a result of the technical aptitude and enthusiasm of the institution’s students, 
the Head of User Support generally considered technical threats to be of greater 
concern than issues related to the volume of network traffic and bandwidth 
limitations, or to the accessing of computer pornography.   
 
He did, however, acknowledge the high profile that issues related to computer 
pornography occupy on the public agenda but, in general, he was confident that the 
‘problem’ of computer pornography, if not resolved, was at least being contained 
effectively within the Institution: 
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…I think we have a situation where there is a LOT of circulation of, I would guess, 
middle-ranging material, the sort of stuff that isn’t actually illegal, or the Vice Squad 
would never bother to prosecute even if it was technically illegal.  There’s a lot of stuff at 
that sort of level, which I think is circulating among undergraduates and occasionally 
things pop to the surface and we deal with them.  And so I think a lid is being kept on that 
in the sense that we don’t appear to be getting worse, and we don’t have large numbers of 
complaints… 
(Head of User Support) 
 
There had been instances of library staff complaining about students displaying 
indecent images on library computers, particularly during evening opening hours.  
However, in an institution with a high male to female student ratio, much of this 
misuse was regarded by Computing Services personnel as being the result of what 
might be described as a ‘laddish’ culture: 
 
The overwhelming majority of the things that I personally deal with are young boys, 
usually fresh from school, who just aren’t thinking about what they’re doing.  Or not 
thinking about the consequences of what they’re doing…just acting a bit daft…dodgy 
pictures, sending jokes that have gone beyond decent taste, or sent to inappropriate 
groups of people…lots of things of that sort. 
(Head of User Support) 
 
Nevertheless, the Head of User Support considered it important to adopt a ‘zero 
tolerance’ approach, and to ‘set the cultural guidelines’ by responding to all 
incidents.  Usually this involved requiring the student(s) concerned to attend a 
meeting with him.  This approach was generally considered to be effective, but 
there had also been incidents where stronger action had been called for.  In at least 
two cases involving University staff, the co-operation of the police in the form of 
the local Vice Squad had been sought.  These cases had resulted in the dismissal of 
University personnel, and in at least one of the individuals concerned being placed 
on the Sexual Offenders’ Register. 
 
The Halls Service Manager gave an example of how some students caused offence 
through the username that they used to connect their computers to the network: 
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…when they put your computer on the network, you have to give it a name.  And we advise 
them what they should use for a name.  Some of them name their computer the most 
amazing things.  And that can offend people.  Cos when you go to look on the network you 
see ****** so in that sense, they don’t know they’re offending people by doing that.  
 
Similar issues arose as a result of the use of ‘inappropriate’ images as background 
graphics on computer screens, causing offence to other students and to Computing 
Services personnel.  The Student Halls Service Manager acknowledged that this 
could be a problem, even where the material concerned did not amount to 
pornography: 
 
…if you talk about the wallpaper, it might just be a picture of a woman, she might actually 
have clothes on, so it’s not pornography but it’s still treating a woman as a sex object. 
(Student Halls Service Manager) 
 
None of the personnel or student representatives interviewed had encountered any 
problems with users accessing or disseminating racist or extremist political 
material.  The University had, however, encountered difficulties as a result of  
detection by the Federation Against Software Theft (FAST) of a student 
distributing copyright-protected software.   The benefits of having properly 
defined policies were illustrated in the course of this incident: 
 
They [FAST] were extremely civilised in the way in which they behaved and the scale of 
what was going on was not sufficiently damaging to them or their clients that they felt they 
needed to take action, but it was clear that had we NOT adopted the appropriate attitude 
it would have been difficult for us, had we not already had a policy in place…we would 
have been on much less firm ground.   
(Head of User Support) 
 
Although FAST had recognized that the University did have appropriate policies 
in place, they had also commented on the lack of written procedures detailing the 
exact steps to be followed in specific circumstances and outlining the line of 
responsibility in particular situations.  This comment had led directly to the 
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drafting of the IT Acceptable Use Policy Procedures document, as described on 
pp.190-191.    
 
According to the Head of Network Services, there had been several incidences in 
the University of harassing or abusive emails being sent.  Although this was 
generally student-to-student harassment, one case had involved a student harassing 
a member of library staff.  In another case, a male postgraduate student had been 
dismissed from the University for sending ‘unpleasant material’ to a female 
student in the same department.  Despite these incidences, technical staff did not 
look at the content of email messages as a matter of course, on the grounds that 
they ‘didn’t want to get into the area of censoring personal emails’ (Head of 
Network Services).  
 
5.4.10 Academic Freedom 
 
When questioned about the existence of a policy on academic freedom, the 
Director of Information Services responded that this was ‘taken as a given’, and 
that, therefore, a documented policy was not appropriate.  This was echoed by the 
Halls Service Manager, who commented that academic freedom was ‘always in 
the back of our minds in anything that we do – I’m not aware of any statement, but 
obviously that is taken as read’. Despite the proactive approach to dealing with 
incidents of computer misuse, the Head of User Support was also confident that 
there was a real commitment not to jeopardise academic freedom in the 
University: 
 
…what we’re absolutely not about is curtailing academic freedom.  What we’re actually 
not about is curtailing legitimate academic activity of whatever sort.  When the computer 
porn policy was being put together, one of the reasons it took so long to be firmed up was 
because of those academic freedom issues… 
(Head of User Support) 
 
They had involved a senior member of academic staff with strong views in favour 
of academic freedom in the formulation of the AUP.  He commented: 
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…I think in a sense I was a token libertarian voice, there was a feeling that it would be 
sensible to hear someone who might not be as committed to a strong policing 
element…clearly there were concerns which I voiced about the extent to which people 
who, after all, in this department [Social Sciences], would be people who were doing 
research on some fairly murky topics, prostitution, paedophilia etc. could have their work 
confined inappropriately. 
(Academic Staff Representative) 
 
According to the Head of User Support, the AUP, in particular, was intended to 
reflect ‘a culture which is permissive rather than restrictive’.  This principle had 
been vigorously promoted by the representative of academic staff: 
 
…there were probably more general concerns about the necessity, I think, to ensure that 
the AUP was driven first and foremost to encourage the use of the Internet for teaching, 
learning and research, rather than to contain it…at a fairly early stage, when drawing up 
the actual content of the AUP, I did point out that there wasn’t a single positive statement 
in it anywhere saying that the University wished to promote the use of the Internet for 
teaching and research.  It was entirely couched in terms of what you couldn’t do, not what 
the University would like you to do. 
(Ibid) 
 
The original draft had been amended to reflect a more positive approach.  The 
academic representative had also lobbied to ensure that the policy distinguished 
between the accessing of ‘offensive’ content and its dissemination: 
 
Something I kept saying was why should we be overly concerned if people are accessing 
material we don’t much like?  It’s the old problem with the obscenity law on offensiveness.  
What I find offensive, someone else might not.  There are plenty of jokes about finding 
memos from [the Administration Office] offensive…offensiveness is indefinable. 
(Ibid) 
 
He goes on to note that ‘offensive’ content only becomes a problem when it is 
displayed or disseminated to others, for example through access in an open 
computer laboratory.  Otherwise, simple access should not be problematised: 
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…we might frown on a lot of the uses, but why we should be either policing it or 
preventing it, seems to me unclear…in a university of all places, the leaning should be 
towards the encouragement of research rather than disabling it…a university above all 
else is an institution where freedom of speech and thought, and the opportunity to think 
the unpopular, ought to be cherished and protected…if people aren’t free to access the 
dubious, the morally slightly ‘iffy’, then universities aren’t doing what they ought to do. 
(Ibid) 
 
Although he recognised that some restraints were needed in order to maintain 
legality, he was concerned that ‘the danger is to err on the side of constraints rather 
than on the side of being expansive’.  With respect to his role as departmental 
AUP Adviser, he had adopted a hands-off approach, and, in fact, had taken no 
action against staff or students in his Department.   He likened this approach to his 
behaviour in the offline environment: 
 
I don’t follow my staff to the bookshop to check that they’re buying acceptable books, I 
don’t follow them round the library to check that they’re reading books that I don’t find 
offensive, I cannot see why I should do so with the Internet. 
(Ibid) 
 
The Students’ Union representative also spoke strongly in favour of a culture that 
maintained freedom of expression on the Internet: 
 
I would hate to see the Internet being less of a free speech area.  I think that’s one of its 
beauties at the moment, that there are so many diverse opinions on there.  And just like 
anything, you don’t have to listen to those opinions if you find them objectionable, or 
they’re not to your liking…I wouldn’t like to see greater controls being put on the Net, to 
be honest. 
 
5.4.11 Other Factors Impacting on Internet Use 
 
As in Institution A, regulatory decisions and mechanisms were not the only – or 
even the main – restrictions on Internet access.  Despite having a well-developed 
network infrastructure at Institution B, at the time of the fieldwork problems with 
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the reliability of the network were inhibiting use.  According to the academic staff 
representative 
 
…I would say that’s 99% of people’s concern.  I mean, it’s the fact that the system is 
always down.  Frankly, it’s quicker to walk to the library than look something up on the 
Internet…I think most people would rather walk that ten minutes than spend it waiting for 
a machine to boot up and then get an error message.  Basically, most people see the 
Internet as a generator of error messages.  So I think they’re so overwhelmed by the 
technical issues with the Internet that these other issues are very marginal. 
 (Academic Staff representative) 
 
5.4.12 Institution B – some conclusions 
 
Policy-making with regard to Internet access and use at Institution B appeared to 
be a product of much careful attention and widespread consultation, both internally 
and with external agencies.  The issue was high on the policy agenda, and its 
importance was afforded clear recognition by members of the Senior Management 
team, not least on account of the potential legal implications involved.  In addition 
to the attention paid to policy formulation and definition, it was evident that 
similar attention was paid to the implementation, dissemination and evaluation of 
policy initiatives.  The effectiveness of the consultation process could be seen from 
evidence of the way in which comments made by participants had directly 
impacted on the wording of the policy provisions.  This was particularly true with 
regard to the input by the member of academic staff concerning the promotion of 
the positive benefits of Internet use, the distinction drawn between access and 
dissemination of offensive materials and the protection of academic freedom. 
 
Indeed, it was apparent that academic freedom was a genuine concern in the policy 
process, and due care appeared to have been taken to minimise the impact of 
proposed measures on intellectual inquiry and research.  Overall, there appeared to 
be a widespread acceptance of the policy measures.  In particular, the researcher 
was impressed with the consistency of the accounts given by individual 
interviewees.  There was also a demonstrable coherence among the various policy 
measures, and a clear linkage between them and relevant legislative provisions.   
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However, despite the University’s carefully considered and comprehensive policy 
formation, with widespread awareness-raising and dissemination, there was still 
evidence of incidences of abuse of network facilities, ranging from minor 
infractions to serious criminal activity. One of the more extreme examples came to 
light in 2003, when a Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University resigned his post and 
was jailed for nine months after a large number of child pornography images were 
found on his computer.  The former Pro-Vice Chancellor, who was in post at the 
time that the case study fieldwork was carried out, admitted to surfing the Internet 
at work and at home in search of such images, as well as to disseminating indecent 
materials.  The offences were ultimately detected by Police Officers working on 
Operation Ore126, following an alert from authorities in the US, and not as a result 
of any University monitoring procedures.  The findings from the questionnaire 
study, presented in Chapter Six, also indicated that, despite a high level of policy 
awareness among students, levels of misuse of computer facilities in the 
University remained high. 
 
Although the decision-making process at Institution B demonstrated a move in the 
direction of a more considered and rational approach to policy formulation, with 
clear problem definition and democratic consultation, the ultimate failure of policy 
measures to successfully address the identified problem suggests that it would be 
inaccurate to present this case study as a perfect example of the ‘rational actor’ 
ideal of policy formulation (see fig. 1.2 on p.31).  This model assumes policy-
making is the outcome of rational processes based on perfect knowledge; policy 
implementation will be pursued consistently, unencumbered by external events 
and brought to a satisfactory conclusion (Rowlands and Turner, 1997; Burger, 
1993; Turner, 1999).  However, the limits imposed on the successful achievement 
of policy goals that resulted from the inability of policy actors to control all 
aspects of the policy environment at Institution B suggest that the notion of 
                                            
126 Operation Ore was a large-scale UK police operation aimed at intercepting an Internet 
paedophile ring. By November 2003 it had resulted in about 1,300 prosecutions from around 6,000 
suspects. (See Operation Ore: can the UK cope?  Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/uk/2652465.stm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]). 
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‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1957; March and Simon, 1958) is a more useful way 
of representing the actual policy process that was found to exist in the case study.  
 
5.5 Case Study (3): Institution C 
 
5.5.1 Institutional Context 
 
‘Institution C’ was a large dispersed post-1992 University.  A polytechnic prior to 
the removal of the ‘binary divide’, the Institution was originally a product of the 
amalgamation of a College of Technology and a College of Art.  It had 
subsequently expanded through mergers with a number of specialist institutions 
and Further Education Colleges.  At the time that the fieldwork took place 
(between April and September 2001 inclusive) the University had approximately 
30,000 students (of whom over 30% were studying part-time) and around 4,000 
members of staff. 
 
The University aimed to build on its historical strengths in technical and trade 
education to become ‘The leading University for professional, creative and 
vocational education underpinned by research excellence’ (ex University website, 
January 2004).   Considerable emphasis was placed on working in partnership with 
the local community; on knowledge transfer to industry and the local region; and 
on widening participation and being student-focussed (Ibid).  The student intake of 
the University comprised a high proportion of students from ethnic minority 
backgrounds, in particular those from the Indian sub-continent127.   
 
The principal Academic and Administrative Officer of the University was the 
Vice-Chancellor; during the course of the fieldwork at this Institution, a new Vice-
Chancellor took up post.  The Core Executive included the Director of Finance, the 
Registrar and the Pro Vice-Chancellors.   ICT services were the responsibility of 
the Department of Information Services and Systems (ISAS), headed by a Service 
                                            
127 This proportion was stated by one respondent to be around 25% of the total student population. 
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Director who reported directly to a Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Strategic Planning and 
Resources.  IT and information policies were developed by ISAS and ratified 
through the University Information Services and Systems Committee. 
 
5.5.2 Information policy and strategy 
 
Institution C presented another very different picture of policy formulation with 
regard to the use of ICT.  There was no single overarching Information Strategy 
document, although there was a plethora of advisory, policy and regulatory 
documents relating to ICT use.  Many of these appeared to overlap in terms of 
content and remit, and indeed were on occasions directly contradictory in content.  
Academic staff in particular demonstrated a very low level of awareness of 
University policies relating to ICT.  
  
At this Institution external agencies, such as the local Vice Squad, had not been 
involved in the drafting of ICT policies, but the policies of other universities had 
been used as a point of reference.  According to the Director of ISAS ‘what we did 
basically was to look at what other people were doing and interpret that within our 
own environments’.  In this respect, he noted that consideration of the needs of the 
high proportion of Muslim students in the University had had a direct impact on 
policy decisions with regard to access to Internet content. 
 
The organisational culture at the University was described by one respondent 
(Academic Representative B) as being ‘bureaucratically hidebound, you need to 
find permission for everything’.  The policy-making environment was described 
by the same respondent as being very centrally directed, unhelpful and rigid.  
These comments were mirrored by those of other academic respondents, who also 
spoke of policies being imposed by the centre and without consultation.  One 
respondent [Academic Representative C] spoke of a ‘big differentiation between 
the executive, the administrative and the academic branches’ and a failure in 
policy making to recognise or use the expertise that exists within the academic 
staff in the University.   
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The Electronic Services Manager, responsible for implementing IT strategy in the 
University Libraries, offered a negative perspective on the policy formulation and 
dissemination process in the University: 
 
I’m not awfully sure what the policy is here, that’s the trouble.  I mean the policy of the 
University is, as far as I can see, we don’t have an IT Committee that oversees the work of 
ISAS in any sense.  So really, they choose these things all by themselves and don’t really 
refer out to the user body at all…they don’t take user views…What does tend to happen in 
this place, and particularly with IT, is if you have a look on the Intranet you’ll find a 
policy document and you’ll think ‘I wonder when that was?’  And usually it’ll have sat on 
the Intranet for a couple of months and somehow become policy by default, but then it 
becomes policy but doesn’t really get referred to. 
(Electronic Services Manager) 
 
The account given by the Head of Human Resources (Policy and Development) 
describing the process of drafting and ratifying University personnel policies 
appeared to support this impression.  Consultation during the process was limited 
to senior members of the Human Resources team, the University Core Executive, 
the Trade Unions and the Senior Staff Team (‘All what you would call the 
managers in this organisation’).  At this point a new policy would go for final 
approval to the executive body, consisting of the Vice Chancellor, the Pro-Vice 
Chancellors, the Deans and Senior Managers (according to the representative of 
Human Resources these would include ‘Director of HR, Director of Finance, that 
kind of level, but not the level below’).  It would also go to the Board of 
Governors for approval.  The Head of Human Resources (Policy and 
Development) commented that the policy approval process ‘can be a bit long-
winded, but we’re quite assertive in pushing it through the process’.   
 
This lack of consultation or involvement of academics in policy formulation had 
resulted in a low level of ‘buy-in’ to policies, which, according to respondents, 
were generally perceived by academics as ‘imposed’. However, a couple of 
respondents did make reference to the incoming Vice Chancellor, who had made a 
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public commitment to ‘open and honest communication’: they were optimistic that 
this might lead to a more open and consultative culture.    
 
5.5.3 Guide to IT Legislation 
 
During the period of the fieldwork at Institution C, ISAS produced a Guide to IT 
Legislation, which was made available to staff and students at the University via 
the University intranet.  This included advice and guidance on a range of 
legislative instruments and issues, such as: 
 
• The Computer Misuse Act 1990;  
• Copyright; 
• Data protection; 
• Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989; 
• Defamation – this included the statement: 
“In accordance with the Defamation Act 1996 the University acknowledges 
the convention of academic freedom but will take all reasonable care to 
avoid the dissemination of defamatory material and will act promptly to 
remove any such material that comes to its attention…You must…ensure 
those opinions and views expressed in personal home pages or via bulletin 
boards do not discredit their subjects in any way that could damage their 
reputation”. 
• Obscenity – here it was noted that: 
“The University is committed to the prevention of publication through any 
of the University’s computing services of any material which it may 
consider pornographic, excessively violent or which comes with [sic] the 
provisions of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 or the Protection of 
Children Act 1978…Users of the computing services are reminded that 
these are principally for use in connection with academic purposes, 
therefore any use of the computing services to publish or gain access to 
obscene, pornographic or excessively violent material is inappropriate.  
You must not disseminate, access or encourage access to materials, which 
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the University deems to be obscene, pornographic or excessively violent 
through the University’s computing services”.  
• Discrimination: 
“Inciting racial hatred by displaying any written material, which is 
threatening, abusive or insulting is an offence under the Public Order Act 
1986…You must not use the University’s computing services to place or 
disseminate materials, which discriminate or encourage discrimination on 
grounds of sex, gender, sexual orientation, race or ethnic origin”. 
• Criminal law – this section concentrated on the criminality of incitement 
to commit a crime, and advised users that they must not place links on 
Internet sites: 
? To sites which facilitate illegal or improper use;  
? To sites where copyright protected works, such as computer 
software, are unlawfully distributed; 
? To bulletin boards which are likely to publish defamatory 
materials; 
? To sites which display pornographic materials; 
? To bulletin boards which are likely to contain discriminatory 
statements. 
 
5.5.4 Regulations for Using IT Facilities 
 
The University Regulations for Using IT Facilities that were in place at the time of 
the fieldwork, and which applied to all users of the University IT facilities, 
concentrated principally on issues such as security and authorisation to use the 
facilities; licensing, copyright and Intellectual Property Rights; charging for the 
use of IT facilities; and use for commercial purposes.  However, reference was 
made in clause 4.1 to personal use of University IT facilities with the statement 
that: 
 
IT resources are provided to facilitate a persons [sic] work as an employee or student of 
the University.  Use for other purposes such as personal electronic mail or recreational 
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use of World Wide Web or Usenet News is not a right.  Any such use must not interfere 
with the users [sic] duties or studies or any other persons [sic] use of IT facilities and 
must not in any way bring the University into disrepute. 
(Regulations for Using IT Facilities, Clause 4.1) 
 
Some reference was also made to offensive content, with the statement [6.3.14] 
that users must ‘Not send or take any part in preparing any text, graphics or audio 
material which is offensive, abusive, obscene or defamatory or which may be 
unlawful’.  Recognition was given to the fact that users may not be able to prevent 
the receipt of such material, but they were required to report its receipt or destroy 
it immediately.  Similarly, clause 7.1.1, which concerned users’ behaviour, 
required that users respect the rights of others and did not ‘Create, display, 
produce, circulate or disseminate offensive material in any form or in any 
medium’.  No definition of ‘offensive’ was provided, nor was any mention made 
of the requirements of academic research. 
 
Users were reminded that they should comply with the requirements of other 
regulations and legislative instruments, such as the University Student Regulations; 
the JANET AUP; the University Guide to IT Legislation; the University Internet 
Code of Practice; and the University Network Security Policy.  The Regulations 
were also accompanied by a document entitled Notes on Procedures for 
Investigating Breaches of IT Regulations in the Case of University Employees.  
 
5.5.5 Student Regulations for the Use of ICT and Associated Software and 
Media 
 
These regulations are disseminated to all students of the University via the 
handbook of General Regulations and Procedures Affecting Students.  Again, the 
emphasis of the regulations was on security, licensing, copyright and virus 
protection, as well as reminding students of the need to comply with relevant 
legislation.  However, with regard to personal use of University ICT facilities, 
students were in this document advised that they are ‘only permitted to use 
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University computing or communication systems or software for the purposes 
specified in their programme of study or research’. 
 
5.5.6 Internet Code of Practice 
 
The University also had an Internet Code of Practice.  Developed by ISAS over 
the period from 1997 (when ISAS first came into being as a department) to 1999, 
at the time of the fieldwork it had most recently been updated in February 2001128.  
The initial impetus for the policy had come from comments made by management 
consultants employed by ISAS who advocated the University developing its own 
AUP to supplement the JANET AUP.  According to members of ISAS there had 
been some consultation with academic staff in the formulation of the policy, which 
was signed off at Vice-Chancellor level, but they had not involved external 
agencies, such as the Vice Squad, in drafting the policy.   The Head of Security 
within the University had also been involved in the policy formulation. The 
academic personnel who were interviewed for the case study, however, were 
emphatic that there had not been any consultation with academic staff – even 
though one of the academic respondents had considerable expertise and was 
director of a research centre in the field of computing ethics [Academic 
Representative A].  Respondents demonstrated a very low level of awareness of 
the existence of this policy: even the Electronic Services Manager, responsible for 
IT services in the library which contains over 400 open access computer work 
stations, was not familiar with the contents of the policy. 
 
Applicable to all students and staff at the University and to the use of all 
University online services, including email, the Code of Practice also referred 
computer users to the University IT and General Student Regulations, the Guide to 
IT legislation and the JANET AUP.   A copy of the policy was given to all new 
students, and formed part of the Information Pack that is provided by the Human 
                                            
128 At the time of writing [January 2004] the wording of the Code of Practice appearing on the 
University website was unchanged from this version. 
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Resources department for new staff.  It also appeared on the University intranet 
and was displayed on the walls of some of the computer laboratories. The Code 
noted that: 
 
[The] University is committed to allowing its members the freedom to engage in academic 
investigation and scholarly debate and accepts that the use of the Internet makes a 
valuable contribution to the exercise of these.  In addition, the University also aims to 
benefit from the Internet by presenting itself favourably to the rest of the world.  The 
purpose of this Code of Practice is to ensure that the Internet is used in a way which is 
beneficial to all the members of the University, and which protects the good name of the 
institution and all its members. 
(Internet Code of Practice, para.2.1) 
 
In fact, the theme of protecting the University’s reputation prevailed throughout 
the Code, together with that of the avoidance of potential legal liability.  
Considerable attention was paid to the issue of publication and dissemination of 
Internet content, whereas the issue of access of unacceptable content was given a 
much lower profile.  This may be on account of the use of filtering software to 
deter such access from taking place129.  With regard to such access, there was 
some recognition given to the needs of researchers, with the statement that ‘Staff 
who by the nature of their research work need to have access to material which 
might compromise the position of the University or their own position must 
register their need to have access to such material with the Director of Information 
Services and Systems’ (Internet Code of Practice, para.5.6).  It was also noted that 
the Director of Information Services would keep a record of any such request 
(Internet Code of Practice, para.5.5).   However, no mention was made of the 
action to be taken in the event of a student of the University requiring access to 
such material for academic purposes. 
 
 
                                            
129 As will be described later in the Chapter, there was institution-wide implementation of 
Websense filtering software. 
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5.5.7 Information Technology for Students: Guidelines for Use 
 
This was a single A4 guidance sheet prepared specifically for students, which 
claimed to provide ‘a summary of the most important points’ of the various 
regulations and guidelines covering the use of University IT equipment, facilities 
and network services.  In addition to the provisions outlined in the Guide to IT 
Legislation, the Regulations for Using IT Facilities and the Internet Code of 
Practice, these guidelines advised students that, unless it is to support their studies, 
‘surfing’ across the Atlantic was outlawed on cost grounds.  They were also 
advised to: 
 
Ensure that what you do is legal, decent, honest and true.  Do not [bold as in original 
document] receive, download, create, send or cause to be sent any material which may be 
offensive, abusive, obscene or libellous or which breaches University codes or which is 
illegal. 
(Information Technology for Students: Guidelines for Use) 
 
As with the Internet Code of Practice, no mention was made of what action a 
student should take in the event of a conflict between this clause and the 
requirements of their studies.   
 
Additional advice provided in the guidelines warned students that ‘The University 
retains the right to monitor all systems and networks used within or attached to the 
organisation or used on University premises’. 
  
5.5.8 Draft Policy and Procedure for Dealing with Bullying and Harassment 
 
This policy had been initiated by the Human Resources Development Team and a 
revised draft was being disseminated for consultation purposes in June 2001.  It 
committed the University to ‘providing a working and learning environment that 
promotes the dignity of every individual and is free from bullying and harassment 
on any grounds’.  According to the Head of Human Resources (Policy and 
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Development), it had been reviewed specifically in order to make explicit that, as 
an organisation, the University accepted that email is a potential way of bullying 
somebody.  In its scope it stated that it applied to all employees of the University, 
but it did not specifically mention application to students of the University130.  The 
policy was available for staff to view on the University Intranet, and was 
communicated to new staff on their induction into the University.   
 
Within the policy, the definition of sexual harassment included the ‘electronic 
display or transmission of pornographic or indecent materials’.  The definition of 
racial harassment included ‘The display of racist graffiti or images’ and ‘The 
transmission of racially offensive materials or statements via electronic or other 
means’.  Similarly, harassment related to sexuality was defined so as to explicitly 
include the ‘Display of or electronic transmission of offensive materials’.   
 
The Head of Human Resources (Policy and Development) noted the impact that 
European Union employment law was having on policy at the University, and the 
difficulty in balancing the duty of exercising a balance of care towards employees 
with that of protecting their individual rights.  Thus, there was a duty of care to 
ensure that employees are not made to feel bullied or uncomfortable through 
another’s use of email or the web.  Further, the University aimed to promote ‘a 
corporate culture where we do recognise diversity and that means creating an 
environment where people are comfortable and it’s not macho’ (Head of Human 
Resources, Policy and Development).  At the same time, the implications of the 
Human Rights Act (Parliament, 1998a) meant that ‘we have to be cautious in 
monitoring that we’re not breaching anyone’s rights, we have to balance the two 
together’ (Ibid). 
 
 
 
                                            
130 However, clause 3.6 of the Student Disciplinary Code stated that ‘harassment, including racial 
or sexual harassment of any student, member of staff or other employee of the University or any 
authorized visitor to the University’ constitutes misconduct. 
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5.5.9 Code of Practice on Freedom of Speech 
 
This appeared in the handbook of General Regulations and Procedures Affecting 
Students and all students, members of staff and visiting or guest lecturers at the 
University were required to comply with the Code’s provisions. The initial 
paragraph stated a commitment on the part of the University to the principle of 
freedom of speech and expression within the law as being one of the ‘cardinal 
principles upon which all institutions of learning should be founded’ (Code of 
Practice on Freedom of Speech, 1.1).  It also acknowledged recognition of the 
need to ensure that academic staff at the University ‘have freedom within the law 
to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and 
controversial or unpopular opinions’ without risking losing their jobs or any 
privileges they may have at the University (Ibid).  However, in common with the 
Code of Practice on Freedom of Speech at Institution A, the rest of this 
University’s Code of Practice was concerned solely with issues relating to the 
organisation and conduct of meetings and lectures on controversial topics, or with 
controversial speakers. 
 
There appeared to be minimal awareness on the part of staff at the institution of a 
policy relating to freedom of speech or academic freedom.  For instance, when 
asked about the existence of such a policy, the Director of ISAS (who was 
ultimately responsible for policy decisions concerning access to Internet content) 
responded: 
 
I can’t remember whether we’ve got a policy, but there are, there is a generic policy, 
which says ‘we treat our academics reasonably’…  
(Director of ISAS) 
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5.5.10 Filtering and blocking of web-based information 
 
The University used a commercial filtering software package, Websense131, to 
limit access to ‘inappropriate’ websites.  The Director of ISAS defined these sites 
as those containing ‘material which is thought probably to be socially generally 
unacceptable, and that’s generally in the area of pornography, but some violence 
also’.  The software works by ‘categorizing’ sites according to their provenance 
and their content – so, for example, a university site would be categorized as 
‘educational institution’. Although the software was externally sourced, the 
University was able to amend the list of filtered sites in response to inappropriate 
blocking, as well as to add to the database of blocked sites by custom building its 
own categories.  
 
This facility was actively used by the Network Management team, who 
acknowledged that the software sometimes ‘gets it wrong’, both in terms of 
blocking sites that shouldn’t be blocked, and not blocking sites that should be 
blocked.  The respondents from the team maintained that the software was not 
used to block political content, but was used primarily to block sexual content: 
 
…we actually block on sex sites. It’s quite amusing, it’s an American site…Sex includes 
things like nudity as well.  Now unfortunately, being America, bless them, we looked at 
nudity and found they’d blocked sites like, say, paintings, the Statue of David…So we 
went, mmm, OK, we’re going to have to get realistic…What we get down to, we block 
explicit sex scenes, pornography…it’s actual sites that contain graphic detail. 
(Team Leader, Security and Network Management) 
 
If users attempted to access blocked sites they would encounter a screen message 
that advised them ‘You are not authorised to access this site – contact ISAS to 
request access’.  If they wished to pursue access, they would then be required to 
complete a form stating the academic purpose for which they required access, 
together with the location and time at which they wished to access it.  This form 
                                            
131 <http://www.websense.com> [Last accessed 5/7/2004] 
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had to be countersigned by their Dean of Faculty.  At the time of the fieldwork, the 
Network Management team estimated that they received on average ten requests a 
month for access to blocked sites, of which at least 90% would be granted.  
According to the Team Leader, Security and Network Management, if access was 
granted, their policing role was still important: 
 
What we actually specify then is, OK, we will do it, but the PC has to be in a) a secure 
area, obviously locked b) you are responsible for who actually has access to this machine, 
and the other thing we always say is, just because we’re allowing you access doesn’t mean 
we’re not keeping an eye on you. 
(Team Leader, Security and Network Management) 
 
The implementation of the software appeared to have resulted in a significant shift 
of power in favour of the systems personnel, with the Team Leader commenting 
‘You can only get to where we want you to get to, the rest is denied’.  However, 
information was not made available to other personnel about what categories of 
sites were blocked, and respondents demonstrated a considerable degree of 
uncertainty about this.  The Electronic Services Manager, for example, commented 
with regard to Websense that ‘I don’t know what it is blocking…I don’t know 
what they block now, but I know they don’t block things like chatlines…’ 
 
According to the Director of ISAS, a major impetus in the decision to use filtering 
software had been concerns over the use of bandwidth.  This appeared to have 
been of greater consideration than issues of legality: 
 
It was done on the basis that anecdotal evidence tells us – not just here, but elsewhere – 
that maybe a proportion of bandwidth, a significant proportion, is being used, mainly for 
moving coloured pictures…and we’re not funded to supply that, what we’re funded to do 
is to supply educational services and it’s an economic decision really…I don’t think it’s a 
legal issue because I think it’s very difficult to actually decide whether something is 
unacceptable or legal or illegal. 
(Director of ISAS) 
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This concern with cost and the use of limited IT resources as a major policy 
impetus was echoed by the Head of Security.  However, the Security and Network 
Management Team Leader identified a rather different driver for implementing the 
software: 
 
The biggest reason, I would say, why we drew it up to start off…if they [prospective 
students] bring parents, as they do, to have a look at the University, and they’re walking 
round and see all these banks of PCs, if we can say, ‘oh, by the way, we don’t allow 
access to pornography at [Institution C], we will block it and we will actively pursue 
people who are trying to get to these sites’, we thought it was a bit of PR as well. 
(Team Leader, Security and Network Management) 
 
This theme was echoed by the User Support Manager, who commented that the 
main policy driver had been ‘Literally, embarrassment…we need to preserve our 
integrity and public face’.  Academic staff also cited protecting the reputation of 
the university as having been a strong policy driver in the use of filtering software: 
according to one member of academic staff (Academic Representative B) the 
University ‘was not a self-confident institution’ and this tended to lead to an over-
regulated and over-cautious approach.  Another academic commented on how the 
University had been able to implement the software with relative ease: 
 
There are tendencies for articulate technologists to ‘bamboozle’ academics.  By which I 
mean that the non-technological academics are apprehensive towards the claims made by 
the technologists.  They don’t have the confidence or knowledge to argue against the need 
for controls. 
(Academic Staff Representative A) 
 
In addition to blocking sites with sexual content, the Security and Network 
Management Team Leader had been keen to prevent access to chat sites as well 
(‘Nothing would give me greater pleasure’), but described how the new Vice 
Chancellor had not been in favour of this: 
 
In fact, I actually mentioned it to [X] our Vice Chancellor, who said ‘well does it cost us 
anything, is there any reason, does it hurt us?’  I said,’ well no, I don’t suppose it does’, 
so he said ‘well, why should we?  It’s not breaking any laws, yes it’s using our resources, 
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but what’s the specific motivator for this, are people actually complaining about this?’ 
People were complaining about people accessing pornography, nobody was complaining 
about people accessing Web chat. 
(Security and Network Management Team Leader) 
 
Prior to the establishment of ISAS, the University had historically had ‘very open’ 
systems (this comment was made by a number of respondents).  As a result, in the 
initial stages, the implementation of the software had met with considerable 
resistance from academic staff – ‘a lot of Big Brother emails flying about’ – but 
technical, security and human resources personnel all stated that they believed that 
the need to protect the University systems and ensure acceptable use of the Internet 
had gradually gained recognition and this had led to acceptance of the filtering 
policy.   
 
However, academic staff interviewed for the study stated that they did not support 
the implementation of filtering and monitoring systems.   Concern was expressed 
over the potential conflict between the needs of teaching and research and 
measures to limit access to controversial material.  One member of academic staff 
(Academic Representative C), involved in teaching a module on ‘Democracy in 
the Electronic Age’, was concerned about the potential for blocking politically 
sensitive material.  His students were on occasion required specifically to look at 
racist, homophobic or extremist material available on the Internet.   He gave one 
example: 
 
There would be an occasion for them to be going into BNP sites or whatever, particularly 
in the context of the election results, where the BNP has scored highly, the number of 
seats, where there is all this rioting going on…it’s the sort of thing we would set our 
students in this department, going on to look at these things, to look at the types of 
information that’s available on the Internet. 
(Academic Representative C) 
 
Another academic respondent commented: 
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As a researcher, I’m very Web-oriented, most of my information is sourced from the Web.  
The controls [i.e. Websense] impose a mechanistic constraint on where you can access 
data from.  For example, within our Centre, there may be a researcher who wants to look 
at issues related to pornography.  The sites they will need to access are likely to be 
blocked, and it is very difficult to unblock access.   
(Academic Staff Representative A) 
 
He gave a specific example of an occasion where he had had legitimate cause to 
access a blocked site, but had not been successful: 
 
I tried to request access, but couldn’t get a response.  Those responsible for implementing 
the filtering software don’t always understand the practical problems it causes. 
(Ibid) 
 
This conflicted with statements made by the technical team, the Electronic 
Services Manager and the respondent from the Human Resources department, all 
of whom maintained that it was very easy for researchers to gain access to blocked 
sites.  The same member of academic staff (and others) also commented that 
access to ‘legitimate’ [non-controversial] sites is sometimes blocked in error.   
 
One respondent in particular was unhappy with the lack of consultation that had 
taken place prior to the implementation of Websense: 
 
…the question of filtering in the institution has never been articulated or debated.  It was 
imposed.  The rank and file academics like myself were not consulted.  More and more 
information in academia is Web-based and there needs to be proper consultation on 
decisions like this.   
(Academic Staff Representative A) 
 
He did recognise legitimate concerns over the security and integrity of the 
University network, but felt that the use of filtering software was ‘different from 
the necessary use of firewalls and other security devices, which I don’t think 
anyone would argue with’ (Ibid).  While he recognised that there was an issue 
concerning the legitimate use of university resources, he noted that: 
 222
 
Constraints on access pose a big problem for us.  They risk stopping us from delivering.  
The problems posed by inappropriate use cannot be resolved through a knee-jerk reaction 
such as has dominated. 
(Ibid) 
 
However, the representative from the Human Resources department was confident 
that adequate discussion had taken place prior to the implementation of the 
software.  She commented: 
 
We checked with the Deans at the start of the programme, and everyone was comfortable 
with this, there’s been an academic discussion about the effect on students and the content 
of the material in the classroom and that’s fine. 
(Head of Human Resources, Policy and Development) 
 
5.5.11 Monitoring of Internet Use 
 
With regard to the monitoring of emails, the Director of ISAS declared that this 
did not take place in the University in a systematic way, but that they would 
respond to specific cases that required investigating.  The Security and Network 
Management team also confirmed that, apart from virus checking, there was no 
systematic email monitoring.    
 
However, although there was a lack of knowledge among academic staff about any 
University policy on monitoring of staff email, academic staff were concerned at 
the possibility that their email could be monitored: 
 
The real issue with monitoring is why our emails should be monitored, and where do you 
start from?  There is a tendency with software to monitor and collect data per se.  This 
changes the relationship between those controlling the monitoring and those being 
monitored.  Previously, before this technology was used, there would have had to be a 
good reason to investigate someone’s correspondence.  Now it is so easy to monitor, they 
don’t need to have a reason. 
(Academic Staff Representative A) 
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This respondent went on to discuss the dangers posed by the potential for data 
profiling (for example, to draw up the profile of someone who represents certain 
characteristics, run it against the profiles of university personnel, and monitor the 
emails of anyone who ‘fits’).  He accepted the desirability of filtering for specific 
beneficial purposes such as the detection and elimination of viruses, but was 
concerned that ‘with all new technology, there is a tendency to use facilities for a 
purpose they weren’t intended’ (Ibid).  Therefore, he felt it was important to know 
what guidelines had been laid down for members of the security team, and was 
concerned that there was no information provided about ‘who is monitoring, or 
why’ (Ibid).  He said that colleagues had reported to him instances of having their 
email monitored.  
 
Another member of academic staff had not encountered any direct evidence of 
email being monitored at the University, but he did comment that other colleagues 
had said that they did not want to continue particular email exchanges because 
‘they knew it would be monitored’ (Academic Representative B).   
 
When the Head of Human Resources (Policy and Development) was interviewed, 
she appeared to contradict the statements from the Director of ISAS and the 
members of the Security and Network Management team with regard to the 
monitoring of email, although she acknowledged that email monitoring in the 
institution was less systematic than were the controls on Web use: 
 
 We do monitor them, we flick through people’s emails as well for certain words, and 
things like that, but I would suggest that on the email, as opposed to Internet access, we’re 
probably still running more on a trust-based system. 
 
According to her, some personal use of email was deemed acceptable, although 
this policy was itself open to review: 
 
I feel very strongly that if we’re going to let people, we do actually let people send 
personal emails, to make it very clear that this is a privilege that can be taken away at any 
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moment, and we’re very clear with the Trade Unions that it really is in the hands of their 
members as to whether I [researcher’s emphasis] continue with this policy or not.   
(Head of Human Resources, Policy and Development) 
 
This respondent was also of the opinion that the provisions of the Human Rights 
Act (Parliament, 1998a) might result in the withdrawal of this privilege: she felt 
that allowing personal use as well as business use might adversely affect the 
University’s right to monitor email use.   
  
5.5.12 Computer Misuse at Institution C 
 
According to the Director of ISAS, the University had not experienced any 
instances of computer misuse that were sufficiently serious to require police 
involvement, although they had had incidents that had resulted in the dismissal and 
resignation of personnel.  This had involved the inappropriate use of network 
services at the expense of work output, rather than issues concerning the access of 
socially, legally or morally ‘unacceptable’ content.   
 
However, the Security and Network Management Team Leader described how, 
prior to the implementation of filtering software, they had detected that ‘over 20% 
of websites accessed at [the University] were going to pornographic sites’.  They 
had then looked at who was accessing these sites on a regular basis, and found that 
the seven heaviest users were all members of staff.  None of this usage was 
claimed to form part of legitimate academic study.  The Security and Network 
Management Team Leader described how they dealt with such users: 
 
What we tend to do then in that situation is…we’ll go and see D [the Head of Security] 
and say ‘D, at these times of the day on this PC has been accessed pornographic material, 
what are you going to do?’  And he’ll say,’ what time of day? I’ll catch them’.  And on one 
given day…the PCs were impounded.  Nobody was actually sacked.  There were some 
resignations.  
(Team Leader, Security and Network Management) 
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He went on to describe a particular case: 
 
One of the PCs, we could have sold for a fortune, it had the most impressive collection of 
porn I’ve ever seen…It was all categorised – it was an ex-librarian and it was all 
categorised and listed.  It was impressive, wasn’t it? [addressed to his colleague].   
(Ibid) 
 
The member of staff responsible for this ‘collection’ had subsequently resigned his 
position.  During the interview with the Security and Network Management team, 
it was apparent that the team approached their ‘policing’ role with some 
enthusiasm.  Although the Security and Network Management Team Leader did 
express some reservations about having to report individuals (‘it’s a hard thing to 
do because you could, in effect, be ruining someone’s life’), he went on to justify 
his actions on account of the potential financial saving to the University: 
 
It doesn’t stop us enquiring though, does it?…Having a little dig…It’s breaking lots of 
University policies and it’s costing the University money.  Pay in the time that the 
person’s spending on it, which can be a lot of time, and also in actual bandwidth to 
America, where all these interesting sites are.  It does cost money, so yes, we feel we have 
to pay our wages back to the University as well [laughs]. 
(Security and Network Management Team Leader) 
 
In one instance, he had been involved in a disciplinary hearing against a member 
of staff who was spending a lot of her work time using Web chat (‘expert witness, 
I think they called me’, he noted).   This member of staff had also subsequently 
resigned (an outcome described as ‘Result!’ by the Security and Network 
Management Team Leader, whose role had been primarily to compile the usage 
logs for her computer).   
 
With regard to student misuse of network services, it was considered that the 
implementation of filtering software had been successful in terms of reducing their 
access to unacceptable content, especially pornographic material132.  According to 
                                            
132 The results of the student questionnaire carried out at the institution appeared to support this 
claim, with none of the students acknowledging use of University network facilities to access 
 226
the Security and Network Management Team Leader, such access had previously 
caused problems, with female students complaining about male students accessing 
pornographic material in open access areas like the library and the computer 
laboratories.  The Electronic Services Manager, based in the Library, confirmed 
that this had happened on occasion, but did not feel that it had been a frequent 
problem.  However, there was now increased concern about students being 
engaged in the production of unacceptable Internet content, a fact that was 
reflected in the emphasis on content production in the University policies.    
 
As was the case in Institution B, they had experienced problems with students 
using University computers to provide server services.  They had resolved this by 
delegating the role of monitoring outgoing network traffic to technicians in the 
Faculties: 
 
We sold it to all the technicians in all the Faculties, saying, this is a wonderful opportunity 
for you to control your area.  And they were very keen, some of them.  They said, yes, this 
is my area. 
(Team Leader, Security and Network Management) 
 
Respondents, such as the Head of Security and members of the Security and 
Network Management team, stated unequivocally that they would involve the 
police should there ever be any instances detected of access via the University 
network of pornographic material involving minors or animals, but to date this 
situation had not arisen. 
 
However, in contrast to the statement by the Director of ISAS that the University 
had not had any cause to involve the police in cases of computer misuse, a member 
of the Security and Network Management team described a case of email 
harassment that had resulted in police involvement.  In this instance, a student had 
used the University email facilities to send threatening emails to a celebrity.  The 
                                                                                                                        
pornography, compared with 36% at Institution B.  See Chapter Six for a more detailed outline of 
these findings. 
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police had been called in, but the Security and Network Management personnel 
had found themselves having to act as technical advisers to the police: 
 
…that time the Police came in, they knew one hell of a lot less than us…I think they were 
finding out a lot from us…I don’t think they’d been around for very long.  I think it was a 
case of, we’ve got some Police Officers, you’re now in charge of electronic security and 
protection, and arresting people who do this…we showed them how things worked.  
(Team Leader, Security and Network Management) 
 
The Head of Security also commented on this particular case, and expressed 
concern at the volume of ‘inappropriate’ email messages sent by students.  He 
suggested that, where student email is concerned, some systematic monitoring 
does take place: 
 
…about a year ago the University started monitoring some of the messages and they were 
surprised by the nature of what they were sending to each other.  You’ve got to be very 
careful, it can come across as harassment and bullying. 
(Head of Security) 
 
The representative from the Human Resources department believed that instances 
of email ‘bullying’ were generally the result of ignorance rather than intent: for 
example, not understanding the impact of the use of capitals, being overly brief in 
composing email messages, or omitting to use please and thank you.  She favoured 
an approach based on raising awareness of these issues rather than one based on 
punishment.  As a result, a working group was currently finalising guidelines on 
the use of email, providing advice on netiquette, use of capitals and tone of 
language.   
 
In fact, a number of respondents at the Institution noted the importance of the role 
of education in encouraging responsible use of network facilities, although this 
area did not appear to be without problems.  The User Support Manager 
commented that ‘The University has a chequered history on IT training’, which 
came under a different department altogether from that responsible for the 
technical provision and security of the network (ISAS).  The Electronic Services 
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Manager also commented that ‘[Student] IT training in this institution is a bit 
diverse, it’s a bit scattergun.  I don’t think the students get any by default’.   
 
5.5.13 Academic freedom 
 
The focus on regulating the Internet use of University personnel at Institution C 
was perceived by academic staff as posing a threat to the relationship of trust 
between managers and academics at the Institution.  One respondent, noting that 
the vast majority of academic staff made ‘legitimate use’ of university Internet 
access for their work, commented: 
 
There is a real issue of trust, which was taken as a given in the past.  The academic’s role 
is based on outcomes, we’re measured by what we achieve.  With the advent of new 
technology, and the concern for what constitutes acceptable Internet use, the trust and 
outcomes basis has changed…this relationship of trust is potentially being changed to one 
of process and procedures, and risks modelling academia along industrialist lines 
whereby we have to justify what we do. 
(Academic Representative A) 
 
This undermining of the trust relationship was reflected in the comments of the 
respondent from the Human Resources department, who noted that originally the 
policy had been to have an entirely trust-based system, but that this had been 
abused by some members of staff.  As a result, they had installed the Websense 
software, and: 
 
We then moved on to making it very clear to people again what was expected, but also 
making it entirely clear that if they did anything outside of those expectations, if they tried 
to access sites which were deemed unacceptable, we would know, we have monitoring 
equipment. 
(Head of Human Resources, Policy and Development) 
 
 
The outcomes-basis of the academic role was also cited by another respondent 
with regard to use of the University network for personal use.  Noting the fact that 
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his work pattern does not reflect a 9.00am – 5.00pm model, and that he makes 
considerable use of his home telephone and home computer for work-related 
activities, he did not consider that it should be regarded as a problem if he chose, 
for example, to look at the web at work to check the next football fixture: 
 
I know that many employers are concerned with the amount of time that people spend on 
social or non-work-related Internet sites, and I think it is a potential problem in a job 
where you are paid to be there.  But I think in an academic environment, where it is much 
more output oriented, my head of department isn’t concerned with how many hours a day 
I spend working, he is simply concerned with how many publications I get out, how much 
research money I bring in, how much teaching I do. Those are the clear output criteria.  
So I could spend all day looking at millions of websites. 
(Academic Representative C) 
  
However, this viewpoint conflicted directly with that put forward by the Head of 
Human Resources (Policy and Development), who commented with regard to 
personal use of the web (even out of office hours) that: 
 
Although there is monitoring equipment for email, we are very clear that staff may not use 
the Internet [sic] for anything that is not work related, we’re very clear about that, with 
email you can, personal emails, but Internet absolute no no, you’re not allowed to look at 
flight details, cricket scores… 
(Head of Human Resources, Policy and Development) 
 
With regard to controversial web content, while acknowledging the very difficult 
nature of having to respond to ideas and ideological perspectives that offend one’s 
own beliefs, an academic respondent who taught politics noted that: 
 
…very open access to ideas, to sources, what is then important in teaching is teaching 
people how to analyse those ideas and how to analyse the sources of those ideas. 
(Academic Representative B) 
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This was echoed by another member of academic staff (Academic Representative 
C), who expressed his distaste for Holocaust denial, but also his disagreement with 
the German legislation criminalizing Holocaust denial133: 
 
Simply because I think it stifles the debate and discussion…if the Holocaust denial debate 
was out in the open, it would be much easier to identify those people who are subversive 
against Jews, and to argue effectively against them. 
 
However, he was also clear that the concept of academic freedom does not imply 
unlimited licence: 
 
I think academic freedom can only be defended when you are doing proper systematic 
research, and carefully constructed research.  I think the idea of trawling round a pile of 
websites out of interest is not research, and I don’t think it’s defendable in that respect. 
(Ibid) 
 
5.5.14 Other Factors Impacting on Internet Use 
 
Other restrictions on access to information on the Internet within the University 
cited by respondents included the increased tendency towards charging for 
information, including access to online newspapers and datasets.  One respondent 
noted that this was a trend that was likely to grow.  Similarly issues of copyright 
and Intellectual Property Rights were seen as exerting an inhibitory effect on 
access to information. 
 
5.5.15 Institution C – some conclusions 
 
It can be seen that policy-making at Institution C indicated a lack of consultation, 
particularly with regard to consultation with academic staff.  Instead policy tended 
to be imposed from the centre, with a distinct differentiation between the 
administrative and the academic communities in the University.  Academic staff 
                                            
133 Auschwitzluege Gesetz 1985. 
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tended to feel marginalized from the policy formulation process, and hence did not 
buy-in to policy measures.  This situation was exacerbated by a lack of 
transparency in both the policy formulation and the policy implementation 
processes.  Policy promotion, dissemination and evaluation also appeared to have 
received scant attention. 
 
Furthermore, there was a wide range of policies whose remit overlapped, but 
whose provisions did not always demonstrate coherence, for example with regard 
to the acceptability (or otherwise) of limited personal use of network facilities, or  
policy with regard to the monitoring of email use.  In some areas respondents 
showed a lack of consistency with each other in their answers, a situation that 
appeared to have more to do with a lack of awareness of what was actually 
happening within the institution than with a deliberate intention to distort the true 
situation. 
 
The picture of an institution lacking in self-confidence, and therefore tending 
towards an overly cautious and regulated approach, was very clear.  While policies 
did make reference to academic freedom, it was apparent that this was accorded a 
very low priority in comparison with the dual aims of protecting the University’s 
reputation and avoiding offence, particularly with respect towards the sizeable 
Muslim community within the Institution.  The exclusion of academic staff from 
the decision-making processes was risking the undermining of the trust-based 
relationship on which the University had previously operated, and was causing 
resentment towards what was perceived as an encroaching ‘managerialism’. 
 
The implementation of a technical ‘fix’ to regulate Internet use was accompanied 
by a lack of transparency as to the basis on which sites were filtered, or the extent 
of such filtering.  Furthermore, the use of the Websense software had facilitated a 
significant power shift in the favour of technical personnel, who now had control 
over what information academic staff and students could access, and who appeared 
to derive considerable satisfaction from their role in policing Internet use.  In 
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particular, the fact that the Security and Network Management Team Leader134 had 
strong views against pornography had been allowed to exert a decisive influence 
over institutional policy formulation.   
 
In an interesting turn of events, the technical solution had seemingly led to an 
example of the ‘cockroach phenomenon’ (Hosein et al, 2003).  This refers to a 
situation whereby attempts to prevent a specific action lead to alternative (and 
equally undesirable) actions springing up to take their place.  This could be seen in 
the changed emphasis on content creation once students found themselves unable 
to access existing ‘unacceptable’ content.  It was noticeable that the technical 
solution had not generally been accompanied by a similar effort towards measures 
to promote education and awareness-raising of issues related to acceptable use. 
 
At a similar point in time to the conduct of the fieldwork at Institution C, another 
study was carried out into a different area of policy-making at the University, 
namely that of the implementation of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) within 
University premises (Prior, 2001).  There is a high degree of similarity between the 
findings of Prior’s study and the current one with regard to the policy-formulation 
process and environment at the University.  Prior noted that the implementation of 
CCTV at the University had been initiated on the basis of assumptions and 
anecdotal evidence of an increase in security-related incidents, in the absence of 
any quantitative empirical evidence.  There had been no consultation with 
academic, administrative or premises staff, or with students, all of who were 
subject to monitoring by the cameras.  Furthermore, staff indicated a degree of 
uncertainty as to the extent and purpose of surveillance that was actually being 
undertaken.  There were no plans for formal review or evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the implementation of CCTV: nevertheless, the University had 
submitted a bid to the Home Office for funding for a massive expansion in the use 
of CCTV.  The author of the study suggested that staff had tolerated the 
implementation of the CCTV on the basis of an ‘assumption of a benign 
                                            
134 This respondent made frequent reference to his aversion for pornography and his determination 
to prevent access to it. 
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organisational culture that was not out to spy on staff’ (Prior, 2001).  However, in 
parallel with statements made by respondents in the current study, Prior observes 
that increased employee surveillance tends towards a deleterious effect on trust 
and results in the deterioration of working relationships.   
 
It was apparent that these examples of policy-making at Institution C could not be 
considered to fit the ideal of the ‘rational actor’.  They were based on imperfect 
knowledge; there was a lack of consideration given to all possible alternative 
modes of action; and there was an uncertain internal and external environment.  
When considering the case of this institution, the policy-making process appeared 
to align more closely with that of the ‘bureaucratic imperative’ (Burger, 1993; 
Rowlands and Turner, 1997; Turner, 1999), as outlined in fig.1.2 on p.31.  This 
model has been described as decision-making that aims towards rationality, but 
that is impeded by the intervention of powerful organisational factors (Rowlands 
and Turner, 1997) and that is rules-governed (Burger, 1993).  The policy confusion 
and lack of coherence or agreement between policies and policy actors, with a 
powerful impact on policy exerted by a small number of key actors, meanwhile 
was more characteristic of aspects of the ‘garbage can’ approach to policy-making.    
 
5.6 Institutional policy formulation – conclusions 
 
Although the picture of policy-making with regard to the regulation of Internet use 
demonstrated very different characteristics at each of the three case-study sites, it 
was apparent that all three institutions recognised a need to ‘do something’ about 
the use of network facilities.  In part, this was a response to externally imposed 
constraints, such as the JANET AUP and relevant legislation, but it was also the 
result of concerns with the protection of institutional reputations, with the 
maintenance of a ‘decent’ and harassment-free working and learning environment, 
with the use of limited bandwidth capacity and with the potential for employees to 
‘waste’ work time by engaging in personal use of the Internet. 
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It was apparent that measures taken to control Internet use were not without 
adverse consequences on the freedom of academic enquiry.  This was true even in 
Institution B, where considerable efforts had been made to minimise this impact 
through a reliance on carefully drafted self-regulatory policy measures rather than 
through the imposition of technical constraints on access.  Moreover, whatever 
measures were in place at each of the institutions, the occurrence of serious 
instances of misuse of online access had not been entirely prevented.  At best, it 
could be argued that the evidence suggests that by having well-defined and 
disseminated policies in place, institutions are in a stronger position to protect 
themselves in the event of such instances occurring.   
 
With regard to the different approaches taken by the three institutions, these 
appeared to be an accurate reflection of the maturity and self-confidence of each of 
the institutions.  Thus, the least consistent and developed position was taken by the 
University College (Institution A), which was also the institution that had made the 
least provision for the protection of academic freedom.  Although it had drafted 
some rules governing the use of computer networks, these were not actively 
promoted and decisions relating to Internet access were being made by the 
Network Administrator with no institutional back-up or transparency in the 
decision-making process.   The picture was one of a relative ‘policy vacuum’, with 
a lack of consistent policy and a low priority having been given to the issue. 
 
The post-1992 University (Institution C), which identified itself as being a ‘not 
very self-confident’ institution, evidenced a somewhat more developed and 
consistent approach, albeit one that was very top-down and that placed a high 
degree of reliance on the use of an externally sourced solution.  Although some 
recognition was given to the importance of protecting academic freedom, there 
was evidence to suggest that the imposition of technical constraints were acting as 
an inhibitory force on academic enquiry.  Policies had been developed without 
consultation with academic staff, and they were not well communicated.  At the 
same time, network personnel were actively engaged in playing the role of 
‘policemen’, and appeared to enjoy a high level of autonomy and power in this 
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role.  The multiplicity of policy documents lacking in coherency or consistency 
could arguably best be described as  ‘policy confusion’. 
 
The more mature and secure pre-1992 University (Institution B) afforded a much 
higher level of importance to issues of academic freedom, even though they also 
accorded a high place on the policy agenda to issues relating to the misuse of 
online services.  They placed their reliance on well-developed and promoted 
policies, drafted in full consultation with academic personnel rather than on the 
imposition of technical restraints.  There appeared to be a much higher level of 
awareness and acceptance of the policies and an overall policy coherence.  
Nevertheless, as will be illustrated in the next chapter relating to student use of 
online facilities, this reliance had not prevented misuse of these facilities.   
 
At all three institutions, there was evidence of a significant shift in power relations 
away from academic staff and towards technical and managerial staff, who were 
seen to be able to exercise control over the sources of information to which the 
academic staff had access.  This was most explicit in Institution C as a result of the 
use of technical constraints imposing a need to request the unblocking of sites 
from technical staff.  However, in all three institutions, it was apparent that the 
ability of technical staff to monitor use of online resources was exerting a 
‘chilling’ effect on individual use of such resources. 
 
The next chapter will discuss student use of the Internet in the three institutions 
and their attitudes towards measures aimed at regulating this use.  The findings of 
the questionnaire survey will be presented, and discussed briefly.  Chapter Seven 
will be devoted to a full discussion of the combined implications of the findings of 
the case studies, the student questionnaires and the policy monitoring. 
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CHAPTER SIX: STUDENT USE – AND ABUSE – OF UNIVERSITY 
COMPUTER NETWORK FACILITIES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The findings of the institutional case studies were supported by results from the 
questionnaire survey used to investigate students’ use of computer networks, and 
their attitudes towards such use, at the three case study sites.  The use of the 
questionnaire was intended to supplement the data collected from the case study 
research, which had thus far concentrated primarily on policy-making, 
implementation and impact from the perspective of staff at each of the institutions.  
Specifically, the questionnaire135 was intended as an instrument to gather data on 
 
• What use students in the three institutions were making of network 
facilities; 
• What level of awareness they demonstrated towards institutional policies 
and regulations governing computer network use; 
• Whether they were aware of any blocking, filtering or monitoring of their 
network use; 
• Whether they had experienced offence as a result of other students’ use of 
network facilities. 
 
In addition, the questionnaire was used to explore students’ attitudes towards 
 
• Institutional filtering and monitoring of their Web and email use; 
• Measures to protect their privacy in the online environment; 
• Their expectations of the ability of students to bypass institutional controls 
on computer use; 
                                            
135 A copy of the questionnaire is included as Appendix Four. 
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• Their expectations of their own rights to impose controls on network use if 
they had responsibility for University network services; 
• The rights of the Government to monitor email and web use in the interests 
of national defence and security. 
 
These questions were intended to provide an insight into the effectiveness of the 
policy measures in place at the three institutions, and to determine what impact, if 
any, these measures were having on actual network use.  They were also intended 
to explore students’ experiences of, and reactions towards, measures intended to 
regulate their use of network facilities.  The nature of the research question to be 
addressed, and constraints on the scale of the survey, meant that it was not 
intended that the data should provide a generalisable picture of students’ 
experiences either across the sector or within the institutions concerned.  The 
categorical and nominal characteristics of the data, and the variation in the size and 
composition of the sample groups, meant that it was not considered appropriate to 
make use of parametric statistical techniques to analyse the relationship between 
the different variables in the study.  However, it was anticipated that the study 
would supplement the data obtained via the case studies by illustrating aspects of 
the impact of specific policy measures on a particular student group within each 
institution.  
 
6.2 A note on methodology 
 
The principles behind the design and administration of the survey questionnaire 
have been outlined in Chapter Two (Methods Adopted), and so will not be 
discussed in detail at this point.  It would, however, be appropriate here to provide 
some context to the circumstances in which the survey data was collected.  As it 
had been decided that the most effective means of administering the questionnaire 
was within a formal classroom setting, the number of respondents in each 
institution varied quite considerably, as did the composition of the student groups 
with regard to variables such as gender.  The administration of the questionnaire 
within a classroom context did ensure that a high response rate was achieved, and 
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therefore the problems of bias associated with self-selected samples were avoided 
(Denscombe, 1998, pp.20-21; Moser and Kalton, 1971, pp.166-169; Harvey and 
MacDonald, p.126).  The use of a purposive sample in a classroom setting enabled 
a response rate of 100% to be achieved (174 respondents in total), although a few 
students did elect to leave some questions unanswered.  In order to collect the data 
during the course of a tuition session it was necessary to gain the co-operation of a 
member of academic staff in each of the institutions, and the researcher therefore 
made use of existing academic contacts within each of the institutions when 
selecting samples. Groups studying subjects with some relevance to the research 
topic were chosen, so that the member of academic staff was also able to use the 
exercise as an educational input for the students.   
 
The student groups were as follows: 
 
INSTITUTION A: Data was obtained from 27 final year undergraduate students 
taking a BSc in Computer Science.  The questionnaire was administered in the 
course of a session on research methods. 
INSTITUTION B: Data was obtained from a total of 129 second and final year 
undergraduate students.  The group included students taking a BSc in Computer 
Science, a BSc in Computing and Management and a BSc in Information 
Management and Computing.  The questionnaire was administered to students 
taking a module in Information Ethics. 
INSTITUTION C: Data was obtained from 17 final year undergraduate students 
taking a BA in Public Administration and Managerial Studies.  The questionnaire 
was administered to students taking a module in Democracy in the Electronic Age.  
In addition, one PhD student had also been invited to attend this particular session, 
and completed the questionnaire. 
 
A more detailed breakdown of data on the composition of student respondent 
groups with regard to courses, cohorts, age and gender is provided in tables 6.1 – 
6.4. 
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Table 6.1: Student course information 
Institution   Frequency Percent
Institution A BSc Computing/Comp Science/Comp Eng 
 
27 100.0
Institution B BSc Computing/Comp Science/Comp Eng 50 38.8
  BSc Comp & Man 54 41.9
  BSc Comp & Info Man 8 6.2
  Not stated 17 13.2
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C BA Public Admin & Managerial Studies 
 
18 100.0
 
Table 6.2: Student cohort information 
Institution   Frequency Percent
Institution A Final 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Second 55 42.6
  Final 65 50.4
  Not stated 9 7.0
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Final 17 94.4
  Post Graduate 1 5.6
  Total 
 
18 100.0
 
Table 6.3: Age of student respondents 
Institution   Frequency Percent
Institution A Under 25 20 74.1
  25 or over 5 18.5
  Not stated 2 7.4
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Under 25 115 89.1
  25 or over 4 3.1
  Not stated 10 7.8
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Under 25 14 77.8
  25 or over 2 11.1
  Not stated 2 11.1
  Total 
 
18 100.0
 
 240
 
Table 6.4: Gender of student respondents 
Institution   Frequency Percent
Institution A Male 21 77.8
  Female 5 18.5
  Not stated 1 3.7
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Male 105 81.4
  Female 15 11.6
  Not stated 9 7.0
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Male  4 22.2
  Female  13 72.2
  Not stated  1 5.6
  Total 
 
18 100.0
All institutions Male 130 74.7
 Female 33 19.0
 Not stated 11 6.3
 Total 
 
174 100
 
From these tables it can be seen that the majority of students were taking 
programmes with a strong computing element: the exception to this is in 
Institution C, but even here the students surveyed were those who had elected to 
take a module on electronic democracy.  This was also the only institution where 
the sample group had a higher percentage of female to male respondents (72.2% of 
those stating gender): in Institutions A and B a significantly higher percentage of 
respondents were male (77.8% and 81.4% respectively of those stating gender). It 
can also be seen that all students were at undergraduate Level Two or above at the 
time of the field work: this was a deliberate sampling choice on the part of the 
researcher, to ensure that they had had spent sufficient time at the institution to 
have gained experience with institutional computing facilities and an awareness of 
any conditions of use of these facilities.  The majority of students were under 25 
years of age, although the sample group at Institution A did include a higher than 
average proportion of older students.    
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It is to be expected that the composition of the student groups will have exerted a 
considerable impact on their computer and network use.  In particular it is possible 
that students undertaking programmes in computer science will be more able and 
inclined to engage in activities such as hacking and other misuse of facilities that 
requires sophisticated computing skills than students of other disciplines.  It is also 
possible that in Institutions A and B the higher proportions of male student 
respondents may have impacted on the numbers of students reporting using 
University computing facilities to access pornography.  Therefore, no attempts 
have been made to extrapolate from this data a picture of general student computer 
use across the institutions.  However, the data obtained from the survey did enable 
the researcher to determine whether or not a proportion of the students at each 
institution are engaging in some form of ‘unacceptable’ use of network facilities.   
 
The SPSS statistical analysis computer package was used to collate and analyse 
the data.  Although this package is suited to the conduct of more sophisticated data 
analysis using parametric statistical tests, its use was chosen for this study on the 
grounds of its reliability for analysis purposes, and its ability to produce a range of 
useful and informative statistical tables.  It also provides the researcher with a 
dataset that could be further manipulated in the future to extend the research 
beyond the current study.   The findings are presented on a cross-case basis in 
order to facilitate a comparison between the institutions.   
 
6.3 Findings 
6.3.1 Student use of computing facilities 
 
Students were asked whether they used University computing facilities to access 
email or the World Wide Web to assist with their academic work, for social or 
personal use, to assist with paid employment or business that is unrelated to their 
studies, or for any other purposes (Q.1).  In addition to the pre-defined categories 
the ‘other purposes’ responses resulted in the creation of three further categories 
for analysis purposes: these were to host a website; to research career information 
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or to assist with job-hunting; and to assist with voluntary work.  The results for the 
three institutions are shown in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5: Student’s purposes for use of University network facilities 
Use of computers Institution A Institution B Institution C Cumulative 
Total 
Assist with 
academic work 
26 (96.3%) 129 (100%) 18 (100%) 173 
(99.4%)
Social/ personal 
use 
25 (92.6%) 129 (100%) 18 (100%) 172 
(98.9%)
Paid employment/ 
business 
8 (29.6%) 63 (48.8%) 3 (16.7%) 74 
(42.5%)
Career/ Job search 
information 
0 (0%) 2 (1.6%) 1 (5.6%) 3 
(5.6%)
Website hosting 
 
0 (0%) 2 (1.6%) 0 (0%) 2 
(1.1%)
Voluntary work 
 
0 (0%) 2 (1.6%) 0 (0%) 2 
(1.1%)
Other purposes  
 
0 (0%) 1 (0.8%) 0 (0%)  1 
(0.6%)
 
All of the students reported that they do use email and the Web; only one student 
(at Institution A) made no use of University computing facilities in order to do so.  
It is clear from table 6.5 that only a very small minority of students (two, both at 
Institution A) did not use the University network facilities for social and personal 
purposes, in addition to academic use: thus, overall 98.9% of respondents were 
engaging in non-academic or study-related use of University network facilities.  
Furthermore, almost half of the respondents from Institution B (48.8%) were 
making use of these for the purposes of paid employment or business that was not 
connected with their studies.  This proportion was lower in the other two 
institutions, at 29.6% for Institution A and 16.7% for Institution C, but 
nevertheless was still significant. 
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In order to collect more detailed information on the specific nature of students’ 
non-academic use of University computing facilities, they were asked whether 
other than for purposes related to their studies they had ever used University 
computing facilities for access to a range of specified content (Q.5).  This content 
included sites related to their hobbies and interests; shopping sites; political 
material of an extreme nature; and pornography. One student at Institution B and 
one at Institution C responded that they had not used University computing 
facilities for access to any of these forms of content.  In addition, two students (one 
at each of Institution A and Institution B) did not provide an answer to Q.5 at all.  
All of the remaining respondents had accessed at least one of these categories of 
content.  The results are shown in Tables 6.6 – 6.10. 
 
Table 6.6: Students reporting use of University computing facilities for access to 
sites related to hobbies and interests 
Institution  Hobbies and 
Interests? 
Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 26 96.3
  No 1 3.7
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 124 96.1
  No 5 3.9
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 17 94.4
  No 1 5.6
  Total 
 
18 100.0
Total Institutions Yes 167 96.0
 No 7 4.0
 Total 
 
174 100.0
 
Table 6.6 demonstrates that these students did make use of University computing 
facilities to gain access to Web content related to their hobbies and interests.  A 
few even took the trouble to let the researcher know which sites they favoured (for 
example, Manchester City Football Club at www.mcfc.co.uk!).  Although use in 
this context was marginally lower at Institution C, this difference was not found to 
be statistically significant. 
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Table 6.7: Students reporting use of University computing facilities for access to 
shopping sites 
Institution  Shopping sites? 
 
Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 21 77.8
  No 6 22.2
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 120 93.0
  No 9 7.0
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 11 61.1
  No 7 38.9
  Total 
 
18 100.0
Total Institutions Yes 152 87.4
 No 22 12.6
 Total 
 
174 100.0
 
The use of University computing facilities to access e-commerce sites was also 
very popular with students, particularly in Institution B where 93% of students had 
engaged in this practice.  The proportion at Institution C (61.1%) appears to be 
significantly lower, but without further investigation it would not be possible to 
attribute a definitive causal factor for this.  While it may be a result of the 
implementation of filtering software within the institution, it is also possible that 
students of computing have higher confidence levels with regard to e-commerce.  
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Table 6.8: Students reporting use of University computing facilities for access to 
games or gambling sites 
Institution  Games or gambling 
sites? 
Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 15 55.6
  No 12 44.4
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 88 68.2
  No 41 31.8
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 2 11.1
  No 16 88.9
  Total 
 
18 100.0
Total Institutions Yes 105 60.3
 No 69 39.7
 Total 
 
174 100.0
 
Again, use by students of University computing facilities for access to games or 
gambling sites was highest in Institution B at 68.2%. While the difference between 
this percentage and that reported at Institution C (11.1%) is particularly high, there 
is insufficient evidence to attribute causation to any single factor.   
 
Table 6.9: Students reporting use of University computing facilities for access to 
pornography 
Institution 
 
 Access to 
Pornography? 
Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 4 14.8
  No 23 85.2
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 46 35.7
  No 83 64.3
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 0 0.0
 No 18 100.0
 Total 
 
18 100.0
Total Institutions Yes 50 28.7
 No 124 71.3
 Total 
 
174 100.0
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Despite the policy emphasis placed by institutions on the prevention of access to 
pornography, the results of this study suggest that levels of this form of computer 
misuse is currently less prevalent among students than other forms of misuse.  The 
results indicated that a much greater proportion of students engage in activities 
such as file sharing and music or software piracy (see Table 6.11 below).  It is, of 
course, possible that this indicates the success of measures that have been adopted 
to curtail access to pornography, or that students were inhibited about 
acknowledging their use of such material but did not attach the same stigma to 
admitting engaging in activities such as copyright infringement.  This may have 
led to a significant underreporting of access to pornography.  However, the 
students were given strong assurances of anonymity and confidentiality and did 
not appear to be concerned about acknowledging their participation in other 
activities that they recognised as being in contravention of University policies or 
even in contravention of current legislation.   
 
Gender may also have impacted on the responses to this question, with the highest 
levels of use of University computers to access pornography being reported in the 
respondent group with the highest male-female ratio (at Institution B).  None of 
the female respondents in any of the institutions acknowledged accessing 
pornography via university computer facilities, in contrast to an overall statistic of 
36.2% of male respondents.  This zero-rating from female respondents contrasts 
with other studies, such as research carried out by Nielsen in September 2003 that 
reported that 29% of adult site visitors were female (Nielsen, 2003).  It may be that 
females are more inhibited about acknowledging their use of university facilities 
for accessing pornography.  The fact that residential halls’ bedrooms are provided 
with network access may also have influenced the level of access to pornography 
at Institution B, with students more inclined to access such content in a private 
space. It is interesting to note that Institution C reported a zero level of access to 
pornography: this might suggest that the use of filtering software is very effective 
in this respect (either through preventing or through inhibiting access).  However, 
it is also possible that the combined impact of a high female-male ratio in the 
sample group and a small sample size led to these findings. 
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Table 6.10: Students reporting use of University computing facilities for access to 
political material of an extreme nature 
Institution 
 
 Extremist material? Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 5 18.5
  No 22 81.5
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 23 17.8
  No 106 82.2
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 3 16.7
  No 15 83.3
  Total 
 
18 100.0
Total Institutions Yes 31  17.8
 No 143 82.2
 Total 
 
174 100.0
 
Positive responses to this aspect of content access were relatively even across the 
institutions, ranging from a low of 16.7% at Institution C through to a high of 
18.5% at Institution A (with a mean of 17.8% across all three institutions).  The 
respondents were not asked to provide further information about the specific 
nature of this content.  Although levels of access to this form of content were 
considerably lower than for the other categories of content investigated in Q.5, the 
findings do suggest that a significant minority of students are using University 
facilities to explore politically extreme material on the Internet for purposes 
unrelated to their studies (see p.241). 
 
The students were then further challenged with another question (Q.6) that asked 
them whether or not they had ever used University computing facilities for other 
specific purposes, such as to download or pass on software or music in 
contravention of copyright or licensing restrictions; to engage in hacking; to send 
hostile email messages; or to access material that they thought might be illegal.  
Despite the fact that they were being questioned about potentially illegal use of 
computing facilities, only two students (one at Institution A and another at 
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Institution B) provided no response to this question.  The remaining responses are 
shown in tables 6.11 – 6.17. 
 
Table 6.11: Students reporting use of University computing facilities to download 
or pass on software or music 
Institution 
 
 Download software 
or music? 
Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 13 48.1
  No 14 51.9
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 100 77.5
  No 29 22.5
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 5 27.8
  No 13 72.2
  Total 
 
18 100.0
Total Institutions Yes 118 67.8
 No 56 32.2
 Total 
 
174 100.0
 
The number of students admitting that they had used University computing 
facilities to download or pass on software or music, even if doing so breached 
copyright or licensing restrictions, was significant in all three institutions. The 
mean across all three institutions amounted to 67.8% of respondents (n = 118), 
with a high of 77.5% (n = 100) at Institution B.  This mean of 67.8% corresponds 
closely to the findings of Oppenheim and Robinson (2003), who used a 
questionnaire to explore the use by Loughborough University students of online 
music file sharing services. In their study, 66% of student respondents 
acknowledged downloading music from the Internet.   
 
These findings support concerns expressed by the British Phonographic Industry 
(BPI) about the scale of activity in UK Colleges and Universities with regard to 
downloading and sharing of music files, while reports carried out by universities 
themselves suggest that more than 50% of UK universities’ Internet capability is 
used for illegal file sharing (Sherwin, 2003).  Indeed, the BPI has announced that it 
 249
intends to prosecute universities that allow students to use their computer networks 
to copy music over the Internet, believing that universities are responsible for 
‘producing a generation of fans who believe that music is a commodity available 
free of charge’ (Ibid).  The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
(IFPI) has also threatened legal action in response to reports that 9.4 million 
Europeans visited the Kazaa site in October 2003 (Teather, 2003).  However, the 
impact of file sharing on the music industry is not simple to determine: the 
research by Oppenheim and Robinson cited earlier suggested that students who 
downloaded the most music were also those who spent the most on purchasing 
music.  Moreover, their interviews with the owners of record stores suggested that 
online file sharing was not having a detrimental effect on their sales. 
 
There appears to be a strong gender bias with regard to file-sharing and music 
downloading activity, with 77.7% of male respondents across all three institutions 
acknowledging that they had engaged in this particular activity in comparison with 
only 24.2% of female respondents.  Oppenheim and Robinson (op cit) also found a 
strong age bias, with none of their respondents over the age of 26 claiming to 
download music. 
 
Table 6.12: Students reporting use of University computing facilities to access 
illegal content 
Institution 
 
 Access illegal 
content? 
Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 5 18.5
  No 22 81.5
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 54 41.9
  No 75 58.1
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 2 11.1
  No 16 88.9
  Total 
 
18 100.0
Total Institutions Yes 61 35.1
 No 113 64.9
 Total 
 
174 100.0
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As part of Q.6 students were asked whether they had ever used university 
computing facilities to ‘access material that you think might be illegal’.  The 
figures in the table 6.12 indicating their responses to this question have to be 
interpreted with caution.  Because students who had engaged in music 
downloading and file sharing were often aware of the illegal nature of this activity, 
some of them responded positively to the question on access to illegal content on 
account of these activities136.  Therefore, it is to be anticipated that there was 
duplication between the two categories, and a positive response to the question on 
access to illegal content does not necessarily indicate access to other categories of 
illegal material such as child pornography or other obscene content.  In fact, there 
were only three cases (one at each Institution) where the respondent had not 
engaged in file sharing or music downloading, but declared that they had accessed 
illegal content.   
 
It would have been illuminating to have asked respondents about the nature of the 
illegal content accessed, but such a question was considered to be too threatening 
and intrusive to respondents to provoke an honest disclosure.  At the very least, the 
statistics do show a relatively relaxed approach on the part of a substantial 
proportion of these students towards the access of illegal content, with 35.1% of 
respondents disclosing that they have accessed illegal content via University 
computing facilities. 
                                            
136 In some cases, they had written comments in response to the question ‘Have you ever used 
University computing facilities for access to material that you think might be illegal?’, such as ‘yes, 
for music downloading’.   
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Table 6.13: Students reporting use of University computing facilities to send 
hostile email messages 
Institution 
 
 Send hostile email 
messages? 
Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 3 11.1
  No 24 88.9
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 18 14.0
  No 111 86.0
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 5 27.8
  No 13 72.2
  Total 
 
18 100.0
Total Institutions Yes 26 14.9
 No 148 85.1
 Total 
 
174 100.0
 
Again, the data on students sending hostile emails have to be interpreted with 
caution, as the findings are reliant on the students’ own definition of what 
constitutes an ‘email message that could be interpreted as hostile’ (the wording of 
Q.6).  This wording was a conscious decision on the part of the researcher, as it 
was considered that it was the intention on the part of the sender to cause offence 
or intimidation that was important.  However, this does not permit a scientific 
measure of ‘hostility’ and does not provide an insight into the seriousness (or 
otherwise) of the level of intended or actual abuse.   
 
It was considered possible that the gender profile of respondents might have 
impacted on the results to this question.  Respondents at Institution C, where the 
sample had a strong female-male bias, were significantly more likely to report 
engaging in this activity.  However, such an impact is not borne out by further 
analysis of the data: in fact, across the study male students were marginally more 
likely to report sending hostile emails than were females: 
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Table 6.14: Students reporting use of University computer facilities to send hostile 
emails, by gender 
Gender 
 
 Send hostile email 
messages? 
Frequency Percent
Male Yes 22 16.9
  No 108 83.1
  Total  
 
130 100.0
Female Yes  4 12.1
  No  29 87.9
  Total 
  
33 100.0
Not Stated No 
 
11 100.0
 
As can be seen, across the three institutions 16.9% of male respondents 
acknowledged sending hostile emails, compared with 12.1% of female 
respondents.  However, one should not read too much into these figures: as noted 
earlier, the statistics are based on self-reporting and it may be that males are more 
ready to admit to such activity.  Alternatively, females may have a different 
perception of what constitutes a ‘hostile email’.  It is, nevertheless, clear, that a 
proportion of students have used University computing to knowingly send hostile 
emails, in breach of University policies, and that this was more widespread among 
respondents at Institution C than at the other two Institutions. 
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Table 6.15: Students reporting use of University computing facilities to engage in 
recreational hacking activities 
Institution 
 
 Recreational 
hacking? 
Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 3 11.1
  No 24 88.9
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 15 11.6
  No 114 88.4
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 0 0.0
 No 18 100.0
 Total 
 
18 100.0
Total Institutions Yes 18 10.3
 No 156 89.7
 Total 
 
174 100.0
 
With regard to hacking, the proportion of respondents at Institutions A and B 
acknowledging that they had used University computing facilities to engage in 
‘recreational’ hacking was similar (between 11.1% and 11.6%), with no 
statistically significant difference between the two institutions.  However, no 
respondents at Institution C acknowledged such use; it is possible that this can be 
explained by the fact that respondents at Institutions A and B were taking 
programmes in Computing, whereas the respondents at Institution C were studying 
Public Administration and Management.  Another factor influencing this 
difference may also have been gender: whereas 12.3% of males across the study 
reported engaging in hacking, none of the female respondents claimed to have 
done so.  The question was deliberately phrased using the term ‘recreational 
hacking’ in order to include, and encourage honesty among, those students who 
were engaging in hacking to ‘test out’ their knowledge and skills, but who had not 
done so in order to gain financial or other advantage. 
 
Two male respondents, one each at Institutions A and B, had not answered Q.6 at 
all – all other respondents had either indicated a positive response to one or more 
of the suggested categories of use, or had declared that they had not made any such 
 254
use.  Statistics for respondents claiming never to have used University computing 
facilities for any of the activities stated in Q.6137 are presented in Tables 6.16 and 
6.17. 
 
Table 6.16: Students reporting no use of University computing facilities for any of 
these activities 
Institution 
 
Frequency Percent
Institution A 
 
12 44.4
Institution B 
 
27 20.9
Institution C 
 
11 61.1
Total across 
Institutions 
 
50 28.7
 
These figures are also represented in Table 6.17, broken down by gender. 
 
Table 6.17: Students reporting no use of University computing facilities for any of 
these activities, by gender 
Gender 
 
Frequency Percent
Male 
 
24 18.5
Female 
 
24 72.7
N/S 
 
2 18.2
 
Overall, it would appear that levels of the more serious misuse of University 
computing facilities did appear to be significantly higher among male respondents, 
and among respondents in Institution B in particular.  It would be inappropriate to 
attribute a causal factor to this higher reported level of misuse at the Institution, 
but possible factors could include the networking of residential halls; the higher 
level of computing skills among the respondent group at this institution; the high 
                                            
137 To download or pass on software or music in breach of copyright or licensing restrictions; for 
recreational hacking; to send hostile email messages; or to access illegal material. 
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male-female ratio of the respondent group (81.4% of respondents were male); or 
the effect of institutional approaches to the regulation of network use.  
Determining whether this level of misuse is replicated among other student groups 
in the institution, and which factors have had the strongest influence on levels of 
misuse, could provide an interesting and informative area for further study. 
 
6.3.2 Students’ experience of offence as a result of other Internet users 
 
Q.7 asked respondents whether or not they had ever been offended by, or felt 
uncomfortable as a result of, Web content that they had witnessed other users 
accessing on University computers.  The question was carefully worded in order 
that they should respond according to their own experience of feeling offence; they 
were not asked simply to state whether or not they had witnessed other users 
accessing offensive content, as it was felt that the subjective nature of the 
definition of ‘offensive’ would result in a statistically meaningless response.  
Worded as it was, it was considered that this question was a reliable means of 
producing meaningful data in answer to the question of whether students had 
actually experienced offence or discomfort.  The results are presented in Table 
6.18. 
 256
Table 6.18: Students reporting having ever been offended by, or felt uncomfortable 
as a result of, Web content that they had witnessed other users accessing on 
University computers 
Institution  Offence? 
 
Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 6 22.2
  No 21 77.8
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 31 24.0
  No 94 72.9
  Not Stated 4 3.1
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 3 16.7
  No 15 83.3
  Total 
 
18 100.0
Total Institutions Yes 40 23.0
 No 130 74.7
 Not stated 4 2.3
 Total 
 
174 100.0
 
It can be seen that across the three institutions, almost one in four students (23%) 
did report having experienced some offence or discomfort as a result of Web 
content that they had witnessed other users accessing on University computing 
facilities.  The proportion of students reporting this offence or discomfort at 
Institutions A and B was very similar, at 22.2% and 24% respectively, but was 
somewhat lower at 16.7% in Institution C.  This may be a result of the 
implementation of the filtering software (although all three students at Institution 
C who had experienced offence or discomfort reported that this was on account of 
pornographic content, which the filtering software is intended to block).   
 
Although the research questions did not focus on gender differences with regard to 
computer use, it is nevertheless interesting to note that common assumptions that 
measures to control access to computer-based pornography are needed primarily in 
order to protect females from experiencing offence did not appear to be supported 
by the results of this study.  Table 6.19 shows that, of respondents from all three 
institutions, 24.6% of male respondents reported experiencing offence or 
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discomfort, in comparison with only 12.1% of female respondents.  While the 
smaller number of female respondents may have led to a statistically unreliable 
figure, it is also possible that the ‘laddish’ culture in which the males find 
themselves means that they feel less able to shy away from content that they find 
objectionable.  This, again, is another area in which a larger scale study could 
provide insights. 
 
Table 6.19: Respondents reporting having ever been offended by, or felt 
uncomfortable as a result of, Web content that they had witnessed other users 
accessing on University computers, by gender 
Gender 
 
 Offence? Frequency Percent
Male Yes 32 24.6
  No 95 73.1
  Not Stated 3 2.3
  Total 
 
130 100.0
Female Yes 4 12.1
  No 29 87.9
  Total 
 
33 100.0
N/S Yes 4 36.4
  No 6 54.5
  Not Stated 1 9.1
Total 
 
11 100.0
 
With regard to the nature of the content causing offence, all those who had 
responded positively to Q.7 were then asked an open-ended question concerning 
the content that had caused them offence or discomfort.  The responses provided 
were grouped into categories, as shown in Table 6.20.  In view of the relatively 
small number of respondents (n = 40), and the similarity of responses across the 
institutions to this question, the results are shown collated for all three institutions. 
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Table 6.20: Nature of content causing offence or discomfort 
 Nature of content 
 
Frequency Percent
Pornography / hard 
core pornography 
 
13 32.5
Violence / dead 
bodies 
 
7 17.5
Bestiality 
 
6 15.0
Racism / extremism 
/ Nazi sites 
 
 2 5.0
Child pornography 
 
1 2.5
Animal abuse / 
cruelty to animals 
 
1 2.5
Abuse of email 
 
1 2.5
Other 
 
2 5.0
N/S 
 
7 17.5
Total  
 
40 100.0
 
If the responses for pornography, child pornography, and bestiality are taken 
together, they represent 50% of all positive responses, suggesting that 
pornographic content of one sort or another does indeed cause more offence than 
any other category of content.   However, an unanticipated form of content that 
was cited by seven respondents was that of sites showing dead or mutilated bodies: 
a couple of these respondents even cited the address of the site that they had 
encountered138.  One of the respondents who had declined to answer this question 
had written ‘Too horrible to mention’ on his questionnaire. 
 
 
 
                                            
138 <http://www.rotten.com> 
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6.3.3 Students’ awareness of University Internet policies 
 
In an open-ended question (Q.2) respondents were asked ‘What University policies 
and/or regulations are you aware of relating to computer use?’  The question was 
posed as an open-ended question in order not to lead respondents.  However, 
whereas it had been anticipated that respondents would name specific policies (e.g. 
University Acceptable Use Policy), in reality most respondents answered by 
stating specific actions or forms of content that were prohibited (e.g. no spamming, 
no pornography).  The breadth of these responses led to the creation of a large 
number of response categories.  The results are presented overleaf in Table 6.21. 
 
The table needs some explanation and should be interpreted with caution.  Firstly, 
it should be noted that respondents could name as many different policies as they 
chose.  Secondly, the open-ended nature of the question meant that respondents 
mentioned those policies or regulations that occurred to them spontaneously: the 
fact that an individual respondent did not mention a particular policy or regulation 
does not necessarily mean that on prompting they would not have acknowledged 
awareness of its existence.  It also meant that respondents chose their own way of 
expressing any particular restriction: thus, whereas one respondent may have used 
the words ‘no offensive use’ or ‘no illegal use’ to refer to their awareness of the 
AUP, another may have given the name of the actual policy.   
 
A final point concerns the last two categories, that is ‘Not aware of any policies’ 
and ‘No answer to question’.  The first of these categories relates to those 
respondents who specifically noted that they were not aware of any policies; the 
second relates to those who had left this question blank.  It is possible that some of 
those who had left the section blank did so precisely because they were not aware 
of any policies or regulations.  However, it was not considered that making this 
assumption constituted a reliable interpretation of the data, and therefore the use of 
two separate categories was preferred.  It is therefore possible that the number of 
respondents who were not aware of any policies was higher than the figure for the 
penultimate category suggests. 
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Table 6.21: Students’ awareness of University policies and/or regulations relating to computer use 
 Institution A Institution B Institution C All 
Institutions 
No pornography/ 
Comp.Porn.Policy 
 
2 (7.4%) 66 (51.2%) 5 (27.8%) 73 (42%) 
(University) AUP 
 
0 (0%) 39 (30.2%) 0 (0%) 39 (22.4%) 
Copyright / no file sharing/ no 
music downloading 
 
1 (3.7%) 27 (20.9%) 3 (16.7%) 31 (17.8%) 
No hacking 
 
 0 (0%) 22 (17.1%) 0 (0%) 22 (12.6%) 
No spamming 
 
  0 (0%) 15 (11.6%) 0 (0%) 15 (8.6%) 
Netiquette / Email policy 
 
  1 (3.7%) 12 (9.3%) 1 (5.6%) 14 (8.0%) 
No illegal use 
 
  3 (11.1%) 9 (7.0%) 2 (11.1%) 14 (8.0%) 
No offensive use   5 (18.5%) 7 (5.4%) 0 (0%) 12 (6.9%) 
 
No personal use 
 
 2 (7.4%) 8 (6.2%) 0 (0%) 10 (5.7%) 
No chat / MSN messaging139 
 
4 (14.8%) 0 (0%) 5 (27.8%) 9 (5.2%) 
Legislation / DPA140/ CMA141 
 
0 (0%) 5 (3.9%) 3 (16.7%) 8 (4.6%) 
No games 
 
0 (0%) 5 (3.9%) 2 (11.1%) 7 (4.0%) 
No server provision / website 
hosting 
 
0 (0%) 6 (4.7%) 0 (0%) 6 (3.4%) 
Email / web use is monitored 
 
1 (3.7%) 2 (1.6%) 0 (0%) 3 (1.7%) 
Websites are filtered / blocked 
 
0 (0%) 1 (0.8%) 2 (11.1%) 3 (1.7%) 
Janet AUP 
 
0 (0%) 2 (1.6%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.1%) 
Hall Network Policy 
 
N/A 2 (1.6%) N/A 2 (1.1%) 
University Security Policy 
 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (5.6%) 1 (0.6%) 
Other policies 
 
4 (14.8%) 8 (6.2%) 4 (22.2%) 16 (9.2%) 
Not aware of any policies 
 
7 (25.9%) 4 (3.1%) 2 (11.1%) 13 (7.5%) 
No answer to question 5 (18.5%) 7 (5.4%) 3 (16.7%) 15 (8.6%) 
                                            
139 MSN Messaging is an instant messaging service that alerts online users when other users in their 
contacts list are also online and allows for synchronous exchange of messages.   
 
140 Data Protection Act 1998 (Parliament, 1998b).   
 
141 Computer Misuse Act (Parliament, 1990).  
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Despite the identified limitations of the data, the results presented here contribute 
significantly to an understanding of the general levels of policy awareness among 
the respondent groups at the three institutions, and are consistent with the findings 
of the three institutional case studies.  At least 25.9% of respondents at Institution 
A (the University College) were not aware of any policies or regulations governing 
their use of University College computer facilities.  Given the lack of attention that 
had been paid to policy development or dissemination at the Institution, this is 
perhaps not too surprising.  Where respondents did declare an awareness of 
regulations, these were expressed in very general terms such as no offensive use, 
no illegal use, no personal use or no pornography.  The most specific restriction 
that was mentioned was ‘No chat / MSN messaging’, noted by 14.8% of 
respondents, an awareness that is most probably prompted by the actual blocking 
of such facilities at the University College. 
 
Respondents at Institution C (the post-1992 University) demonstrated a higher 
level of policy awareness: only 11.1% specifically claimed not to be aware of any 
policies or regulations.  Awareness was highest with regard to the proscription of 
pornographic sites and chat or MSN messaging – as access to these sites is 
blocked, these results are not particularly surprising.  Of all the respondent groups, 
students at Institution C were most likely to mention specific legislative 
provisions, such as the Data Protection Act (Parliament, 1998b) or the Computer 
Misuse Act (Parliament, 1990).   
 
At Institution B, the pre-1992 University, respondents showed a very high level of 
policy awareness with only 3.1% of respondents at the institution declaring a lack 
of awareness of any relevant policies.  A total of 51.2% of all respondents at this 
institution spontaneously stated that they should not access pornographic content, 
or mentioned the Computer Pornography Policy by name.  In addition, 30.2% of 
respondents made reference to the University’s AUP (whereas no respondents at 
either of the other two institutions made reference by name to the relevant 
institutional policy).  In addition, a fairly high proportion of respondents at 
Institution B (20.9%) indicated that they were aware of the fact that they should 
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abide by copyright restrictions, and should not engage in file-sharing activities.  
Respondents here also made reference to other categories of computer misuse that 
are proscribed when using University computer services: these included hacking, 
spamming, website hosting and provision of server services.  None of these 
categories of misuse were mentioned by respondents at either of the other two 
institutions.  These results are entirely consistent with the picture of an institution 
that devotes considerable time and attention to policy development and 
dissemination, and which accords a high place on the policy agenda to issues 
related to computer misuse.   
 
6.3.4 Students’ awareness of filtering and monitoring 
 
Respondents were asked whether they were aware of any blocking or filtering of 
access to websites from University computers (Q.3).  Their responses are shown in 
Table 6.22. 
 
Table 6.22: Students’ awareness of blocking or filtering of access to websites from 
University computers 
Institution  Aware of blocking/ 
filtering? 
Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 13 48.1
  No 13 48.1
  Not stated 1 3.7
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 77 59.7
  No 52 40.3
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 10 55.6
  No 8 44.4
  Total 
 
18 100.0
All Institutions Yes 100 57.5
 No 73 42.0
 Not stated 1 0.6
 Total 
 
174 100.0
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Table 6.22 shows how divided the responses to this question were in all three 
institutions.  In Institution A, opinions were shared equally between those who 
believed that access to websites was filtered or blocked: the positive responses 
appeared to be related primarily to the blocking of chat and instant messaging 
sites142.  Institution B had the highest level of positive responses to this question: 
in this case, these responses appeared to relate particularly to a recent initiative 
blocking the use of Napster and other related file-sharing sites143.  Interestingly, at 
Institution C, which had implemented institution-wide content-filtering software, 
respondents did not demonstrate a significantly higher level of awareness of the 
filtering of websites than at the other institutions, with just over half of 
respondents answering in the affirmative to this question – and 44.4% unaware of 
any filtering or blocking of access. 
 
Respondents were also asked whether or not they believed their University 
monitored email content (Q.4a) and Web use (Q.4b).  Responses indicated a high 
level of uncertainty with regard to whether or not monitoring was taking place, 
particularly with regard to the possible monitoring of email content, as shown in 
tables 6.23 and 6.24. 
                                            
142 A number of respondents had noted the blocking of these sites in their response to this question. 
 
143 Again, a number of respondents had noted the blocking of such sites. 
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Table 6.23: Does the University monitor email content? 
Institution  Monitor email? Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 4 14.8
  No 1 3.7
  Don’t know 21 77.8
  Not stated 1 3.7
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 84 65.1
  No 14 10.9
  Don’t know 31 24.0
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 2 11.1
  No 1 5.6
  Don’t know 15 83.3
  Total 
 
18 100.0
All Institutions Yes 90 51.7
 No 16 9.2
 Don’t know 67 38.5
 Not stated 1 0.6
 Total 
 
174 100.0
Table 6.24: Does the University monitor web use? 
Institution  Monitor web use? Frequency Percent
Institution A Yes 8 29.6
 No 0 0.0
  Don’t know 18 66.7
  Not stated 1 3.7
  Total 
 
27 100.0
Institution B Yes 83 64.3
  No 6 4.7
  Don’t know 40 31.0
  Total 
 
129 100.0
Institution C Yes 9 50.0
 No 0 0.0
  Don’t know 9 50.0
  Total 
 
18 100.0
All Institutions Yes 100 57.5
 No 6 3.4
 Don’t know 67 38.5
 Not stated 1 0.6
 Total 
 
174 100.0
 265
In Institution A, the majority of respondents (77.8%) stated that they did not know 
whether email content was monitored, only 14.8% were of the opinion that it was 
monitored and only one respondent was confident that it was not monitored.  
Twice as many respondents (29.6%) at the institution thought that web use was 
monitored, although the majority (66.7%) were still uncertain about this.  No 
respondents declared that they were confident that web use was not monitored.  
 
There was an even higher level of uncertainty with regard to the monitoring of 
email content at Institution C, with 83.3% of respondents declaring that they did 
not know whether this was happening, and again only one respondent stating that 
it was not monitored.   However, opinion was divided with regard to the 
monitoring of web use between those who thought that it was monitored, and those 
who declared that they did not know.  Again, no respondents stated that they were 
confident it was not monitored. 
 
Respondents at Institution B were more likely to believe that their email was being 
monitored, with 65.1% claiming that they thought it was, against 10.9% who 
thought that it was not monitored and 24% who were not sure.  A similar 
proportion of respondents to those who thought their email was being monitored 
also thought that their web use was being monitored (64.3%), although in this case 
there was also a higher level of uncertainty, with 31% declaring that they did not 
know whether this use was being monitored and only 4.7% confident that it was 
not. 
 
Overall, the picture across the institutions is one of considerable uncertainty – 
something that institutions may consider to be to their advantage – and may, 
indeed be encouraging deliberately, as was the case in the library at Institution B 
(see p.195) – this uncertainty having the potential to contribute to lower levels of 
misuse. 
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6.3.5 Students’ attitudes to the control of Internet access and use 
 
In Q.8 to Q.17 a Likert scale was used for respondents to rate their attitude towards 
a range of issues relating to the control of Internet access and use. As the statistical 
differences in responses between the institutions to the majority of these questions 
were not significant, and causal explanations for any minor differences could not 
amount to anything more than guesswork, the results are presented on a cross-case 
basis.  The exception to this is Q.17, which asked respondents about their attitude 
towards the right of the Government to monitor email or web use in the interests of 
national defence and security.  Although it is still not possible to attribute causal 
factors to any differences found, it was felt that the scale of the differences in 
response to this question did provide an insight into some significant differences in 
thinking among the three respondent groups and warranted illustration.  In addition 
to providing the table of results, the findings are shown as pie charts, as it was 
considered that this kind of data is easier to interpret and understand when 
represented in this graphic format.  Tables of figures are included to give further 
clarification of the statistical breakdown. 
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Graph 6.1 
Q.8 The University should monitor Web access
N/S
Strongly agree
Agree
Indifferent/DK
Disagree
Strongly disagree
 
  Frequency Percent
Strongly disagree 32 18.4
Disagree 59 33.9
Indifferent/Don’t know 23 13.2
Agree 53 30.5
Strongly agree 5 2.9
Not stated 2 1.1
Total 174 100.0
 
It can be seen that a majority of the respondents did not agree with the statement 
that ‘The University should monitor Web access’, with 52.3% disagreeing or 
strongly disagreeing with this statement.  This compares with 33.4% who agreed 
or strongly agreed with the statement.  A considerable proportion of respondents 
(18.4%) were in strong disagreement with the proposition. Nevertheless, the 
figures suggest that one in three students in the respondent groups considered that 
it is appropriate for the University to monitor their Web use.  This is a lower rate 
of acceptance than has been found in studies of public library users (see, for 
example, Sturges et al, 2003), but this difference could be expected in an academic 
environment with raised expectations of privacy and academic freedom. 
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Graph 6.2 
Q.9 The University should block access to offensive sites
N/S
Strongly agree
Agree
Indifferent/DK
Disagree
Strongly disagree
 
Frequency Percent
Strongly disagree 27 15.5
Disagree 49 28.2
Indifferent/Don’t know 20 11.5
Agree 56 32.2
Strongly agree 18 10.3
Not stated 4 2.3
Total 174 100.0
 
When respondents were asked their opinion on whether the University should 
block access to offensive websites, opinions were almost evenly divided between 
those who agreed or agreed strongly that it should (42.5%) and those who 
disagreed or disagreed strongly that it should do so (43.7%).  Of all respondents, 
10.3% agreed strongly with the statement that ‘The University should block access 
to offensive sites’.  It cannot therefore be assumed that students will invariably 
resent attempts to restrict their access to Internet content: these figures would 
suggest that a substantial proportion may consider that it is in their own interest, or 
is at least entirely reasonable, for the University to impose such restrictions. 
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Graph 6.3 
Q.10 The University should monitor email content
N/S
Strongly agree
Agree
Indifferent/DK
Disagree
Strongly disagree
 
Frequency Percent
Strongly disagree 78 44.8
Disagree  60 34.5
Indifferent/Don’t know  11 6.3
Agree  18 10.3
Strongly agree  3 1.7
Not stated  4 2.3
Total  174 100.0
 
However, when respondents were asked to respond to the statement that ‘The 
University should monitor email content’ the majority were strongly against 
accepting the statement.  Altogether 79.3% of respondents disagreed or disagreed 
strongly with the statement, compared with only 12% who supported it.  Of those 
who disagreed a substantial proportion felt strongly about the issue, with 44.8% of 
all respondents disagreeing strongly.  Respondents were also less likely to ‘sit on 
the fence’ in response to this statement, with only 6.3% claiming to be indifferent 
or not to know what they thought.  A number of students had added written 
comments to the effect that email correspondence deserves the same level of 
privacy protection as would be afforded paper-based correspondence.    
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Graph 6.4 
 
Q.11 There are sufficient controls in place in the University to protect my privacy online 
N/S
Strongly agree
Agree
Indifferent/DK
Disagree
Strongly disagree
 
  Frequency Percent
Strongly disagree 9 5.2
Disagree 20 11.5
Indifferent/Don’t know 88 50.6
Agree 50 28.7
Strongly agree 5 2.9
Not stated 2 1.1
Total 174 100.0
With regard to their confidence in the level of privacy protection afforded by the 
University to their online transactions, respondents evidenced a high level of 
uncertainty.  Half of all respondents (50.6%) stated that they were indifferent, or 
did not know, to the statement ‘There are sufficient controls in place in the 
University to protect my privacy online’.   It would seem highly unlikely that such 
a high proportion of students would really be indifferent to their own privacy 
protection (especially in the light of their responses to Q.10), so this would suggest 
that they are not sure of the effectiveness of measures to protect their privacy 
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online144.  Of the remaining respondents, quite a high proportion (31.6% of all 
respondents) believed that their privacy online is protected at the University.  Only 
16.7% of respondents disagreed, or strongly disagreed, with the statement. 
Graph 6.5 
Q.12 Whatever measures the University takes to control online access, some students will 
always be able to get round them 
N/S
Strongly agree
Agree
Indifferent/DK
Disagree
Strongly disagree
 
  Frequency Percent
Strongly disagree 3 1.7
Disagree 6 3.4
Indifferent/Don’t know 18 10.3
Agree 101 58.0
Strongly agree 44 25.3
Not stated 2 1.1
Total 174 100.0
 
Whatever uncertainty respondents might have felt about the effectiveness of online 
privacy protection within their Universities, they were very sure that University 
measures to control online access would always be vulnerable to students’ abilities 
to bypass them.  When asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with the 
                                            
144 In future work, the researcher would not use the same category for ‘Indifferent’ and ‘Don’t 
know’ as the implications of each of these responses may be quite different. 
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statement ‘Whatever measures the University takes to control online access, some 
students will always be able to get round them’ 83.3% of all respondents agreed, 
or strongly agreed, with the statement.  Only 5.1% actively disagreed with the 
statement.  Although this does not, of course, necessarily reflect the actual ability 
of students to bypass such controls, it certainly does suggest a culture that 
anticipates being able to circumvent measures of control. 
 
Graph 6.6 
 
Q.13 It is none of my business what measures the University takes to control/monitor my 
Internet use 
N/S
Agree
Indifferent/DK
Disagree
Strongly disagree
 
 
  Frequency Percent
Strongly disagree 77 44.3
Disagree 72 41.4
Indifferent/Don’t know 15 8.6
Agree 9 5.2
Agree strongly 0 0.0
Not stated 1 .6
Total 174 100.0
 
There was an even higher uniformity of response to the statement that ‘It is none 
of my business what measures the University takes to control or monitor my 
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Internet use’.  Whether they supported monitoring of use or not, 85.7% disagreed, 
or strongly disagreed, with this statement, indicating that they did consider it to be 
their business what measures the University took.   Only 5.2% of respondents 
agreed with the statement and none of them agreed strongly with it. 
 
Graph 6.7 
 
 
Q.14 If I were in charge of University computing facilities I would expect to have the right 
to block access to offensive (but legal) content 
N/S
Strongly agree
Agree
Indifferent/DK
Disagree
Strongly disagree
 
  Frequency Percent
Strongly disagree 29 16.7
Disagree 48 27.6
Indifferent/Don’t know 36 20.7
Agree 47 27.0
Strongly agree 13 7.5
Not stated 1 .6
Total 174 100.0
 
When the tables were turned and students were asked about their expectations if 
they were in charge of University computing facilities, 34% agreed, or strongly 
agreed, that they would expect to have the right to block access to offensive – but 
legal – web content.  However, a considerable proportion of respondents (20.7%) 
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were not sure (or possibly were indifferent) about what they thought about this, 
and the greatest proportion (44.3%) of students disagreed, or disagreed strongly, 
with this statement. 
 
Graph 6.8 
 
Q.15 If I were in charge of University computing facilities I would expect to have the right 
to block access to illegal content 
N/S
Strongly agree
Agree
Indifferent/DK
Disagree
Strongly disagree
 
  Frequency Percent
Strongly disagree 8 4.6
Disagree 18 10.3
Indifferent/Don’t know 17 9.8
Agree 98 56.3
Strongly agree 32 18.4
Not stated 1 .6
Total 174 100.0
 
If respondents were uncertain about whether they would expect to have the right to 
block offensive – but legal – content, there was much less uncertainty when it 
came to illegal content.  In this case, 74.7% of respondents agreed, or strongly 
agreed with the statement ‘If I were in charge of University computing facilities I 
would expect to have the right to block access to illegal content’.  Only 9.8% did 
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not know or were indifferent, and a total of 14.9% disagreed, or disagreed 
strongly, with the statement. 
 
Graph 6.9 
 
Q.16 If I were in charge of University computing facilities I would expect to have the right 
to monitor email content 
 
N/S
Strongly agree
Agree
Indifferent/DK
Disagree
Strongly disagree
 
  Frequency Percent
Strongly disagree 55 31.6
Disagree 66 37.9
Indifferent/Don’t know 25 14.4
Agree 20 11.5
Strongly agree 6 3.4
Not stated 2 1.1
Total 174 100.0
 
The reluctance to accept University monitoring of email content that respondents 
had expressed in Q.10 remained largely unchanged in the hypothetical scenario of 
their being responsible for University computing facilities.  69.5% of respondents 
disagreed, or disagreed strongly, with the statement ‘If I were in charge of 
University computing facilities I would expect to have the right to monitor email 
content’.  Only 14.9% agreed, or agreed strongly, with this statement.  It is clear 
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that the majority of respondents attached considerable importance to the privacy of 
their email correspondence, and did not accept a right on the part of the University 
to monitor this correspondence. 
 
Graph 6.10 
 
Q.17 The Government should have the right to monitor email / Web use in the interests of 
national defence and security 
N/S
Strongly agree
Agree
Indifferent/DK
Disagree
Strongly disagree
 
 Institution A Institution B Institution C All Institutions 
Strongly disagree 
 
4 (14.8%) 25 (19.4%) 5 (27.8%) 34 (19.5%) 
Disagree 
 
10 (37.0%) 11 (8.5%) 4 (22.2%) 25 (14.4%) 
Indifferent/ Don’t 
know 
8 (29.6%) 26 (20.2%) 3 (16.7%) 37 (21.3%) 
Agree 
 
3 (11.1%) 49 (38.0%) 5 (27.8%) 57 (32.8%) 
Strongly agree 
 
2 (7.4%) 16 (12.4%) 1 (5.6%) 19 (10.9%) 
Not stated 
 
0 (0.0%) 2 (1.6%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.1%) 
 
It should be noted that the fieldwork for this survey was carried out in the period 
from December 2001 to February 2002, only months after the terrorist attack in 
September 2001 on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the United States.  
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It also followed the implementation of legislation in the UK regulating the 
surveillance of electronic communications (RIPA145), the hurried enactment in 
December 2001 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act146 and attempts by 
the Home Office to impose greater retention and surveillance measures on 
communications data (see Chapter Three, pp.96-103).  The issue of government 
surveillance and interception of electronic communications was therefore 
receiving considerable media attention during this period. 
 
It can be seen from Graph 6.10 that a significant proportion of these students did 
agree, or agreed strongly, with the statement that ‘The Government should have 
the right to monitor email or Web use in the interests of national defence and 
security’.  Altogether 43.7% declared support for this statement, against 33.9% 
who disagreed or disagreed strongly.  However, there was also a considerable 
proportion (21.3%) that was undecided (or indifferent), and opinions did vary 
between the respondent groups.  Thus, for example, students in Institution B were 
more likely to agree or agree strongly with the statement (50.4%) than those at the 
other two institutions.  Those at Institution A were least likely to agree or strongly 
agree (18.5%).  Gender differences in response to this question were analysed but 
not found to be statistically significant. 
 
6.3.6 Other student comments 
 
Respondents were also given an opportunity to answer an open-ended question 
(Q.18) inviting them to make other comments about Internet use and access.  
Although most students did not take up this opportunity, the comments that were 
made tended to follow similar themes and can be categorised as follows: 
 
                                            
145 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.  Available at <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/ 
acts2000/20000023.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
 
146 <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm> [Last accessed 5/7/2004]. 
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• Students commented on the subjective nature of offensiveness and the 
difficulty of defining what is offensive; 
• A couple of respondents commented on the benefit to society of allowing 
freedom of thought and expression, and one noted that “It is for the greater 
good that the Internet be kept largely ungoverned and access should be 
full”; 
• Email should be afforded a high level of privacy / the same level of privacy 
as other forms of correspondence – comments of this nature were made by 
a number of respondents; 
• At Institution B, where students pay for network access in residential halls, 
a number of respondents commented on the cost of access, and complained 
about recent increases in this cost; 
• At the same Institution they commented that, if they are paying for access, 
there should not be any restrictions – one student felt this should also apply 
if they are using their own computer (“If your own PC is logging onto the 
University network, it is your own business”); 
• One respondent suggested that it was unrealistic to expect students to use 
the Internet only for specified purposes, as ‘people will always break the 
rules’. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
Although the limitations in size of the sample groups do not allow for the 
extrapolation of generalisable truths about UK students’ use and misuse of 
University computing facilities, this questionnaire study has contributed to the 
information and insights obtained in the institutional case studies.  It is clear that 
these students did make extensive use of University computer networks, and that 
this use was not generally confined to academic purposes.  Nor was it always 
restricted to legal purposes or those that respected the terms of use imposed by the 
individual Universities.  In particular, the results suggested that file-sharing 
activities, especially music piracy, was taking place on a large scale, leading to the 
potential for legal action to be taken against individuals or institutions.   
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The considerable efforts made at Institution B to develop and disseminate policy 
on Internet access and use appeared to have been successful in achieving a high 
level of policy awareness among these students.  However, it should be noted that 
this awareness did not appear to have impacted on levels of misuse of facilities: in 
fact, of the three respondent groups, students at this institution appeared to engage 
in higher levels of misuse than at the other institutions.  While this group may not 
have been representative of the institution as a whole, it can be deduced from these 
results that simple awareness of conditions of use and Acceptable Use Policies 
does not guarantee that students will respect these conditions.  At best, such 
policies provide the institution with a defence in the event of a legal challenge, 
whilst exerting a less damaging impact on academic freedom than measures such 
as the imposition of filtering software. 
 
With regard to students’ attitudes to filtering and monitoring, it was interesting to 
note the consistency with which all three groups of students differentiated between 
the monitoring of Web use and that of email use.  Although there was a fairly high 
level of tolerance of monitoring of Web use, and even of blocking of access to 
some Web content, it was clear that students expected to be afforded a high level 
of privacy in their email communications.  Even in the hypothetical situation of 
their being in charge of University computing facilities, they still generally did not 
expect to monitor email content.  There was a rather higher level of acceptance of 
the right of the Government to monitor email communication in the interests of 
national defence and security, but this might have been influenced by the emphasis 
on measures to combat terrorism imposed in the wake of the September 11 attacks 
in the US.   
 
The findings from the questionnaire study led to the identification of further 
research that could be carried out to extend and explore the work – this will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight of the thesis.  Prior to that, the appropriateness and any 
limitations that were identified in the methodology of this part of the work will be 
discussed in the next Chapter, as will the overall implications of the findings of the 
policy monitoring, case studies and questionnaire study. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter discusses the findings from the different components of the study, 
and their implications when considered as a whole in the context of the original 
research question.  Following an initial restatement of the research question, the 
findings are discussed and subsequently considered with reference to the policy 
process models introduced in Chapter One. In the course of the discussion, the 
contribution made to the theoretical and practical knowledge of the subject area is 
identified and the appropriateness of the methods adopted is considered.  Where 
deficiencies in the research design have been identified, these will also be 
discussed.  Consideration of the final conclusions from the study is reserved for 
the final chapter, Chapter Eight, as are suggestions for further areas of related 
research. 
 
7.2 Reconsidering the problem 
 
It has been recognised that policy formulation with regard to the Internet is a bi-
directional process, with regulation of the Internet being both affected by, and 
affecting, the context in which policy is implemented.  Appropriate policy 
measures to promote access to the Internet can bring about a more democratic and 
‘open’ space, just as restrictive approaches can constrain the choices available to 
citizens and limit their freedom of speech and access to information on the 
Internet.  The overall aim of this study was to explore a range of such policy 
measures intended to regulate access to Internet content, including those 
implemented at both the macro and the micro level, and to consider the potential 
impact they may exert on freedom of expression and freedom of access to 
information.  The erosion of the ‘public sphere’ as a forum for rational debate and 
decision-making identified by Habermas (1962; 1989), and a concern for the 
conditions that afford the promotion of ‘ideal speech’ were used to provide a 
theoretical rationale for the study of such an impact.  The use of a typology of 
 281
policy process models was adopted in order to explore and illuminate the factors 
and forces that are shaping policy formulation in this area.  A new policy process 
model was developed to further advance the theoretical and methodological tools 
available for the analysis of a range of areas of information policy.   
 
7.3 Discussion of policy approaches at macro and micro level 
 
Despite the inherently democratic architecture of the Internet and its resistance to 
conventional forms of governance, the findings of the policy monitoring and 
analysis at both macro and micro levels confirmed the viewpoint of those who 
have suggested that the Internet is, in fact, a closely regulated sphere, subject to a 
multi-tiered governance structure (as, for example, previously posited by Wall, 
1997; Wall, 1998; Akdeniz, 1997a; Walker, Wall and Akdeniz, 2000; Valauskas, 
1996).  A wide range of relevant measures were identified in the course of the 
policy monitoring and the case study research; moreover the breadth of scope and 
application of such measures appeared to be extending, a phenomenon that can be 
described as ‘policy creep’.  Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the findings 
suggested that in, their impact on information access, the restrictive perspective 
dominated over the distributive perspective in measures taken at both macro and 
micro levels.   
 
Over the period during which the study took place, the monitoring of EU and 
Council of Europe policy indicated that the issue of Internet content control 
occupied a high position on the European policy agenda.  This was particularly 
true with regard to the regulation of sexual content, and its access by minors147; 
however, there was also evidence of measures intended to extend the sphere of 
European regulation into the control of racist and extremist political content and 
the oversight of personal communications over the Internet (particularly in the 
wake of the events of 11th September 2001).   
 
                                            
147As Heins (2001) has noted, the European Parliament definition of “harmful content” relates 
directly to the protection of the morals of minors.   
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At the same time, EU and UK measures to control content were accompanied by 
those aiming to promote the growth of e-commerce.  This combination of content 
control and promotion of the Internet as a virtual marketplace, with the 
accompanying ‘skewing’ of discourse to favour an advertising and sales 
environment, provides a good example of the distortion of the ‘ideal speech’ 
situation.  This distortion contrasts sharply with the vision portrayed by the 
European Commission Legal Advisory Board (1997) in its response to the Green 
Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual and 
Information Services (European Commission 1996c), cited on page 71 of the 
thesis, which championed ‘the potential empowerment of users through increased 
transparency of government and availability of public sector information’. 
 
In a similar vein, the Council of Europe claims to be an organisation that has the 
protection and furtherance of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the very 
heart of its mission.  Articles Eight and Ten of the ECHR afford protection of the 
privacy of the individual and of the right to freedom of expression to citizens of 
member states.  Moreover, European Court of Human Rights’ rulings have 
highlighted the particularly high protection afforded to information and ideas 
expressed in the context of political debate, on the grounds that public debate ‘is at 
the very core of the concept of a democratic society’148, and the fact that this 
applies equally to ‘ideas that offend, shock or disturb’149.  Again, this is strongly 
supportive of the notion of the undistorted Habermasian public sphere.   
 
It was indeed evident from the case study analysing the development of the 
Guidelines on Public Access to and Freedom of Expression in Networked 
Information that concerns for the preservation of freedom of expression did exert 
an influence throughout this particular policy formulation process, as did a genuine 
                                            
148 Lingens v. Austria, judgement of 8 July 1986, Series A, No.103, 8 EHHR 103 (1986), para.42, 
cited in Gomiens (1996). 
 
149 Handyside v. United Kingdom, judgement of 7 December 1976, Series A, No. 24, 1 EHHR 737 
(1979-1980), para.49. 
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commitment to the promotion of the positive benefits and democratising potential 
of the Internet.  The commitment to freedom of expression was most apparent in 
the initial draft of the document, especially in the declaration that no end users of 
public access points should be prevented from accessing any legal content they 
choose on account of official or popular pressure to remove illegal, distasteful or 
harmful content.  However, although a commitment to freedom of expression was 
still apparent in the final document, in particular through the emphasis on end user 
control, it has to be noted that the original statement was considerably diluted by 
the time that the final draft was agreed, and that the vision of full and unrestricted 
public access to the Internet for all citizens, irrespective of age, no longer prevailed 
as a policy goal.  The difficulties inherent in reconciling a wide range of 
conflicting viewpoints and policy priorities on the part of the different actors 
involved ultimately inhibited the achievement of the original policy goals. 
 
Policy approaches at European level with regard to the regulation of Internet 
content were found to be closely mirrored by those adopted at national level in the 
UK.   Although measures had been taken in the UK to promote increased public 
access to the Internet in the interests of economic competitiveness and social 
inclusion, intensive media reporting of child pornography on the Internet, and of 
use of the Internet to commit criminal actions, had encouraged an increasingly 
restrictive and regulatory approach on the part of the government and a range of 
law enforcement agencies.  The claim made by Hill (1994, p.8) that in the UK 
‘Freedom of speech is a long-established and cherished freedom…and must be 
deemed to lie at the heart of our national information policy’ does not sit easily 
alongside the statement by the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, in 2000 that ‘the 
Internet cannot exist in an anarchistic free speech environment’ (cited on p.90 of 
the thesis).  Such a statement indicates that priorities seen as contributing towards 
the preservation of law and order were being afforded a higher place on the policy 
agenda than was accorded to ‘soft’ concerns such as freedom of expression.   
 
These divergent viewpoints are more than an issue of rhetoric or semantics: they 
are of crucial importance.  As Rowlands (1997) has pointed out, the manner in 
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which a problem is framed and defined by policy makers is crucial to the policy 
response that will be used to address it: 
 
If we see people sleeping on the streets as a problem of vagrancy, then the policy response 
may be framed in terms of law enforcement and policing.  We might also view the same 
issue as an indicator of social deprivation or a sign of failure in other policy areas such as 
community care; in which case, the policy response will obviously be very different (we 
might provide low cost housing, for example, or appropriate mental health care). 
(Ibid p.86) 
 
Thus, if the ‘problem’ of the Internet is perceived and defined as one of providing 
equality of access to the new informational environment, the response will be very 
different to a situation where the problem is seen as being one of the potential 
harm of ‘unacceptable’ content.  In the former case, the distributive perspective is 
likely to prevail; in the latter, the restrictive.   
 
As with the EU and the Council of Europe, the policy measure of choice to address 
this ‘problem’ at UK national level was that of voluntary self-regulation and the 
development of technical measures such as rating systems, albeit with an 
undercurrent of the threat of more repressive measures should this approach fail.  
However, from an initial emphasis on the control of child pornography, the sphere 
of regulation here had also extended to encompass defamatory content, copyright 
infringement and racist content.  Much attention had also been paid, both at 
European and at UK level, to provisions to facilitate the surveillance and 
interception of electronic communications, ostensibly in response to the events of 
September 2001, although evidence indicated that these measures were already 
being planned in advance of these events.  Moreover, such measures had been 
implemented with an apparent disregard for the normal judicial safeguards that 
have historically accompanied such measures in the offline environment. 
 
The case studies at the institutional level indicated that the issue of the regulation 
of Internet access, use and content was also high on the agenda of the three 
academic institutions that were studied, albeit in one case (Institution A) concerns 
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were addressed through the means of informal and ad-hoc measures.  This 
attention was driven by a multiplicity of forces, such as anxieties about potential 
legal action; institutional reputation; the provisions of the Janet AUP; bandwidth 
and network traffic costs; controlling the use of employee work time; the 
avoidance of employee and student harassment; and a general concern with the 
maintenance of a ‘decent’, moral environment.  However, although a token 
recognition of the importance of academic freedom was made in all three 
institutions, in only one (Institution B) did this concern appear to have been 
accorded a significant importance in the policy formulation process towards 
Internet regulation.   
 
As a basis for further discussion of the findings of the case studies, a Venn 
diagram can be used to illustrate those aspects of the findings related to policy 
formulation and implementation that were similar, and those that differed, in the 
different institutions (figure 7.1 overleaf). 
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Institution A Institution B 
Institution C 
Policy vacuum 
 
Ad-hoc decision-
making 
Reliance on technical 
measures 
 
Conflicting policies 
 
Centralised top-down 
approach 
Policy coherence 
 
Consultative policy 
development 
 
Emphasis on policy 
dissemination 
Lack of: 
-Transparency 
-Dissemination 
-Consultation 
Concern with 
reputation 
Power of technical 
& HR staff 
No consultation 
with students 
Fig.7.1: Features of the policy process at the case study sites 
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It can be seen from Fig. 7.1 that one of the features of policy-making that was 
common to all three institutions was a concern with the institution’s reputation, 
which acted as a powerful policy driver at all three sites. The fact that UK Higher 
Education Institutions are subject to the provisions of conflicting and as yet often 
untested legal provisions at national level, that all have implications for the 
regulation of Internet use (such as the Data Protection Act 1998; the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000; and the Human Rights Act 1998), had contributed 
to an atmosphere of uncertainty and potentially over-cautious regulatory 
approaches.  In particular, the case studies illustrated the potential for legislation to 
result in unintended outcomes that conflict with the original aims of the measure: 
as, for example, the citing at Institution C of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(Parliament, 1998a) as a justification to prohibit personal use of University email 
systems on the grounds that continuing to allow this use would remove the right of 
the Institution to monitor email use.  
 
It was also notable that none of the institutions had involved students in their 
policy formulation, although one had latterly recognised the need to address this in 
future policy development.  This failure to involve students in the policy process 
may well have contributed to the lack of policy compliance on their part that was 
revealed in the course of the questionnaire research.  A significant feature in all 
three institutions was the very strong role that technical staff were able to play 
both in the policy development and implementation stages: their command of the 
technical aspects of the ‘problem’, and of any potential solutions, gave them 
considerable power in determining which approaches were favoured, and in the 
subsequent ‘policing’ of policy adherence.  The ultimate result appeared to be a 
considerable shift in the power balance that operated between academic and 
technical support staff.  This aligns with Habermas’ view of the potentially 
distorting effect on rational debate incurred as a result of the words of ‘experts’ or 
‘technocrats’ who are able to manipulate discourse through their superior 
command of technical knowledge (Outhwaite, 1994, p.9).  
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The satisfaction derived from being able to adopt the role of ‘policeman’ and 
‘gatekeeper’ on the part of technical staff150 that was evidenced by some 
participants in the institutional case studies, has potentially worrying implications 
for the future defence of academic freedom in an electronic environment.  In 
particular, the implementation of filtering software at Institution C was shown to 
have exerted a major impact on the power balance operating between academic 
and technical staff.  Whereas at one time University librarians were all too often 
seen as the ‘gatekeepers’ to knowledge, with the power to impose access 
restrictions on books and journals, this perceived role appeared to be shifting in the 
direction of technical personnel.  This is a matter of concern with regard to the 
potential impact on academic freedom: although the power held by librarians was 
no doubt on occasion subject to abuse, it was at least held in the hands of a 
profession openly committed to freedom of expression and freedom of access to 
information (as described in Chapter One of this thesis), and professionally 
accountable to this ethic.    It seems clear from the case study findings that the 
overriding concern for technical staff was the integrity and security of the systems 
for which they have responsibility, and issues such as the preservation of academic 
freedom were accorded lesser importance by them. 
 
Furthermore, the findings of the case studies indicated that moves to engage in 
increasing amounts of electronic surveillance were perceived by academic staff as 
undermining the trust-based model of academic autonomy on which universities 
have operated in the past. The increase in the potential to undertake electronic 
surveillance was identified by academic personnel as representing an undesirable 
encroachment of a culture of managerialism.  Uncertainty of the extent of 
employer monitoring was found to be exerting a panoptic effect (Foucault, 1977) 
that led academics to ‘self-censor’ their communication and information-seeking 
activities. Such an internalisation of discipline within the individual 
(‘governmentality’: Dean, 1999) in the electronic environment has been discussed 
                                            
150 As illustrated, for example, by the comment made by the Network Team Leader at Institution C, 
that ‘just because we’re allowing you access doesn’t mean we’re not keeping an eye on you’ (cited 
on p.216) 
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by Mehta and Darier (1998) who describe the pressure that Internet users 
experience 
 
…to conform to the normalizing influences inherent in this deployment of electronic power.  
Although considerable resistance is evident, the fear of reprisals from “legitimate” 
authority and self-appointed Internet “police” shape the behavior of many. 
(Ibid, p.110) 
 
However, the findings with regard to student use of university computer network 
facilities also provided evidence of other changes to the definition of norms, values 
and morality in the electronic environment.  In the questionnaire study conducted 
as part of this project, 67.8% of all student respondents (including 77.5% of those 
at Institution B) reported engaging in software or music piracy.  Such results 
appear to be supported by the findings of Oppenheim and Robinson (2003), who 
cite a figure of 66% of students surveyed acknowledging participation in music 
file-sharing activities.  It is very unlikely that the same percentage would have 
been prepared to steal CDs or software packages from offline shopping outlets.   
 
There is potential here for further research into the change in attitude engendered 
by the electronic environment, in particular whether this altered ethical response to 
the issue of theft is a result of a perception of a decreased likelihood of being 
caught when stealing online; the fact that the theft does not involved tangible 
property in the form of a manufactured ‘artefact’; a belief that it is in the interests 
of the artists concerned to have the widest possible audience for their music; a 
retaliation against a perceived exploitation of consumers on the part of record 
companies or software houses; the ease with which theft can be carried out in the 
electronic environment; or, a combination of some or all of these151.    
 
The importance of the impact of organisational culture on policy decisions was 
very apparent in the findings of the case studies.  The top-down confidence-
lacking organisational cultures of Institutions A and C had led to a reliance on a 
cautious regulatory approach, whereas Institution B, with its stronger market 
                                            
151 Further discussion on these issues can be found in Oppenheim and Robinson (2003). 
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position and more established, mature, and consultative academic culture, was 
more confident in adopting a self-regulatory approach underpinned by carefully 
developed ethical policies.  However, it should also be noted that ultimately none 
of the institutions had succeeded in preventing misuse of their computer facilities 
as evidenced by the student questionnaire findings.  Indeed, the evidence from the 
questionnaire study indicated that it was in Institution B that the highest levels of 
misuse, including for illegal purposes, was taking place.  This was in spite of the 
fact that this was the Institution in which awareness of policies on computer 
misuse was also at the highest level.   
 
The results of the questionnaire study further suggest that it is wholly unrealistic – 
and probably counter-productive – for universities to adopt policies that disallow 
all personal use of university network facilities.  With a mean of 98.9% of students 
across the three institutions engaging in some form of personal use, policies stating 
that no such use is allowed will inevitably be seen as lacking in credibility.  
Rather, the results indicate that efforts to constrain non-academic use should be 
concentrated on those areas that represent the greatest potential legal liability for 
the institution.  This is particularly evident with regard to the widespread file-
sharing activity that was seen to be taking place.   
 
7.4 The use of policy models to explore the findings 
 
7.4.1 Lessig’s models of direct and indirect regulation 
 
The various forces that can bring about a regulatory impact on information flow 
have been illustrated by Lessig (1999) in his models of direct and indirect 
regulation, as shown on p.34 and p.35 of the thesis.  These forces comprise those 
of legislation, the market, social norms and architecture.   Of these modalities of 
constraint, Lessig (Ibid) argued that it is the modification of architecture (through 
code) that has the most crucial role to play in exerting democratic regulation of the 
Internet without prejudicing freedom of expression. Other critics have disagreed 
with this perspective.  For example, Hosein et al (2003) maintain that, whereas 
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code can be an effective regulatory mechanism, it also represents the interests of 
its developers and therefore is socially shaped.  More seriously, Internet regulation 
through architectural modification, such as age verification schemes or filtering 
software, has been open to charges of being subject to inaccuracy, lack of 
objectivity and ambiguous standards, while the ‘invisibility’ of solutions such as 
filters and their potential use for censorship renders them antithetical to free 
speech values (Harvard Law Review, 1999).    
 
This viewpoint is supported by the findings of the investigation into institutional 
measures to regulate Internet use: while the implementation of filtering software in 
Institution C did appear to have been more successful than ethical approaches in 
reducing levels of computer misuse, the interviews with academic staff in 
particular indicated that the negative impact of this measure on academic enquiry 
at the University had been significant.  The lack of transparency that accompanied 
this implementation, with a low level of awareness demonstrated by either staff or 
students of the fact that their Internet access was being filtered and a lack of 
information being made available about the basis for filtering decisions, also 
exerted a detrimental impact on academic freedom in the institution. Academic 
staff were powerless to challenge regulatory decisions on account of this lack of 
transparency, and also in some cases because they lacked the technical language 
that could have enabled them to engage in the debate about these decisions. 
 
With regard to the specific issue of the regulation of Internet content and access at 
the macro level, the combination of legal initiatives intended to bring about the 
adoption of an increased range of self-regulatory measures, the fostering of 
conditions favourable to the development of e-commerce, and the promotion of 
technical measures and educational initiatives designed to control Internet content 
and use espoused by the various bodies of the EU, the Council of Europe and the 
UK government, can more usefully be interpreted through the modified model of 
‘indirect’ regulation proposed by Lessig (1999, p.93; illustrated on 35 of the 
thesis).  However, such indirect regulation had also led to a lack of transparency 
and accountability.  Such a lack of accountability in the approach towards Internet 
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regulation of the EU was commented on in the Library Association Record 
(1998d): 
 
Because the approach to Internet regulation has been legislation-driven in the United 
States, and of course because the US has a constitution, the debate can at least happen in 
an ordered and accountable manner.  The danger with the European approach, according 
to civil liberties groups, is that it tends to be more covert. 
 
Certainly, this study has shown that the EU, the Council of Europe and the UK 
authorities have tended to favour a pragmatic approach based on an 
encouragement of self-regulatory approaches.  However, this approach has also 
been shown to have led to a lack of clarity in the legal position exerting a ‘chilling 
effect’ on ISPs, who are deterred from hosting controversial material, or material 
that could attract legal action (as is illustrated, for example, by the case of 
www.thinkofthechildren.co.uk described on page 92, or that of Godfrey v Demon, 
described on p.91).   
 
Collins and Murroni (1996, p.172) have also criticised a reliance on self-regulation 
through bodies such as the Internet Watch Foundation, on the grounds that ‘Self-
regulatory bodies are accountable not to citizens or consumers – even through the 
imperfect channel of Parliament – but only to the industry which has established 
them.’ This leads ultimately to the risk of a situation where only ‘acceptable’ 
voices are heard: and because of the lack of transparency and judicial process to 
review decisions to withhold access to content, citizens are not even aware of the 
restrictions imposed.  At the micro level the findings of the questionnaire study 
demonstrated clearly that even well-disseminated and communicated self-
regulatory measures are ineffective unless they have full ‘stakeholder’ acceptance 
and support through their participation in the formulation process.   
 
The development of the Council of Europe guidelines was a good example of a 
genuine attempt to devote attention to the policy consultation process, and had the 
potential of being an illustration of genuinely democratic policy formulation in 
practice.  It is unfortunate that a combination of delays, technical difficulties and 
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bureaucracy significantly reduced the value of the electronic consultation (which, 
ironically, in the process could have demonstrated the potential of the Internet to 
act as a forum for the public sphere envisaged by Habermas).  The process 
highlighted the huge difficulties involved in reconciling a wide range of 
viewpoints and divergent agendas in the democratic process, and the subsequent 
compromises that were reached to accommodate a plethora of different groups 
representing different interests.  The end result was a document that evidenced a 
dilution of the strength of commitment to the principle of freedom of expression 
from earlier drafts, in particular with regard to the emotive issue of principles of 
freedom of access for minors. 
 
Another serious issue that was revealed by this particular case study was the 
importance of paying sufficient attention to the dissemination and evaluation 
stages of the policy process.  Thus, despite the considerable amount of time and 
energy devoted to the consultation stage and to the subsequent careful 
reformulation and redrafting, the impact of the guidelines had been undermined, 
with the majority of public access providers unaware of their existence.  It would 
certainly not be realistic to suggest that the guidelines have had any significant 
impact on the practice of most information professionals, and there is little 
evidence of their having exerted any influence on policy-making by national 
governments.  A similar lack of attention to policy dissemination was seen at the 
organisational level in Institution C, where one respondent described how a new 
policy document ‘sat on the Intranet for a couple of months and somehow become 
policy by default…but doesn’t really get referred to’ (Chapter Five, p.206). 
 
7.4.2 The Re-Interpreted Policy Process: The Rational Actor, the 
Bureaucratic Imperative and the Garbage Can 
 
The inability to achieve a successful solution to the ‘problem’ of Internet 
regulation would suggest that claims that the Rational Actor model of policy 
making represents an unattainable ideal (Rowlands and Turner, 1997) are 
supported in this policy area.  The case study at Institution B indicated that the 
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policy-making process at this University was based on careful attempts to achieve 
rational and successful decision-making, with attention paid to consultation and 
evidence-gathering.  However, even so the inability of policy formulators to 
achieve perfect control over the policy context (the fast-changing technical 
environment and the non-compliance of students, in particular) inhibited the 
achievement of policy goals.  Evidence of a genuinely rational approach to policy 
formulation in this area was much less apparent at the other two case study sites. 
At the macro level, the multiplicity of competing agendas and priorities involved 
in formulating policy within the EU, the Council of Europe and the UK had also 
led to a subversion of the original policy goals. 
 
This distortion of policy goals due to the impact of different policy actors and 
stakeholders is more suggestive of the Bureaucratic Imperative model, and indeed 
many of the characteristics of this approach could be seen at both macro and micro 
level.  The diluted emphasis on the protection of freedom of expression in the final 
draft of the Council of Europe Guidelines as a result of the need to accommodate a 
wide range of divergent views is one such example. The powerful impact of 
organisational culture and departmentalism was particularly apparent at the micro 
level, especially in the rules-governed approaches taken to policy development at 
Institution C.  This approach had, arguably, led to a relatively successful attempt in 
Institution C to limit misuse by students of network facilities, as indicated by the 
findings of the questionnaire study: however, it also appeared to have seriously 
undermined the trust and goodwill between academic and managerial staff, as well 
as having exerted a negative effect on the freedom of academic enquiry. 
 
As could be anticipated, it was at the problem definition and agenda-setting stage 
of the policy process that features of the Garbage Can model could be seen most 
clearly.  The role of a wide range of policy drivers, including a media-generated 
moral panic, in putting the ‘problem’ of the Internet onto both the public policy 
agenda and the institutional agenda, was very apparent. Similarly, the ‘attachment’ 
to this problem of measures that arguably were the result of the policy priorities of 
individual policy actors can be described as a characteristic of Garbage Can 
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policymaking. Fisher’s interpretation of the implementation process of the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act is a good example: 
 
[ATCSA] has become a legislative portmanteau into which have been dumped many 
measures that have nothing to do with terrorism or with any emergency…The Bill appears 
to have been prompted by a government that wants to be seen to be ‘doing something’ 
about terrorism.   
(Fisher, 2002, p.16) 
 
This would seem to be a classic example of a ‘solution seeking a problem’ and 
certainly reflects the findings of the monitoring of the policy process at national 
level: a ‘solution’ that the UK government had already determined that they 
wished to implement, was – post-September 11 – ‘attached’ to the ‘war against 
terrorism’.   
 
Characteristic also of the garbage can model was the legislative confusion that 
surrounds the conflicting provisions of much of the recent UK legislation in this 
area, in particular between the data interception and retention provisions of RIPA 
2000 and ATCSA 2001, and the privacy provisions of the Data Protection Act 
1998 and the Human Rights Act (Parliament, 1998a).  The fragmentation of 
initiatives at both EU and Council of Europe levels, all emanating from different 
departments with a diversity of priorities, and the ‘skewing’ of outcomes to 
accommodate the agendas of the more powerful and/or vocal stakeholders, also 
provide a good illustration of the garbage can model in practice. 
 
At the organisational level, the findings from the case study in Institution A 
indicated a tendency for measures to be implemented on an ad-hoc basis in 
response to pressures for regulation from individual stakeholders (as shown, for 
example in the case of the sensitivities of technical staff).  The ability of technical 
staff at all three institutions to shape the issue definition and determine policy 
measures to address it, on account of their ‘expert’ knowledge, was also indicative 
of the garbage can model, as was the lack of consistency and coherence of 
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approaches to the regulation of Internet access and use and the lack of clear policy 
definition witnessed at the University College.  
 
7.4.3 Extending the policy process model 
 
The re-interpreted policy process model has thus proved useful as an analytical 
tool to identify and understand the characteristics and impact of features of the 
policymaking process at the different levels.  Insights gained from the use of this 
model were used to extend the model to further illuminate the characteristics of the 
policy processes that were identified in the course of the work, whilst continuing 
to take into account the features of the existing models.  Thus a new model, the 
reflexive spiral (figure 7.2), was designed.  This incorporates the impact of both 
the internal, organisational context and that of external forces and is intended to 
illustrate the bi-directional, continually evolving nature found to be characteristic 
of the policy process in a fast-changing technological environment.  In contrast to 
the staged, linear depiction of Lasswell’s original model, this model is based on 
the spiral concept of the Action Research cycle (Kember, 2000, p.26) to show that, 
since it represents an ongoing cycle of review and evaluation leading to the 
adoption of new policy goals and a repetition of the policy stages, each new cycle 
begins from a changed position with a revised problem definition.   
 
It should be noted that, although the model suggests smooth and continuous 
progress through the cycle, it is possible for policy makers to pay more attention to 
specific stages of the cycle.  In real life, it has to be recognised that they may even 
omit a stage or stages altogether (as was indeed shown to be the reality of policy 
making in the case studies described here, particularly with regard to the 
consultation, dissemination and evaluation stages).  In addition, while the policy 
process in some areas will be a continuous and evolving process, in other areas it 
will be a short term, finite process.  In this case, the process will draw to a 
conclusion at the end of the first (or subsequent) iteration of the cycle. 
 
 297
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXTERNAL CONTEXT 
 
 
(Architecture, Market, Norms, 
Legislation) 
 
Define 
Gather 
intelligence Identify 
Consult and 
 build consensus 
Draft policy 
Gain approval 
Implement 
and 
disseminate Evaluate and refine 
ORGANISATIONAL 
CONTEXT 
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This model shows policy as being shaped both within an organisational context 
(and therefore subject to the impact of factors such as organisational culture and 
individual policy actors) and by the impact of the external factors identified by 
Lessig (1999), that is architecture, social norms and values, market forces and 
legislative initiatives.   Although in the model policy formulation and 
implementation are shown to go through the normal identified rational policy 
stages of problem definition, intelligence gathering, consideration of alternatives, 
and so on, these are not portrayed as finite stages, and the spiral can continue its 
iteration until the issue is no longer defined as a problem in need of a solution.  
Moreover, each ‘cycle’ of the iteration will take into account any changes in the 
problem definition that result from the evaluation and refinement stage of the 
previous cycle.   
 
While this method of illustrating the policy process allows for the retention of the 
features of the rational actor, bureaucratic imperative and garbage can models, it is 
considered that it also offers new potential for recognising the problems inherent 
in formulating policy in a continually evolving environment.  It allows for the 
integration of the features of the Lessig models, thus providing a powerful means 
of illustrating the different forces that impact to exert regulation in the policy 
environment.  It is anticipated that the model could be used heuristically, both by 
researchers and by policy makers, to explore and define other areas of information 
policy.   By providing an ongoing mapping of policy stages and by encouraging a 
consideration of both the organisational factors and the external factors that shape 
the policy context and policy options, it is intended to offer an analytical tool that 
engages with the current realities of the policy-making arena.   
 
7.5 Appropriateness of methods adopted 
 
It is a salient point to note that, without the existence of the very object under 
study, that is, the Internet as a source of information, a significant part of the 
research could not have been undertaken.  As it was, the large amount of official 
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information made publicly available on the Internet by bodies such as the 
European Union, the Council of Europe, the UK government and a range of 
interest groups, brought the wide scope of the research within the realms of the 
manageable.  Even so, it should be acknowledged that the academic study of a 
fast-changing information policy area such as this does entail considerable 
difficulties, especially when the study is necessarily carried out over a 
considerable period of time.   
 
Involvement in the electronic consultation exercise staged by the Council of 
Europe illustrated the difficulties of research in which one does not have control 
over aspects such as the technical management of specific processes.  Thus, in this 
instance, the delays and technical problems experienced by the Council invalidated 
much of this exercise.  Although this insight into the workings of the Council did, 
in itself, represent a finding with regard to policy processes within the Council, it 
also inhibited the collection of more extensive data by the researcher.  Had it not 
been for the opportunity to participate in the Helsinki Conference, the research into 
the policy formulation process within the Council would have been rendered very 
difficult. 
 
With regard to methodology, the re-interpreted process model proved useful as an 
analytical tool that facilitated the identification of the many sources of complexity 
that were found to impact on the policy formulation process in this context.  The 
model was also useful in providing an overarching framework within which to 
study this complexity.  It afforded an enhanced theoretical understanding of 
information policy processes and ultimately led to the representation of the policy 
process via a new policy model with the potential this offers to provide theoretical 
insights for future academic information policy studies, as well as practical use for 
policy makers.  
 
The use of the re-interpreted process model as a heuristic technique to explore 
policy formulation at each of the institutional, national and supranational levels 
has not been a feature in earlier applications of the model; this study has 
highlighted its usefulness as an appropriate tool for multi-level policy research, as 
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well as adding to the body of academic knowledge on the information policy 
process.  This is of particular significance in the light of the limited frameworks 
and research tools currently available to inform the study of the information policy 
process (Turner, 1999).  The combination of the use of the re-interpreted policy 
process model with the use of the models of direct and indirect regulation offered 
by Lessig (1999) to illustrate the impact and role of specific regulatory forces on 
the policy environment acted as a powerful mechanism for the analysis of policy 
formulation.    
 
The consistency between the results found at the different levels of study 
(institutional, national and supranational), and in the different methodological 
components of the overall project (documentary analysis, participant observation, 
case study and questionnaire), suggests that the triangulation process has been 
useful to confirm the validity and reliability of the various findings.  In particular, 
the combination of documentary analysis of formal policy statements with 
interview and questionnaire interrogation of those implicated in, or affected by, the 
formulation and enactment of policy, was instrumental in highlighting the 
difference between espoused policy and policy in action. 
 
Turner (1999), among others, has noted the paucity of case studies that have been 
carried out in the information policy arena; it is anticipated that this study will 
contribute towards the existing limited stock of such research.  The case study 
approach generated an in-depth insight into the policy formulation approach at 
each of the institutions, and in particular was crucial in gaining an appreciation of 
the viewpoint and experience of policy actors with very divergent agendas.  This 
permitted a very real understanding of the multi-faceted and complex environment 
in which information policy is both formulated and implemented, particularly 
where sensitive and emotive issues such as pornography and freedom of 
expression are involved.  It should, however, be acknowledged that the bounded 
nature of the case study as a research strategy inevitably limits the findings to a 
‘snapshot in time’, as was the case here, rather than allowing for a longitudinal 
analysis of policy development over an extended period.   
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The use of semi-structured face-to-face interviews appeared to be an appropriate 
method, allowing a degree of consistency and adherence to the main research 
questions, whilst also allowing sufficient flexibility for interviewees to determine 
and develop the themes that they felt had been important in the policy process.  
The inductive and qualitative nature of the case study approach facilitated the 
intended emphasis and focus on the exploration of the policy process, and the 
impact of different forces and actors in shaping policy outcomes. Although it was 
never intended that the results of the case studies would afford a generalisable 
picture of policy formulation elsewhere, the use of the re-interpreted policy 
process model proved to be a robust interpretative tool with which to explore the 
implications of the findings.    
 
The questionnaire study added a new dimension to the findings through its 
exploration of the practical reality of student use of the Internet.  It should again be 
recognised that it is of limited valued in terms of generalisability, and some design 
shortcomings in the questionnaire instrument were identified in the course of 
carrying out the study.  There was also a greater disparity in the composition of the 
student groups at the different institutions than would have been the ideal, but it 
was considered that the benefits of the researcher herself administering the 
questionnaire in a classroom environment were sufficient to justify the limitations 
imposed by this method.  It also has to be acknowledged that piloting of the 
questionnaire instrument did not guarantee the prior identification of all potential 
analytical problems, as for example the ability to differentiate between an answer 
of ‘don’t know’ and ‘indifferent’ on the Likert scale for questions 8 to 17.  
However, it is considered that, despite these limitations, the questionnaire proved 
to be a valid and reliable means of gaining an insight into the reality of the use by 
these students of university computer networks, and their experiences of, and 
attitudes towards, measures taken to regulate this use.   
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This discussion of the study’s findings has suggested that the issue of regulating 
Internet content and use without risking an adverse impact on freedom of 
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expression and freedom of access to information was problematic at each of the 
levels studied.  It is clearly not an issue that can be resolved through simplistic 
solutions, whether these are self-regulatory in approach or intended to achieve 
regulation through the imposition of the technical regulation of systems 
architecture.    
 
The exploration of the policy process at the various levels indicated that the issue 
has occupied a high position on both public and institutional policy agendas, albeit 
with a changing focus of priority areas at the different levels and over time (e.g. on 
access by minors, or on the prevention of offence).  Although a commitment to the 
value of protecting freedom of expression was voiced at each level, there was little 
evidence of this being a driving force in shaping policy, which was ultimately 
subject to influence from multiple policy actors and agendas.   
 
The factors identified by Lessig (1999) as exerting regulation could all be seen to 
be involved in regulating Internet content and use, with legislation sometimes 
being used as an indirect means of influencing the other modalities of regulation.  
The use of the re-interpreted policy process highlighted the impossibility of 
achieving the ideal of totally rational policy formulation or implementation.  
Instead, it was found that organisational cultures and values, as well as the 
priorities of individual policy actors, were crucial in determining final policy 
outcomes. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Cyberspace has no intrinsic nature.  It is as it is designed…An extraordinary amount of 
control can be built into the environment that people know [in cyberspace].  What data 
can be collected, what anonymity is possible, what access is granted, what speech will be 
heard – all these are choices, not “facts”. 
(Lessig, 1999, pp.216-217) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This concluding chapter considers how the findings of the study contribute to the 
achievement of the research aims set out at the beginning, and outlines the 
conclusions reached in response to the overall research question.   It also suggests 
some recommendations for policy makers concerning the process of policy 
formulation, and identifies some possible areas for future research.   
 
8.2 Regulating the Internet: policy and practice 
 
The study explored the ‘problem’ of regulation of Internet content and use and the 
policy responses to this issue in a variety of settings, over a period of time and at a 
range of levels.  The research aimed to identify measures specifically intended to 
control and regulate access to illegal, ‘harmful’, ‘undesirable’ or ‘inappropriate’ 
content. The impact of such measures on intellectual freedom and freedom of 
expression were subject to particular examination during the course of the study.  
The following paragraphs summarise the principle substantive conclusions to the 
research. 
 
1. The assertion that information policy formulation tends to be piecemeal, 
erratic and reactive to specific issues and lobbying by powerful 
stakeholders (Browne, 1997a) is supported by the findings of this study, 
both at the macro and at the micro level.  The wide range of interested 
parties, policy actors and vested interests that were identified in the course 
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of the research could be seen to be impacting on policy in such a way that 
rational policy formulation was inhibited and policy goals were subverted. 
2.  In the course of exploring this specific aspect of information policy, the 
study indicated that regulation of the Internet is a problematic area for 
national governments and institutional organisations due to factors such as 
its inherently ‘resistant’ architectural structure, its transborder reach and 
the demands of conflicting legislative provisions.   
3. Evidence did not support the notion that technical architecture can 
satisfactorily resolve the problem of reconciling content regulation with the 
protection of freedom of expression. Potential technical solutions have not 
yet been shown to be sufficiently robust and flexible to address the matter.   
4. The policy measure of choice at all levels has tended to favour a self-
regulatory approach, in some instances supported by other measures such 
as educational initiatives. 
5. Nevertheless, the vision of Berners-Lee of the Web as ‘a global space 
where people could share information, ideas and goods, unfettered by any 
central body’ (Woolnough, 2001, cited on page 11 of the thesis) was not 
found to represent an accurate portrayal of the reality: on the contrary, it 
was demonstrated that the Internet, and within it the World Wide Web, is a 
closely regulated environment, subject to a multi-tiered governance 
structure.  Indeed, the scope and impact of such regulatory measures 
appeared to be increasing at each of the levels investigated.  
6. At the macro level, in particular, changes in policy emphases were 
identified, moving away from a focus on increasing access to network 
infrastructure and services, towards a focus on the prevention and detection 
of crime and terrorism.  This had resulted in a significant shift away from a 
distributive perspective in favour of a more restrictive approach. 
7. The findings indicate that no single policy measure has been successful in 
preventing the misuse of computer networks without simultaneously 
engendering a negative impact on freedom of expression or freedom of 
access to information. 
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8.2.1 Policy and practice – macro level approaches 
 
At the transnational level, the European Union was seen to be involved in 
developing and implementing a number of initiatives with control of the use of the 
Internet at their centre.  However, the longitudinal monitoring of EU policy 
revealed a continually changing cycle of shifts in emphases from initial measures 
aiming to develop the European network infrastructure and promote universal 
access to the Internet, moving towards a concentration on content regulation and 
the prevention of ‘harm’ to minors.  The scope of content regulation has also been 
allowed to ‘creep up’ to include content areas such as violence and xenophobia.  
As the media focus on the Internet subsided and the subsequent moral panic 
lessened, a light-handed approach, based on self-regulation and aimed at 
producing a favourable environment for the encouragement of e-commerce, did 
appear to be emerging.  However, the ‘war on terrorism’ declared by Western 
governments post-September 2001 has since led to increasingly restrictive 
measures on the part of the EU, particularly with regard to the monitoring and 
interception of Internet use and electronic communications. 
 
At the national level, similar shifts in emphasis were seen in United Kingdom 
national approaches to the regulation of Internet content and use, from a 
perspective driven primarily by the demands of economic growth and 
competitiveness to one with a focus on security and the prevention of crime and 
terrorism.  As with the EU the scope of content regulation in the UK has expanded 
to include that of defamatory, criminally racist and adult obscene content.  
Uncertainty over issues of legal liability has tended to encourage a cautious and 
restrictive approach with regard to the removal of Internet content on the part of 
ISPs in the UK.  In addition, UK ISPs have been subject to extensive data 
retention, monitoring and interception legislative requirements. 
 
At the level of a specific mission-driven policy body, the Council of Europe was 
shown to have freedom of expression as one of its founding priorities, and the 
safeguarding of this human right as being at the core of its mission.  Nevertheless, 
with regard to the regulation of Internet content, this core value has come into 
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conflict with competing pressures to take action against ‘undesirable’ content, in 
particular pornographic material and content promoting violence and hate speech.  
Although the Council claims to afford the highest importance to the guarantee of 
freedom of expression (see, for example, Council of Europe, 1997f), the case study 
on the drafting and approval process for the Guidelines on public access to and 
freedom of expression in networked information demonstrated the dilution of this 
commitment in response to the pressure of alternative viewpoints expressed in the 
course of the consultation process.  In particular, the right of minors to unfiltered 
public access to the Internet was significantly undermined in the course of the 
policy formulation process.   
 
The research also indicated an extension of the realm of regulation with which the 
Council of Europe has concerned itself in regard to the Internet, with the 
Convention on Cybercrime representing involvement in a very broad area of crime 
prevention and control that would at one time have been considered as being 
outside the remit of the Council.  It is perhaps surprising to find that an 
organisation with such a public commitment to human rights should produce ‘the 
most far-reaching, comprehensive attempt to control communication over the 
Internet to date’ (Castells, 2001, p.178; also cited on p.150 of this thesis).   
 
At each of these levels a number of common features were apparent.  The 
preferred measure of control at each of them has been that of voluntary self-
regulation, together with support for the development of more sophisticated 
technological solutions.  In this respect, a significant degree of coherence was 
found between the different bodies.  However, it should also be noted that other 
legislative initiatives in force in the different arenas tended towards a different 
agenda or the favouring of different policy priorities (such as privacy and data 
protection), which in turn caused significant levels of policy confusion and 
uncertainty. 
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8.2.2 Policy and practice – micro level approaches  
 
At the organisational level, actual and potential misuse of university computer 
networks was found to be a serious concern for UK Higher Education Institutions.  
As well as abiding by the provisions of the Janet AUP, such institutions are subject 
to a wide range of legislative measures that impact on their approaches to the 
control of the use of their computer facilities.  In addition, at the institutions 
investigated by this study there was a demonstrable concern with the potential 
harm to institutional reputation, and to the work output of employees, that may 
result from misuse of their computer networks. 
 
Within the institutions there was generally a low level of awareness among both 
academic staff and students of policy measures that were intended to regulate 
Internet content and use, although such awareness was more widespread in 
Institution B, which devoted considerable time and attention to policy promotion 
and dissemination.  In all three institutions examples of serious misuse of 
computer networks were found to be taking place.  Furthermore, whatever policy 
measures had been chosen to regulate Internet content and use in each of the 
institutions, and despite rhetoric supporting the principle of academic freedom, 
examples were found in each institution that indicated that academic enquiry was 
being inhibited as a result of such policy measures.  In addition, these measures 
were found to be exerting a negative force on the trust-based relationship that had 
existed previously between academic and administrative personnel at the 
institutions.   
 
8.3 Theoretical and methodological conclusions 
 
The study has demonstrated that it is possible to use analytical tools such as policy 
models to gain a better understanding of the complex interaction of human, 
organisational and contextual factors that shape information policy formulation in 
a specific area.  It has also shown how these same factors can act to impede policy 
implementation and the successful achievement of policy outcomes.  The use of 
policy process models to simplify and explain the complexity of the environment 
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in which policy intended to regulate Internet access and use is formulated and 
implemented was found to be a useful and flexible heuristic technique.   
 
Lessig’s model illustrating the forces that can exert regulation on information flow 
has been shown to be applicable to, and illustrative of, the regulation of Internet 
content and use, particularly at the macro level.  While the findings of the study do 
not support Lessig’s premise of the supremacy of code as offering the highest 
potential level of protection to freedom in the electronic environment, his models 
have been shown to be relevant and of value in identifying the various forces that 
are exerted to restrict such freedom.  His model of indirect regulation (see p.35), 
for example, has facilitated a better understanding of how, at the macro level, 
legislation can be used to manipulate a range of regulatory forces on information 
flow.  It is particularly useful in alerting us to the potential dangers of a model of 
policy formulation and implementation lacking in transparency and accountability.   
 
The re-interpreted policy process model (Rowlands and Turner, 1997), illustrated 
by the Rational Actor, the Bureaucratic Imperative and the Garbage Can models of 
policy formulation, has allowed for a critical analysis of the many varied and 
complex factors and policy actors involved in shaping policy towards Internet 
regulation, particularly at the organisational level.  It has proved to be a useful tool 
for analysing a complex policy environment, and understanding the crucial impact 
of organisational factors on policy outcomes.  Whilst characteristics of all three of 
these models of policy formulation and implementation were seen to exist in the 
institutions studied, the impact of bureaucratic expediency and the multitude of 
competing agendas found to be acting on policy formulation rendered the 
Bureaucratic Imperative and the Garbage Can processes as being the most useful 
models to illustrate the reality of this particular area of policy-making.   
 
The use of this policy process model also facilitated the development of a new 
policy process model that can be used in the information policy field to illustrate 
and enhance the dynamic, evolving and bi-directional nature of policy formulation 
in an era of rapid technological development.   
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The results suggest that a policy approach that utilises a range of strategies 
incorporating legislative measures in specific domains, market control, self-
regulatory practices and facilitating technologies is predominant with regard to the 
regulation of Internet content and access, and that this multiplicity of approaches is 
engendering a multi-tiered governance of the Internet both at the micro and at the 
macro level.  In this highly regulated environment, it is crucial that policy 
measures should stress the benefits of the Internet as a medium rather than focus 
solely on suggested negative aspects, if the Internet is to fulfil its democratising 
potential to promote rational debate and recreate the public sphere. 
 
8.4 Recommendations for policy makers 
 
Given the importance of a consideration of specific social, cultural, technical and 
organisational contexts, combined with the accelerated rate of technological and 
social change in this policy area, it would be unwise to target any specific policy 
solutions as offering a panacea to the ‘problem’ of regulating Internet content.   
Instead, this section highlights some policy process issues that were identified in 
the course of the research as being crucial to the achievement of successful policy 
outcomes.  Although a number of these may seem to amount to little more than 
common sense (and indeed could be seen as pivotal to the ‘rational actor’ model), 
the research revealed multiple instances of their being overlooked in practice.   
 
Thus, in formulating policy, it is recommended that particular attention be given 
to: 
 
1. Wide consultation with all relevant stakeholders in order to gain ultimate 
acceptance of chosen policy measures; 
2. Evidence-gathering in order to ensure that policy solutions are based on an 
understanding of the real nature of the problem; 
3. Dissemination and promotion of policy measures in order to achieve 
effective implementation and compliance with policy measures; 
4. Flexibility and consideration of a wide range of alternative policy 
solutions rather than the hasty adoption of a seemingly expedient solution; 
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5. Continual re-evaluation of the nature of the problem and the effectiveness 
of policy measures – this is particularly important in an area such as that 
under consideration in this study, if technological, social and legal changes 
are to be accommodated; 
6. Time frame – if all stages of the policy process are to be given adequate 
attention, it is essential to allow a realistic time-frame for the decision-
making process; 
7. Transparency in the decision-making process – this was notably lacking at 
two of the academic case study sites, leading to a lack of trust between 
policy-makers and stakeholders and ultimately, a rejection of policy 
solutions; 
8. The role of values in the policy process, ensuring that the chosen policy 
measure is a true reflection of, and does not run counter to, intended 
underpinning values.  
 
An example of the result of neglect of the latter principle could be seen in the case 
study of the drafting of the Council of Europe Guidelines, during which process 
the intended emphasis on freedom of expression was allowed to be subverted by 
other policy actors and influences.   
 
 
8.5 Some areas for further research 
 
From a methodological viewpoint, it has been concluded that the re-interpreted 
process model offers information policy researchers a valuable analytical tool with 
which to gain a better theoretical understanding of information policy processes at 
a range of levels.   While it is believed that this study offers a significant 
contribution towards the development of a body of case studies exploring the 
formulation, implementation and evaluation of information policies at 
organisational, national and supra-national levels to fill the gap identified by 
Rowlands and Turner (1997), there remains a need for further such case studies.  
This has been shown to be particularly true in areas relating to ethical approaches 
to information use, for example with regard to attitudes towards the control of 
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filesharing and copyright infringement in the online environment.  The application 
of the reinterpreted policy process model to such research could offer a powerful 
means of exploring the data obtained from such studies.  In addition, such studies 
could provide an opportunity for testing the application of the reflexive spiral 
model to a wide range of areas of information policy formation. 
 
It is recognised that the current study was limited in terms of the settings studied 
and it would be beneficial to extend the research into other case study sites, both 
within the UK and beyond.  It would also be of potential value to follow up the 
institutional case studies with further research at the same sites to see how policy 
has changed in response to recent developments in technology, legislation and case 
law. Given the dynamic and ever-changing nature of policy and of technological 
developments with regard to the Internet, further longitudinal monitoring of policy 
at macro level could also prove to be useful and insightful.   
 
The richness of the data obtained from the relatively limited sample of students 
surveyed with regard to their use of university computer network facilities, and 
their attitudes towards such use, suggests that it would be useful to extend the 
study across a much larger sample.  In particular, the need for further objective 
research on the impact of music filesharing activity on music purchasing patterns 
has already been highlighted by Oppenheim and Robinson (2003).  The current 
study supports the potential for such work, and suggests that the approach of using 
an anonymous questionnaire administered in a classroom setting offers a reliable 
means of data collection where relatively sensitive issues relating to illegal use of 
computer facilities are concerned. This would allow a better understanding of the 
reality of such use and its implications for policy and practice towards network 
regulation.   
  
8.6 Conclusion 
 
The distortion of public debate suggested by Habermas has been shown in the 
context of this study to be analogous to the impact of measures implemented to 
regulate access to Internet content.  This is true not only as a result of the distorting 
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impact of governmental and organisational measures specifically aimed at exerting 
a regulatory impact on the Internet, but also as a result of such varied forces as use 
of the Web by multinational corporations to advertise and sell their products; the 
increased power of technocrats and Internet ‘experts’ to exert ‘technological 
bamboozlement’ (see p.217); and the ability of the mass media to construct a 
moral panic around the whole issue of Internet content.   The condition of ‘ideal 
speech’ within the institutions studied was also shown as being inhibited by 
practical barriers such as inadequate technical infrastructures and a lack of user 
training and support.  The concept of the Internet as a ‘a contested terrain’ 
(Castells, 2001, p.171) appears to be an accurate representation of a regulatory 
environment in which wide-ranging measures were found to apply to the control of 
Internet use and content.  This was found to be true at each of the policy levels that 
were studied. 
 
The findings of the study suggest that there is no perfect solution to the issues 
raised by the potential for misuse of computer networks, at either the macro or the 
micro level: even where policy had been formulated with considerable care and 
consultation, it was demonstrated that on the one hand misuse was still taking 
place, and on the other hand that there had been a negative impact on freedom of 
expression and freedom of access to information.  This is consistent with the 
argument put forward by Mehta and Darier (1998) that electronic communication 
networks offer the potential for increased control, but also for increased resistance, 
and with the claims of Foucault (1977) that even the most sophisticated 
mechanisms of control can and will be resisted.   
 
The study would tend to suggest that a flexible, constantly evolving, multi-tiered 
approach is required, and that measures taken should be subject to a critical 
approach with regard to their potential impact on freedom of expression and on 
freedom of access to information.  In particular, close attention should be paid to 
the potential ‘skewing’ of policy towards the more closely regulated approach and 
strengthening of restrictions that may be the result of relocating the power balance 
towards those with expert technical knowledge.  It is also imperative that concerns 
with issues such as the protection of institutional reputations and the avoidance of 
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potential legal action are not allowed to lead to an over-zealous approach towards 
Internet regulation.  This is of critical importance to any information professional 
who supports the concept of freedom of expression as being at the heart of the 
profession and as representing the most fundamental guarantor of the preservation 
of democratic civilisation. While a comparison of the notion of the public sphere 
as a forum for the rational debate of public policy with the democratising potential 
of the Internet has been made, it is clear from the findings of this study that this 
potential was not being fully realised in the context under investigation. 
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